OR: Just asking for ID wasn’t a “stop” without more

On its third review of this case, having gone up twice, the court concludes that asking for defendant’s ID under the circumstances here was not a “stop” that required reasonable suspicion or probable cause when compared with other cases. All the cases cited by the court had more facts adding up to a “stop.” State v. Canfield, 2014 Ore. App. LEXIS 1363 (October 8, 2014). And, this is something I just can’t buy. A person cannot just ignore a request for production of an ID without risking arrest (or these days getting shot), and, once it’s produced, you’re not free to leave until it’s handed back (compare Mendenhall (except there the defendant was moved to a different location) and Place (seizure of suitcase of a traveler was seizure of the person)). Anyway, from the case at hand:

The question before us on remand is whether defendant was unlawfully stopped. The parties acknowledge that, in these circumstances, the officer who approached defendant had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to justify a stop. Thus, the sole question is whether defendant was, in fact, “stopped” for purposes of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution at the time he consented to the search of his person. As the court indicated in State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 410, 813 P2d 28 (1991), police are “free to approach persons on the street or in public places, seek their cooperation or assistance, request or impart information, or question them without being called upon to articulate a certain level of suspicion in justification if a particular encounter proves fruitful.” See also State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 71, ___ P3d ___ (2014) (Police may engage in conversation with a person and request the person’s consent to search without stopping the person under Article I, section 9.).

. . .

In the present case, unlike in Anderson, there was no indication at the time the officer spoke to defendant that the officer was investigating any crime. And unlike in Highley, there was no indication that the officer was investigating a potential probation violation. Additionally, there was no retention of identification as in Painter, 296 Or at 425, there were no statements by the officer that defendant would only be free to leave after the officer had cleared things up, as in Warner, 284 Or at 150, and there was no pending warrant check underway, as in Hall, 339 Or at 19. Finally, there is nothing in the record here that would indicate that the officer’s demeanor or manner or tone in questioning defendant was coercive. See Backstrand, 354 Or at 404-05. In short, there is nothing in the record that would indicate that the officer “intentionally and significantly restricted, interfered with, or otherwise deprived the individual of his or her liberty or freedom of movement.” Id. at 399.