RI: Arrest outside territorial jurisdiction not Fourth Amendment violation

Defendant was wanted for a robbery, and Pawtucket officers were looking for him, not in hot pursuit. They arrested him in Providence outside their jurisdiction, but the arrest is not suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Morris, 2014 R.I. LEXIS 69 (May 28, 2014):

Here, there is no question that defendant’s arrest, although extra-jurisdictional, involves only a violation of state law and not of defendant’s constitutional rights. As a general matter, “the lawfulness of a state arrest by state police is governed by state law so long as that law is not inconsistent with federal constitutional standards.” State v. Berker, 120 R.I. 849, 855, 391 A.2d 107, 111 (1978). This Court has further concluded that a warrantless arrest made under our state statutes is “constitutionally sound *** to the extent that it meets the requirement of probable cause[.]” Id. at 856, 391 A.2d at 111; cf. Ryan, 731 F.3d at 70 (noting that Moore “implies that an extraterritorial arrest is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment”). Our primary concern here is, therefore, with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for an arrest, based on probable cause, that was made outside the territorial jurisdiction of the arresting officer. We hold, in conjunction with the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit, that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained after defendant’s arrest outside of the Pawtucket detectives’ jurisdiction.

Although the arrest here was in excess of the officers’ jurisdiction, the Fourth Amendment does not impose some hypothetical ideal of a law enforcement officer’s conduct, but rather is concerned with whether the officer’s conduct was “reasonable” under the circumstances. See State v. Taveras, 39 A.3d 638, 648 (R.I. 2012) (“The lynchpin of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness.”); see also State v. Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 351, 352, 353, 230 A.2d 831, 835, 836 (1967) (stating that “standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application” and that a court “should measure the totality of circumstances against the constitutional standard of reasonableness” and be mindful of the fact that “a law enforcement officer *** must act on a quick appraisal of the facts before him without the benefit of the hindsight which is usually possessed by those reviewing his actions”). This Court has stated that the exercise of our supervisory power to interpret and apply the exclusionary rule “should be exercised with great restraint after balancing carefully the societal interests involved.” State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I. 1990). We are of the opinion that the detectives’ actions in the case at bar do not constitute egregious conduct in excess of their jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conclude that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply here to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of defendant’s unauthorized arrest.