Protective sweep was unjustified and happened prior to arrest or any circumstances that could justify it, and, frankly, was only “half-heartedly” argued by the state. State v. Trudelle, 2007 NMCA 66, 142 N.M. 18, 162 P.3d 173 (2007), cert. granted 141 N.M. 763, 161
P.3d 260 (2007), cert. granted 2007 N.M. LEXIS 661 (2007), cert. quashed 2008 N.M. LEXIS 79 (2008):
[*22] The State half-heartedly asserts that the arrest of Mrs. Trudelle “could arguably support a protective sweep of the premises.” This argument fails for three reasons. First, the record appears to show that the officers conducted the protective sweep prior to arresting Mrs. Trudelle. We have previously held that a protective sweep is “uncalled for” where the sweep takes place before the police decide to place a suspect under arrest. Id. Second, the fact that the officers left Defendants unrestrained and allowed Mrs. Trudelle to re-enter the house unaccompanied suggests that the officers did not fear for their safety, at least with respect to Defendants or others who may have remained inside of the house. See id. at 440-41, 806 P.2d at 580-81 (finding that officers did not reasonably fear danger where suspect was left unrestrained and was allowed to re-enter house). Finally, the officers arrested Mrs. Trudelle pursuant to an unrelated, outstanding warrant that the officers happened to discover during or following the protective sweep. Therefore, the arrest of Mrs. Trudelle bears no relation to the protective sweep and cannot be used to justify it.
. . .
[*25] Nevertheless, the State argues that the evidence suggesting the existence of a meth lab on the property, combined with Mrs. Trudelle’s arrest and Mr. Trudelle’s desire to retrieve his dog from the house, justified the protective sweep. This argument is without merit. First, as we have previously stated, Mrs. Trudelle’s arrest was of no consequence with regard to the protective sweep. Second, the record shows that Mr. Trudelle decided to retrieve his dog only after the officers told him that they were going to conduct the sweep with or without his consent. Even if we were to assume that Mr. Trudelle’s entry constituted some type of exigency, that exigency would have been of the officers’ own making and thus cannot be used to justify the sweep. See State v. Wagoner, 1998 NMCA 124, P 13, 126 N.M. 9, 966 P.2d 176 [hereinafter Wagoner I] (“[T]he exigency should not be one improperly created by law enforcement officers.”), overruled on other grounds by Wagoner II, 2001 NMCA 14, P 40.
Probation search walk through did not require reasonable suspicion, and they are not limited to interpersonal contact with the probationer. United States v. LeBlanc, 490 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2007).
Police responded to a domestic dispute including a beating that was called in by a neighbor, and it could not be determined whether the person being beaten and screaming on the other end was a woman or a child. Exigent circumstances were apparent from the call. Richards v. State, 286 Ga. App. 580, 649 S.E.2d 747 (2007).*
30 second delay of sitting at a light that changed is reasonable suspicion to stop. The court had previously held that 8-10 seconds was not, but this was considerably longer. State v. Barnard, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1307 (June 19, 2007).*
Arrest of the wrong man with the same name but at different address as the person named in an arrest warrant was without probable cause where there were no identifiers like the arrestee’s social security or driver’s license number which were available but not provided. Lucas v. Galloway Township Police Department, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44616 (D. N.J. June 20, 2007):
Instead, Officer Welsh took affirmative steps to change the object of the warrant to Jason J. Lucas, and that act is something considerably more than simply executing a judicially authorized warrant. The Supreme Court has stated that [*23] “if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [probable cause], immunity should be recognized.” Schneider, A.2d at 360 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). However, our Constitution does not permit an officer to serve a warrant providing nothing more than a name and address on anyone matching that name; such is beyond the bounds of reasonable belief and is impermissible. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (holding particularity requirement of Fourth Amendment “makes general searches under [warrants] impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what [or who] is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” (emphasis added)). No undue burden is placed on New Jersey’s municipal police departments in requiring that officers executing warrants be left with no discretion on whom to serve them. While mistakes will invariably happen, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that mistakes will only be made after proper diligence and regard for our notions of liberty and justice is accorded. Thus, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the facts alleged make out a constitutional violation.
