GA: Supervisor didn’t plan DUI roadblock, so it was unconstitutional

The roadblock in this case was set up for valid DUI interdiction purposes and not general crime control. However, there was no supervisory planning as to where it was placed and operated, and that made it unconstitutional. Brown v. State, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 862 (October 21, 2013), rev’g State v. Brown, 315 Ga. App. 154, 726 S.E.2d 654 (2012):

As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervisory personnel” requirement for implementing a specific checkpoint, see LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253 (497 SE2d 367) (1998), and the distinct requirement that a law enforcement agency’s checkpoint program have an appropriate primary purpose other than the general interest in crime control, which requires review at the “programmatic level” and may involve evidence relating to agency policy and practice and policy-makers other than the supervisor who decided to implement the particular checkpoint at issue, see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (121 SCt 447, 148 LE2d 333) (2000). There is no dispute in this case that the Cobb County Police Department’s traffic safety checkpoint policy satisfies the Edmond requirement, and we adhere to LaFontaine’s holding that the decision to implement a particular checkpoint may be made by any authorized supervisor.

However, Appellant’s fallback argument – that LaFontaine’s “supervisory personnel” requirement was not satisfied in this case, rendering the checkpoint at which he was stopped unconstitutional – has merit. As the dissent below correctly recognized, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the police sergeant decided to implement the roadblock as a supervisor in advance or as an officer in the field. See Brown, 315 Ga. App. at 161 (Mikell, P.J., dissenting). And as the dissent correctly concluded, the trial court’s factual determination that the sergeant made the decision while acting as a field officer rather than in advance as a supervisor was supported by some evidence and therefore was not clearly erroneous, and the trial court’s suppression order should have been affirmed on this basis. See id. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

Also Williams v. State, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 878 (October 21, 2013).