N.D.Ga.: Use of flashbang device for drugs and weapons search not unreasonable

Using flashbang devices during a search for weapons and drugs was not unreasonable. Even if it was, it doesn’t require suppression because it deals with the manner of entry, not whether it should have occurred. United States v. Honeycutt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147705 (N.D. Ga. March 29, 2013):

With respect to the agents’ use of a flash bang device as a diversionary tactic in entering Defendants’ residence, it is hard to say the agents acted unreasonably given that they were there to effectuate two arrest warrants on individuals for drug and weapons charges; they had information that there were weapons, including a rifle and handguns in the residence; and they had no information that children were in the house at all, much less sleeping in the living room where the flash bang was thrown.

Moreover, even if the agents acted unreasonably by throwing a flash bang device into the living room, suppression of evidence later seized from the residence is not necessary. Defendants have not pointed to authority, nor has the undersigned found any, that suppression of evidence seized from a house where agents gained entry while using a flash bang device is required, even where its use is considered to be excessive force. See United States v. Zamora, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40775, at *50-51 n. 19 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2005) (discussing the lack of Eleventh Circuit authority for the proposition that suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for an alleged excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment). In United States v. Morris, 349 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit considered, and rejected, an argument similar to Defendants’ concerning the use of flash bang devices. There the defendant argued “that the use of [a] flash-bang device was unreasonable and that his inculpatory statements and the two guns should have been suppressed as fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 1012. The court acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit “has often emphasized the dangerous nature of flash-bang devices and has cautioned that the use of such devices in close proximity to suspects may not be reasonable.” Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 2000)). However, the court further explained that the “exclusion of evidence under the Fourth Amendment requires more than unreasonable police behavior: ‘the exclusionary rule depends on causation.’ ” Id. (quoting Jones, 214 F.3d at 838). The court found that suppression of the evidence was not required “because Morris cannot show that the use of the flash-bang device caused the discovery of the guns or his inculpatory statements.” Id. at 1013. The court noted testimony similar to that in this case, i.e., “Morris’s statements at the house were made in a ‘chatty manner and were freely given,” and “there was nothing about Morris’s manner or speech that suggested he was confused or disoriented.” Id. Likewise, in Jones, the officers broke down a door with a battering ram and tossed a flash-bang device into the living room, but the court found that the defendant’s statement, made 30 minutes after the allegedly unreasonable entry, was not caused by the entry where he “did not contend that 30 minutes after the entry he was still so disoriented by the explosion that the statement was involuntary.” 214 F.3d at 837-38.