D.Utah: Co-conspirator claiming duty to keep car secure still did not have standing

Co-conspirator told to drive somebody else’s car with drugs in it who had a duty to keep the car secure still did not have standing. United States v. Santos, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143489 (D. Utah October 3, 2013):

Mr. Santos nevertheless testified that Mr. Ocegueda authorized him to possess the Ford Focus. Mr. Ocegueda gave the keys to Mr. Santos after they arrived at the Hampton Inn and instructed Mr. Santos to drive the car to a gas station to fill the tank. In addition, Santos testified that he had a possessory interest in the Ford Focus because he knew there was something illegal in the trunk, and his family would be harmed if he did not keep the car and its contents secure.

These statements, however, are not enough to establish standing. “[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress need not always come forward with legal documentation establishing that he lawfully possessed the area searched” but “the proponent must at least state that he gained possession from the owner or someone with the authority to grant possession.” United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990). Mr. Santos did not know the owner of the Ford Focus. Moreover, he knew that Mr. Ocegueda was not the owner. And “there was no evidence concerning where or from whom [Mr. Ocegueda] obtained the vehicle or whether his apparent possession was lawful.” United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 271 (10th Cir. 1989).

Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Santos gained possession from the owner or someone with the authority to grant possession. The fact that Mr. Ocegueda transferred possession of the car to Mr. Santos after they arrived in Utah, urging him to drive across the street and fill the vehicle’s gas tank, is insufficient to establish a possessory interest in the car or a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. Nor can Mr. Santos’s possession of the car keys create a possessory interest. “In the absence of other evidence, possession of a key does not establish a passenger’s legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle.” Id. Similarly, Mr. Santos’s non-specific knowledge of contraband alone is insufficient. Id. at 270-71 (finding defendant’s similar claim regarding the presence of marijuana deficient and noting that the Supreme Court has rejected claims of “automatic standing,” “declin[ing] to use possession of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area search[ed]”) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980)).