CA8: Once PC develops to search a car for drugs because of a hidden compartment, the search may be destructive

Once probable cause develops to search a car for drugs because of a hidden compartment, the search may be destructive. United States v. Guevara, 731 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2013):

Next, Guevara argues the troopers lacked the probable cause necessary for a destructive search of the engine. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013) (internal quotation and alterations omitted). It is a “practical and common-sensical standard” based on “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “All [that is] required is the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Particularly with respect to automobile searches:

[A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975). To a layman the sort of loose panel below the back seat armrest in the automobile involved in this case may suggest only wear and tear, but to Officer Luedke, who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be secreted inside the panel. An appeals court should give due weight to a trial court’s finding that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996). “Consensual searches generally cannot be destructive.” United States v. Santana-Aguirre, 537 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Alverez, 235 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 2000)). “Cutting or destroying an object during a search requires either explicit consent for the destructive search or articulable suspicion that supports a finding that probable cause exists to do the destructive search.” Id.

The district court held that once the troopers discovered the hidden compartment, they had probable cause to search the vehicle in a destructive way. We agree. After finding the compartment, the troopers had more than enough information such that a reasonable person, particularly with their training and experience, would believe there was a “fair probability” that drugs were hidden in the engine compartment. First, Guevara and her sister gave inconsistent answers about which relative they were going to visit, and neither of them knew the address of their final destination. The vehicle also had an open title and had been loaned to them by a third party for the trip. Second, the troopers noticed the engine compartment was particularly clean, with visible evidence that someone had touched or handled the area. Bolts in the area of the air intake manifold looked “tooled,” and the hose covering the air intake manifold came off very easily, suggesting it had been on and off several times or had not been replaced properly. Finally, the location of the hidden compartment in the air intake manifold was, in the experience of the officers, typical of drug smuggling in a vehicle of this type. Hr’g Tr. Mot. to Suppress at 23, No. 11-00135, ECF No. 54. Upon finding a hidden compartment in the engine, the troopers had more than a suspicion that the Jeep was being used for smuggling. Based on the totality of the circumstances, they had a reasonable belief they would find drugs in the compartment. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s finding that after the troopers discovered the hidden compartment, they had probable cause to continue the search. See Alverez, 235 F.3d at 1088-89 (finding a destructive search of a vehicle is allowed where officers have probable cause).