Defendant took his vehicle to a shipping company for transport. The shipping company, however, was already under DEA surveillance for another reason. Officers did a dog sniff on the vehicle, which was negative, and then the interior, which was positive. The officers then got a warrant for the car, removing panels, finding cocaine. The vehicle then was wired for surveillance, including electronic devices to signal when the panels were removed. By turning the vehicle over to the shipper, giving the shipper complete access to the vehicle, the defendant surrendered any expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Macias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29638 (N.D. Ill. April 19, 2007):
Although Macias has presented cases in which canine searches of car interiors constituted unreasonable searches, one crucial fact makes the instant search distinguishable–Macias had turned his car over to the shipping company before the search occurred. The bill of lading that Macias signed required him to provide the shipping company with the keys needed to access all areas of the van, advised him to remove all of his personal effects, disclaimed any liability for theft of items from the van, and advised Macias that other carriers or third-parties employed by the shipping company may be involved in transporting Macias’ vehicle.
Based upon these circumstances, any expectation of privacy Macias had in the interior of his van was unreasonable. He had completely surrendered the van to the shipping company and gave the company the keys needed to access any area of the vehicle. Macias’ agreement to do these things was much like the agreement signed by the defendants in United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003), in which they gave Federal Express the right to inspect the package they had shipped. In light of Federal Express’ right to inspect the package, the defendants in Young had given up their expectation of privacy, and agents’ subsequent search of the package was not unlawful. Id. at 1307-08. Here, Macias gave more than just the right to inspect–he gave complete access not only to the shipping company but also to any other carrier or third-party they employed. As a result, like the defendants in Young, he gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle while under the shipping company’s control. See also United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, 1033 (7th Cir. 1998) (passenger had no reasonable expectation of privacy in bag while it was being transported by Greyhound). Based upon the lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy, the agents’ use of a dog to sniff the interior of his van was not an unlawful search.
Officers executing a search warrant for items useful in identity theft permitted a search intense enough to look anywhere in the house where they may be concealed. Looking in a gun case was reasonable. United States v. Armstrong, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29539 (D. Minn. April 20, 2007).
Plaintiff’s complaint that challenged the legality of her arrest was barred by Heck, the court taking judicial notice of the state conviction being on appeal, but Heck did not bar the part of the case dealing with alleged excessive force during the arrest. Olson v. Lemos, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29679 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2007).*
Pepper spraying that was justified did not support an excessive force claim where plaintiff was not in discomfort but for the pepper spraying itself. Davis v. Callaway, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29468 (D. Conn. April 9, 2007):
Davis has not alleged that, aside from the immediate discomfort he felt, he was otherwise injured by the use of OC. Because Davis has not demonstrated any such further injury, he cannot, on this issue, sustain his action. See McLaurin, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (holding that the allegation against the officer who sprayed the plaintiff with mace was not actionable “because [the] plaintiff has not alleged any injuries from being spayed with mace–aside from the immediate discomfort”). Consequently, with regard to Callaway’s use of force in spraying Davis with OC, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Defendant claimed that the officers timed his arrest to conduct a search incident of his vehicle that otherwise could not have occurred. The court found the officers’ actions objectively reasonable. Alternatively, inevitable discovery would have found the evidence in the vehicle because officers could seize and inventory it. United States v. Pannell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29464 (E.D. N.Y. March 26, 2007):
Nevertheless, defendant Pannell argues that the gun should be suppressed because the postal inspectors waited to arrest him in his car as a pretext to perform a search. Pannell’s argument fails, however, since the Fourth Amendment is concerned only with the objective circumstances surrounding the agents’ actions, not their subjective intent. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) (“the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent”) (emphasis in original). “Subjective intent alone … does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). The objective circumstance that justified Pannell’s arrest was the warrant issued by Judge Reyes based on probable cause. Accordingly, because the agents stopped defendant’s car pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, the arrest is permitted under the Fourth Amendment without regard to whether it was a pretext to search the car. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 & n.1 (1973) (traffic violation arrest not rendered invalid by fact that it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 1998) (“an officer’s use of a traffic violation as a pretext to stop a car in order to obtain evidence for some more serious crime is of no constitutional significance”); United States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (“whether the stop was pretextual or not . . . is irrelevant to determining the arrest’s validity”); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir. 1994) (arrest based on pretext to justify search for weapons is permitted under Fourth Amendment).
