KS: PC-less seizure of car led to confession which was suppressed for flagrant violation

The seizure of defendant’s vehicle under the automobile exception was without any probable cause to believe that it was linked to a homicide. In fact, there was no evidence at all the car was connected. The police then used the seizure as a reason to get defendant to come and talk to them (“if you want your car back, please give me a call. We can talk”). The court finds the seizure led to a confession which cannot be separated from the seizure. There was consent to search the vehicle after the police said they were getting a search warrant for the car. State v. Jefferson, 297 Kan. 1151, 310 P.3d 331 (2013):

Thus, although Jefferson was a suspect in Jackson’s shooting at the time the detectives seized his vehicle, there is simply no evidence in the record linking the shooting to Jefferson’s vehicle. In fact, the evidence contradicts such a link. Detectives had recovered the van used in the shooting and had found no weapons in that vehicle. Moreover, the shooting occurred more than a month before detectives seized Jefferson’s vehicle, making any potential link between Jefferson’s vehicle and the shooting even more tenuous. Additionally, the detectives acted inconsistently with their later claim of probable cause when they went to Jefferson’s apartment—not to search his vehicle—but only to talk with Jefferson. And finally, the detectives allowed Jefferson’s car to remain unattended, with keys in the ignition and the engine running, while they chased Jefferson. The officers simply did not act in a manner indicating a fair probability that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of the homicide.

Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no support in the record for the district court’s conclusion that the detectives had probable cause to believe Jefferson’s car contained weapons or any other evidence related to Jackson’s homicide.

. . .

Consequently, we have no hesitancy in concluding here that the detectives exploited their illegal seizure of Jefferson’s car to obtain his incriminating statements. And the State has failed to establish under the totality of the circumstances that Jefferson’s statements are sufficiently attenuated from the preceding illegal seizure. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s suppression ruling, reverse Jefferson’s convictions, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.