Consent to a “real quick” “check” of car was a limited consent that did not include removing a panel inside

Defendant was asked to consent to a “real quick” “check” of the car, and he agreed. That is a limited consent to search that did not include removing an inside panel. People v. Cantor, 149 Cal. App. 4th 961, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478 (4th Dist. April 13, 2007):

We have reviewed the police videotape of the vehicle stop plus the transcript of its audio and conclude the search exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent to Weizoerick’s request for a “real quick” “check” of the car. After receiving defendant’s consent, Weizoerick proceeded to methodically search the car’s passenger compartment, its trunk, under its hood, and then its interior again several times. By then, almost 15 minutes had passed since defendant had given his consent and still Weizoerick had found nothing incriminating. At that point, if not sooner, the search should have ceased. A typically reasonable person would not have understood defendant’s consent to a “real quick” search to extend beyond that point, much less to include authorization to unscrew the panel of a piece of equipment during a second search of the trunk while awaiting the arrival of a drug sniffing dog.

Reason for protective sweep made it unlawful: a deputy had reasoned that the sweep was necessary because “there may or may not have been a working meth lab in the home.” State v. Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007).

Defendant fled into a third party’s home trying to elude police, and the officer thought it was defendant’s own home. He had no expectation of privacy as to the police entry. “Although Officer Schnapp was not aware at the time he observed the defendant push his way into the residence that he had witnessed the defendant commit the felony offense of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling …. the defendant had no objectively reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy when he fled into that home.” State v. Walker, 953 So. 2d 786 (La. 2007).*

Nolo plea with a discharge did not bar a subsequent civil action under Heck. Jansma v. Grand, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27508 (W.D. Mich. April 13, 2007):

There is legal precedent in finding a no contest plea can bar a subsequent § 1983 claim under Heck. See Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2005); Schreiber v. Moe, 445 F. Supp. 2d 799, 812-13 (W.D. Mich. 2006); Ramirez v. Dennis, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10436, *11-13 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 2002) (listing authorities). However, none of these cases contemplate a no contest plea which is subsequently discharged without an adjudication of guilt at the end of the probationary period as is the present circumstance. If the probation period has expired and Jelta’s charge has been discharged, there would not be a conviction such that Heck could be invoked. Therefore, where Jelta’s plea has been expunged with no adjudication of guilt or a conviction, n6 Heck cannot bar his claim under § 1983.