E.D.Pa.: After remand of suppression order, court denies suppression for lack of deterrence

The District Court originally suppressed and the government appealed because the court didn’t properly explain the application of the exclusionary rule to deter future violations. The Third Circuit reversed. United States v. Wright, 493 Fed. Appx. 265 (3d Cir. 2012). On remand, because the court had already found the level of culpability “low” and barely negligent, the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Wright, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86937 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2013)*:

Defendants focus their argument on the fact that Agent Taylor was somehow “more than negligent” in his failure to examine the warrant before executing it. Agent Taylor specifically stated that he did not review the documents with care before he executed them. This is, at most, negligence. Thus, Defendants’ argument that Agent Taylor somehow knew of the risk that the warrant was defective or acted with less care than even a careless person would use is not persuasive under these facts. I find the warrant’s lack of particularity at the time of execution was a result of mere negligence. The error occurred in the U.S. Attorney’s Office and led to a warrant that was incomplete when it was served. It is important to remember that the warrant was complete at the time it was approved by Judge Rapoport.

Because the Agent did not act with grossly negligent, deliberate, or reckless disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, I find that suppression would not deter future Fourth Amendment violations. I conclude that the costs of suppression outweigh the benefit because it is nearly impossible to deter isolated incidents of negligence such as this. When I granted the motion to suppress earlier in the case, I specifically found the level of culpability of the Agent to be “low.” Upon re-examination of the facts of this case as developed at the suppression hearing, and after careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, I find no reason to change the conclusion. After careful consideration of the discussion of this case by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and in light of all the circumstances, I find there to be no sufficient basis upon which to exclude the evidence seized.