Indiana has the Indiana Public School Police which act as school resource officers. Acting on a tip, one encountered a student suspected of marijuana, and his original intent was to take the student to the dean’s office. Instead, the officer took the student to the police. The officer was governed by T.L.O. The court surveys the cases and finds that school resource officers generally are governed by T.L.O. even though they may be sworn police officers working in a school. T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. App. 2007):
Finally, courts have found relevant the officer’s purpose in conducting the search. See J.F.M., 607 S.E.2d at 307-08 (officer was concerned with student’s actions as violations “under the rules and policies of the school, not as violations of the laws of North Carolina”); In re Josue T., 1999 NMCA 115, 128 N.M. 56, 989 P.2d 431, 438 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (“The nature of a T.L.O. search by a school authority is to maintain order and discipline in the school. The nature of a search by a police officer is to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions.”); State v. Tywayne H., 1997 NMCA 15, 123 N.M. 42, 933 P.2d 251, 255 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997), review denied (holding that search conducted by police officers hired as security for an after-school dance sponsored by local chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Driving was not governed by T.L.O. because the rationale of the student-teacher relationship, upon which T.L.O. was based, “is not applicable to a uniformed police officer conducting a search on his own initiative”).
We conclude that Sergeant Driskell acted as school resource officer acting to further educationally related goals. Although Sergeant Driskell’s encounter with T.S. ultimately resulted in Sergeant Driskell taking T.S. to the police station, Sergeant Driskell testified that, at the time he initiated the encounter, he intended to take T.S. to the Dean’s office. Tr. at 33. Therefore, although Sergeant Driskell did not act in conjunction with other school officials prior to the initial contact with T.S., when he initiated contact, he had the intent to involve the school’s dean. Such intent indicates that Sergeant Driskell was concerned with a possible violation of school rules, and not solely a criminal violation. We also agree with the rationale of the North Carolina and Pennsylvania courts that the presence of drugs on school property presents a serious threat to a learning environment. Therefore, Sergeant Driskell acted not only to ferret out criminal activity, but also to preserve an environment conducive to education.
We do not hold that any action by a school police officer is governed by T.L.O.‘s reasonableness test. As our supreme court has indicated, this standard applies to school resource officers acting on their own initiative, and acting “to further educationally related goals.” Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1160. On the facts of this case, Officer Driskell was acting to further such goals, and we therefore will analyze his actions under the principles of T.L.O.
Oklahoma sustained a driver’s license checkpoint based on proof that there was a problem with unlicensed drivers in the jurisdiction and the officers’ plan was to avoid any impeding of traffic beyond seconds. Lookingbill v. State, 2007 OK CR 7, 157 P.3d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007):
It is evident from the cases discussed above that law enforcement officers, operating within certain parameters, may establish checkpoints for the purpose of verifying that drivers are licensed and that they are operating ostensibly safe vehicles. The District Court concluded that the highway checkpoint seizure in Appellant’s case was not constitutionally flawed. In reviewing the record, we find the evidence is sufficient to support that conclusion.
The law enforcement officers in this case testified that there was a “significant” problem of unlicensed drivers in Greer County, and this was their stated purpose for planning the driver’s license checkpoint challenged here. The State offered proof showing that the officers chose the site because it was the route most traveled through Greer County. The checkpoint was in a fixed location, in broad daylight, and in an open area where the troopers could be easily seen. The officers planned to stop every passing car and, if everything was in order, to detain motorists for less than a minute. n6
n6 According to Trooper Cummins, their checkpoint plan included the contingency that if traffic should start to back up, vehicles would then be waved through so as not to cause any unreasonable delays in travel. A traffic backup never occurred, however, because Appellant was one of the first vehicles through the checkpoint, resulting in the checkpoint being promptly disbanded once Trooper Laughlin arrested Appellant and transported him to jail.
Use of a ruse to gain entry did not constitute a violation of the knock and announce requirement. Martinez v. State, 220 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App. – Austin 2007).
Defendant’s grandfather had authority to consent to an entry into the premises and the bedroom defendant was staying in. Since it was his property, the police acted reasonably in believing that his consent extended to defendant’s backpack in the room. Glenn v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 413, 642 S.E.2d 282 (2007) (en banc):
Equally important, nothing about the backpack itself put the officers on notice that Glenn claimed an exclusive privacy interest in it. The backpack had no lock or, for that matter, anything else ostensibly designed to inhibit someone from opening it. The backpack was found on the floor of a room sometimes used by Glenn, not squirreled away in some secretive place within his principal bedroom. No identifying information on the backpack revealed who owned it, used it, or had access to it. The officers did not know who left it there or who, if anyone, intended to come back for it. Under such circumstances, the officers were not required to speculate — as Glenn implicitly suggests — that grandsons, but never grandfathers, use backpacks.
