The plaintiff in a strip search case in California is granted partial summary judgment on liability because the case is not materially distinguishable from a recent case in the Ninth Circuit. Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 2006 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 95756 (C.D. Cal. December 7, 2006).
“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”
[Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979).] This test has been applied by the Ninth Circuit most recently in Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding unconstitutional a strip search of an arrestee, performed pursuant to a blanket policy, where the arrestee was arrested on charges of being under the influence of a controlled substance), cert. denied, U.S. , 2006 WL 2516530 (Nov. 27, 2006). Accordingly, the Court looks to the four factors of scope, place, manner, and justification to determine if the uncontroverted facts establish the constitutional violations advanced by plaintiffs.
As to the scope of the intrusion, the Ninth Circuit has justifiably recognized that the strip and/or visual body cavity search at issue in Way, and at issue here, is “frightening[ly] invasi[ve]” and “humiliating.”
“The scope of the intrusion here is indisputably a frightening and humiliating invasion, even when conducted with all due courtesy. … Its intrusiveness cannot be overstated. … [T]he fact that a strip search is conducted reasonably, without touching and outside the view of all persons other than the party performing the search, does not negate the fact that a strip search is a significant intrusion on the person searched …. The feelings of humiliation and degradation associated with forcibly exposing one’s nude body to strangers for visual inspection is beyond dispute.”
Id. at 1160 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The factor regarding the intrusiveness of the search strongly favors plaintiffs.
As to the manner of the search, Defendants argue, in conclusory fashion, that “inmates … are not subjected to a search that is excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest.” Opp. at 9. Here, however, it is undisputed that the searches are conducted in a group setting, with the individuals separated only by gender. Although defendants have presented evidence of some measures taken to preserve the privacy of those being searched, the evidence of record reveals that they have taken no steps to conduct the searches on an individual basis and have instead continued to conduct the searches en masse without any attempt to limit the humiliation occasioned by conducting the searches in full view of dozens of other individuals. In Way, although the Ninth Circuit ultimately found the blanket policy at issue to be unconstitutional, it looked favorably upon the fact that the search was conducted by one officer, with no one else present. Way, 445 F.3d at 1160-61; cf. Beard v. Whitmore Lake School Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 606 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[t]he fact that the searches of the females did not occur in the presence of only school officials, but rather in the presence of other [female] students, further supports the conclusion that the searches were unreasonable”). Accordingly, the factor regarding the manner of the search also strongly favors plaintiffs.
Where the plaintiff did not contend that the original seizure of his money was unlawful, the fact it took too long for plaintiff does not overcome qualified immunity. Gallo v. Pillow, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20479 (E.D. Ark. March 20, 2007):
Gallo does not allege that the original seizure of the money was unreasonable. He maintains that, after his arrest, Defendants did not return it within a reasonable period of time. Holding onto property seized from a lawful search may violate the Fourth Amendment, but this conduct is not a clearly established violation. Because keeping property too long is not a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment — to the extent that Pillow and Volner were arguably culpable — they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Detention of 15-17 minutes was reasonable based on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Terry, 220 Fed. Appx. 961 (11th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).
“The motions filed by defense counsel in this case are insufficient as they lack supporting detail as to what conduct by the officers they are challenging or even as to which search warrant they are objecting. Further, there are no facts or details offered to support the Defendants’ conclusions that the searches were illegal or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the motions without prejudice.” Defendants also failed to show standing to challenge the search of the vehicles involved. One came back to a person with the same address as one defendant’s driver’s license, but that was not enough. United States v. Avila Rubio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20663 (D. Idaho March 21, 2007).*
In a case involving aggravated and sexual assault in Indian country, the court did not have to determine whether the Indian officer was qualified under Iowa law to investigate crimes to apply for a search warrant because any citizen could provide the same information in a search warrant as a citizen informant. United States v. Papakee, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20680 (N.D. Iowa March 21, 2007).
Officer who approached a truck parked with the motor running in high crime area did not violate the Fourth Amendment by initiating contact. Reasonable suspicion developed from the conversation. State v. Henry, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 263 (March 22, 2007).*
