CA3: PC and warrant defeats false arrest claim; destruction of property claim too inspecific

There was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, so the police couldn’t be sued for false arrest. The police don’t have to put in the affidavit for arrest and search warrant everything in the investigation. Their unreasonable search claim of unnecessary destruction of property fails for not being specific enough. Badillo v. Stopko, 519 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d Cir. 2013):

Based on the information provided in the affidavit, warrants were issued for the arrest of Gilbert and for the search of his home. After searching the Badillos’ home for over three hours and finding no contraband, the police became frustrated and threatened to “destroy” the home unless Gilbert told them where the drugs and money were. Gilbert proclaimed his innocence and, in a second search, the officers destroyed furniture and punched holes in the wall. They recovered no evidence from the Badillos’ home. Gilbert was arrested pursuant to the warrant and spent 37 days in jail. The charges against him were ultimately dismissed.

. . .

A. False Arrest

The theme of the Badillos’ arguments before the District Court, and on appeal, is that the police conducted a flawed and incomplete investigation, and that they should have concluded Tino was Antinohel Centeno. The District Court correctly noted that this theme “confuse[s] th[e] inquiry by focusing on whether Defendants’ investigation should have led them to suspect that Antinohel was Tino. The relevant inquiry here is whether there are allegations that Defendants knowingly, deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth made false statements or omissions that call into question the finding of probable cause with respect to the search and arrest warrant for Gilbert.”
. . .

The Badillos essentially argue an affidavit must include all examples of possible investigatory tactics that were either unsuccessful or not used. We disagree. Cf. Reedy, 615 F.3d at 214-15 (concluding it was reckless to omit, in an affidavit charging the plaintiff with filing a false police report, that the plaintiff had consistently described her assault and initially cooperated in the investigation, and that the police were investigating a similar assault); Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (finding it reckless to omit the fact that an eyewitness had failed to identify plaintiff as the perpetrator). Moreover, a magistrate is likely to expect that all significant evidence would be included in an affidavit, especially one as detailed as Stopko’s. The magistrate would infer, for example, that there was no direct surveillance of Gilbert engaged in drug activity. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that there were no facts recklessly omitted from the affidavit.

B. Unreasonable Search

The Badillos contend the search of their home violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers destroyed property during the search. The Badillos allege that the initial search of their home uncovered no evidence. A police officer became irate and threatened to “destroy” the house unless Gilbert told him where the drugs and money were. The police then conducted a second search of the home, in which they “caus[ed] extensive property damage,” by “destroying furniture and punching holes in walls.”

“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of execution of [a] warrant.” United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (citation omitted). “[O]fficers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979). But “[e]xcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful ….”Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71.

The Badillos have failed to allege what pieces of furniture were damaged, the nature of the damage, or the extent of the damage. The allegations are too vague to support a conclusion that the officers acted unreasonably. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ….”). We therefore will affirm as to this claim.