FEMA required blood draws of firemen in a “wellness program” violates Fourth Amendment

Mandatory blood draws for a firemen’s “wellness program” under FEMA auspices was a Fourth Amendment seizure because it was mandatory and they were subject to punishment for not agreeing. Anderson v. City of Taylor, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44706 (E.D. Mich. August 11, 2005):

Defendants contend that all of Plaintiffs’ cited cases involve some sort of punitive aspect to a seizure, i.e. in Chandler, a testing of urine was a prerequisite to qualify for state office. In other words, Defendants contend that there is no punitive aspect in the blood draw because it is used solely for the benefit of a health screening of Plaintiffs. It is correct that the results of the Plaintiffs’ blood draws will not dictate a particular punishment upon the Plaintiffs. However, the Defendants miss the central aspect of the blood draws–they are mandatory. The United States Supreme Court has set forth that a blood draw itself is a search or seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment. Skinner at 616. Because the blood draws are mandatory, it follows that Plaintiffs would be subject to some form of punishment for refusing the constitutionally protected intrusion. In fact, Plaintiffs Pochron, Bell, and Lavender set forth in their affidavits that they would have been punished had they not participated in the blood draw. (Plaintiffs’ Response, Exs. 3-6). Herein, lies the punitive aspect to the blood draws at issue in this case. The Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has not held there must be a punitive aspect tied to the results of a blood draw.

The Court finds that the mandatory blood draws instituted by Defendants, despite the fact that they were intended to benefit Plaintiffs, violates their personal privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. As Justice Brandeis set forth in his landmark dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), albeit addressing a more serious issue, “[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficient.” Id. at 485.

Defendant Marine’s wife (an ex-Marine herself) had apparent authority to consent to a search of the defendant’s briefcase when NCIS agents came to their house on base to inquire about a possible child sex offense and whether there were pictures of it. United States v. Gallagher, 65 M.J. 601 (N-M. Ct. App. 2007).*

The right to privacy in Hawai’i does not include prostitution or “blowjobs” and “handjobs” for consideration. State v. Romano, 114 Haw. 1, 155 P.3d 1102 (2007).*

After a rape suspect was excluded by a DNA test, the unknown sample was sent to CODIS, and it came back as belonging to the defendant. Defendant was on parole, and he was called in for a blood sample. He was never in custody and he was not entitled to a warning before consent was sought. The taking of the sample was purely consensual. State v. Bandy, 2007 Ohio 859, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 776 (7th Dist. February 22, 2007).*

Rearguing search issue affirmed on appeal via a § 2255 was improper. Also, other prongs of that argument were waived by not having appealed, and he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first instance. United States v. Ringgold, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13983 (D. Nev. February 22, 2007).*

Heck‘s requirement that a conviction be set aside before a § 1983 case may be filed creates an element of the constitutional claim, so the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the last element occurs. Kucharski v. Leveille, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14055 (E.D. Mich. February 12, 2007).*