Plaintiff was arrested under a mistaken belief that she was a person wanted on a warrant for domestic battery: her name was the same as the other person’s alias. Before the strip search, however, officers had subjective information that she was not the same person, and this precluded summary judgment for the defense. Archuleta v. Wagner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14261 (D. Colo. February 27, 2007).
Fellow officer shot during an arrest of a suspect stated no Fourth Amendment claim because he was an unintended victim. Small v. City of Philadelphia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14323 (E.D. Pa. February 26, 2007):
Plaintiff asks us to extend the definition of a Fourth Amendment seizure to encompass the foreseeable, but unintended, victims of deadly force directed toward others. Plaintiff has not identified any authority which supports the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals who are foreseeable victims of deadly force intentionally used against others and we have found none. Cf. Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 482 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that “the Fourth Amendment does not protect persons who were merely ‘reasonably foreseeable victims’ of excessive force inflicted upon another”). Indeed, the Third Circuit has explained that, unlike the situation where the police intentionally shoot a person who is mistakenly believed to be a criminal, there is no Fourth Amendment seizure where the police mistakenly shoot an innocent bystander while attempting to shoot a criminal:
“if a police officer fires his gun at a fleeing robbery suspect and the bullet inadvertently strikes an innocent bystander, there has been no Fourth Amendment seizure. If, on the other hand, the officer fires his gun directly at the innocent bystander in the mistaken belief that the bystander is the robber, then a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred.”
Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1998); Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991); Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir.1990); Brower, 489 U.S. at 596). We find, accordingly, that because Plaintiff was not the intended target of Redanauer’s gunshot, he was not subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is, accordingly, granted with respect to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Officer stopped defendant for swerving slightly, and, during the conversation, the defendant offered consent to look in the back of his truck. The officer, however, did not look at that time, and he kept talking to the suspects and reasonable suspicion was building to continue the stop. Ultimately, he found that interior screws were missing, and then he used a drug dog to sniff and drugs and a gun were found hidden there. United States v. Grant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14221 (S.D. Tex. February 28, 2007).*
§ 1983 case was defeated by plaintiff’s admission there was probable cause for arrest. Cox v. Pate, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14419 (W.D. Pa. February 27, 2007).*
Defense counsel had no duty to argue every conceivable permutation of his suppression position developed in 20/20 hindsight. United States v. Ringgold, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13960 (D. Nev. February 22, 2007):
Finally, Mr. Valladares states in his affidavit that he kept Movant aware of all stages of the criminal proceeding concerning the motion to suppress, especially what issues were going to be raised in the motion, and that Movant agreed that this was the most fruitful course of action. Movant never disputes this. Rather, with 20/20 hindsight, Movant argues that counsel should have raised every conceivable argument, no matter how tenuous, the failure of which allegedly renders counsel’s representation unreasonable. Contrary to Movant’s conclusory arguments, counsel’s performance was reasonable. The Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to raise every conceivable argument during a hearing or in a motion. Here, counsel raised what appeared at the time to be the most fruitful issues well within the confines of the Sixth Amendment.
