Samson v. California only applied the California statute, and Florida’s statute is different, so the search here was unlawful because Florida law does not require all probationers submit to suspicionless searches. Rollins v. State, 948 So. 2d 1046 (2d Dist. February 23, 2007):
We are mindful that the United States Supreme Court recently held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006). However, Samson examined a California law which provided that “every prisoner eligible for release on state parole ‘shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.'” Id. at 2196 (citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a) (West 2000)). There is no similar law in Florida requiring a person placed on probation to submit to a search, with or without cause, by a law enforcement officer. Therefore, Samson does not apply to the case at bar.
Defendant’s neighbor entered his land to look for a dog, and he stumbled upon a greenhouse with marijuana in it. He told the police who came onto the property and looked, too. Under Dunn, it was open fields. Wilson v. State, 952 So. 2d 564 (5th Dist. 2007):
In Dunn, DEA agents made three warrantless entries onto the defendant’s 198-acre ranch on two consecutive days by crossing over a perimeter fence that completely surrounded the property. Thereafter they walked one-half mile, crossed several barbed wire fences, climbed a wooden fence and peered into the barn using flashlights to view the interior of the locked barn, at which time agents observed an illicit drug laboratory. The barn, which was 60 yards from the defendant’s residence, was not visible from the perimeter of the property because the clearing in which the barn was situated was completely surrounded by woods. The Supreme Court concluded that these actions did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because the barn was not within the curtilage of the residence. Therefore, the defendant did not enjoy an expectation of privacy in the area immediately outside the barn.
In concluding as it did, the Dunn court announced a four-part test to use in determining whether an area is protected “curtilage.” The Court emphasized, however, that the “centrally relevant consideration [in this determination is] whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. at 301. Our application of the Dunn four-part test here, with emphasis on the “centrally relevant consideration,” leads us to the inescapable conclusion that Appellant’s greenhouse, like the barn in Dunn, does not lie within the curtilage of his residence.
The first Dunn factor, the distance between the home and the area claimed to be curtilage, is, in this case, unhelpful because the distance of 100 feet supports no inference either way. Likewise, the second Dunn factor, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, is of little import here because the perimeter fence does not provide a demarcation point separating the residence and curtilage from the remaining property. See United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding perimeter fence around five-acre parcel did not bring entire parcel within curtilage of residence).
The third factor, however, suggests strongly that the greenhouse at issue here did not fall within the protected curtilage. This factor requires that we analyze the use to which the area is put to determine if it was “so associated with the activities and privacies of domestic life” that it should be “deemed” a part of the residence. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302. Here, as in Dunn, the only use to which the structure was put was the manufacture of illicit drugs, a use completely disassociated with the “privacies of the home.” This factor, therefore, militates in favor of the government.
The fourth and final Dunn factor involves an examination of the steps taken by Appellant to “protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Id. at 301. In Dunn, the barn was locked, enclosed within a wooden fence, barbed wire fence and a perimeter fence, yet the Court concluded that the defendant had done “little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields.” Id. at 303. Here, the greenhouse was protected to a lesser degree than the barn in Dunn. It was not locked, it was constructed of semi-transparent material with a two-foot void, and only one fence, a standard rail fence, separated it from adjoining lands. Based on a comparison of the facts in Dunn, we must conclude that the fourth Dunn factor also favors the government.
Spatial and temporal proximity to shots fired can be reasonable suspicion. People v. Mendez, 371 Ill. App. 3d 773, 309 Ill. Dec. 205, 863 N.E.2d 837 (2d Dist. 2007):
Several Illinois courts have held that a police officer may form a reasonable suspicion that an individual was involved in a shooting due to his spatial and temporal proximity to the shots fired. For example, in People v. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d 272 (1971), police officers testified that they were assigned to patrol an area where a gang war was expected to occur. At approximately 9:30 p.m., the officers heard what they believed to be gunshots. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d at 274. Within two minutes and about two blocks away, the officers saw six people walking. There was no one else in the area. Four of the six people were wearing the type of clothing worn by one of the gangs that might have been involved. The officers stopped and frisked all six people. The supreme court found the stop and search reasonable under Terry. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d at 277. The police officers had a reasonable suspicion that the group of people walking in the area of gunfire was involved in the shooting and therefore the court upheld the investigatory stop, including the pat-down search for weapons. Lee, 48 Ill. 2d at 277.
Knock and talk led to an arrest, and there was specific exigent circumstances as to his closed duffle bag. Alternatively, it could have been subjected to a search incident. State v. Warren, 949 So. 2d 1215 (2007).*
