Plaintiffs stated claim for relief that police who had been setting up sweeps of a bar to check customers for identification. For the closely regulated industry exception to apply, then the state liquor control authorities have to be the ones conducting the sweeps, not law enforcement in a manner that created an inference of harassment and discrimination against patrons. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2007):

As noted above, “the regulated industries exception is a narrow one, and … a warrantless search can be placed within that exception only if it is in fact made pursuant to and in enforcement of the regulatory scheme.” Shaefer, Michael & Clairton Slag, Inc., 637 F.2d at 204. The regulatory scheme at issue here only permits warrantless inspection by specified categories of individuals, and the officers of the Abington Township Police Department are not among those individuals–especially absent evidence that they were authorized by the PLCB. 47 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-513; Black, 530 A.2d at 430. Thus, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the sweeps were not in accordance with the regulatory scheme, and the District Court erred in finding that the closely regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement applied based on the record before it. By alleging that Abington Township police officers entered the premises without a warrant, the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. We therefore vacate the District Court’s dismissal of their Fourth Amendment claim.

Excessive force claim fails because the officers were trying to arrest decedent when there was a struggle for an officer’s gun. Henning v. O’Leary, 477 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. February 16, 2007):

Here, there can be no doubt that O’Leary had the requisite reasonable cause. In the tense struggle that followed Henning’s refusal to submit to the officers’ attempts to handcuff him, Peterson’s gun got loose, and at least two officers believed Henning had his hands on or near it. Police officers cannot be expected to wait until a resisting arrestee has a firm grip on a deadly weapon and completely freed himself from officers trying to subdue him before taking action to ensure their safety. Nor can they be required to take a less deadly shot where none is available that would not place someone else also in jeopardy.

The Hennings dispute the officers’ characterization of the events, but they offer no real evidence to contradict it. They did not depose Dvorak (perhaps he can’t be found), the only nonpolice eyewitness to what happened, and they otherwise rely only on some minor inconsistencies in the three officers’ stories. Yet minor inconsistencies are not unusual–indeed exact, step by step recall of this incident by three different officers would be unusual. Absent something else, the Hennings really offer nothing to corroborate their version of the events–certainly not enough to get them to a jury. “[T]he plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), and the Hennings have failed to do so.

Officers had qualified immunity for alleged false arrest of plaintiffs. After a near altercation in an IHOP restaurant for being loud and obnoxious, defendant off duty officers told the plaintiffs to go outside to talk about it more, and, once outside, the plaintiffs’ conduct escalated to aggressive, and that gave probable cause to arrest. Roberts v. City of Hapeville, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10508 (N.D. Ga. February 15, 2007).*

Plaintiff stated a claim for relief for allegedly being kicked while on the floor during an arrest during a police raid. If true, it was unnecessary force. Davis v. City of New York, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10555 (E.D. N.Y. February 15, 2007).*