Exigent circumstances not present for warrantless entry

Exigent circumstances that the defendant might be destroying evidence were not shown to justify a warrantless entry. Inevitable discovery also does not apply. United States v. Isais-Cabrera, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8507 (N.D. Cal. January 19, 2007):

The government must also satisfy the exigent circumstances requirement. Exigent circumstances requires that there be some indication, based on the totality of the circumstances, that evidence would be destroyed or the suspect would flee. United States v. Salvador, 740 F.2d 752 (9th Cir 1984). Furthermore, the government bears the burden of demonstrating a risk of destruction with particularity. United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). “Mere speculation regarding the presence of drugs on a premises and the danger of their destruction is not sufficient to show exigent circumstances.” United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). Contrary to the government’s contention, there were no exigent circumstances here. There is simply no evidence of any sort indicating that Aguayo was destroying evidence at the time the police entered Apartment No. 2. The government argues that the police officers had a reasonable belief that Aguyao might destroy evidence based on his likely awareness of Borrego’s search and arrest in Apartment No. 5, but this type of speculation does not satisfy the requirement of a particularized evidence necessary to support a reasonable belief. Nor has the government provided sufficient evidence for its contention that the warrantless entry was necessary to protect the police officers. It has provided nothing beyond the blanket assertion that it is “obvious and reasonable” for the police to conclude that Aguayo might harm the officers if he had learned of Borrego’s search and arrest. Gov’t Resp. at 8. The general observation that guns and drug trafficking are often interrelated does not support the government’s argument. The government’s claim that the conduct of the officers after entering the apartment supports their view of this as an emergency is not compelling. Id. The officers had sufficient time between the search of Apartment No. 5 and the entry into Apartment No. 2 to obtain a telephone warrant. In fact, they appear to have taken their time rather than acting as if exigent circumstances existed. The court concludes that the government has failed to carry its “heavy burden” of showing “particularized evidence” that the agents reasonably believed that the defendant presented a substantial risk of flight at the time of the arrest or was destroying evidence. Reid, 226 F.3d at 1028.

Defendant was on parole with a parole search condition, and he showed up at the parole office asking for his monitoring device to be removed. Parole officers then went out to search his car and found a gun shop bumper sticker and during the search found three pipe bombs and proof he traveled. The search was valid. United States v. Henry, 472 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Pa. 2007).*

§ 1983 case failed because officers collectively had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Deberry v. Village of Matteson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8709 (N.D. Ill. February 1, 2007).*

Class action status denied without prejudice in strip search claim because numerosity could not be met. Foster v. City of Oakland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8522 (N.D. Cal. January 29, 2007):

While there is no specific numerical requirement in the text of Rule 23, courts have repeatedly held that classes of less than twenty members do not satisfy the numerosity requirement. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S. Ct. 1698, 64 L. Ed. 2d 319 & n.14 (1980) (citing, with approval, cases in which numerosity was not met with as many as forty class members); Harik v. Cal. Teacher’s Ass’n, 326 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (vacating certification of classes with less than ten members). Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that the size of the potential class is larger than fifteen members. The text of Rule 23(a)(1) instructs the court to certify a class only where joinder of all of the potential plaintiffs would be impracticable. In this case, joinder seems viable: all potential plaintiffs are in the same geographic area, and the small number of potential class members suggests that doing so would not be unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs have not satisfied the numerosity requirement at this time.

Police had probable cause to arrest the juvenile for disorderly conduct for fighting on a school bus and remaining combative when taken to the school cafeteria to sort it out, and a small quantity of marijuana was found on him. In Interest of R.P., 2007 PA Super 37, 918 A.2d 115 (2007).*