Protective sweep that extended to crawl space was not unreasonable

Officers were executing an arrest warrant and they did an intensive protective sweep that even went into the crawl space of the building and evidence was found. This was not an unreasonable protective sweep. United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. January 30, 2007):

The inquiry therefore becomes whether the officers had “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. We answer this question in the affirmative. The fact that police identified a car registered to a local criminal who did not live at Defendant Hinton’s address is sufficient to justify a quick and limited protective sweep. That Defendant Hinton lived in a duplex is of no moment. The local criminal who owned the car in Defendant Hinton’s driveway was as likely to be visiting Defendant Hinton as he was to be visiting Defendant Hinton’s neighbor. This probability is sufficient to justify a protective sweep. See United States v. Biggs, 70 F.3d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding a sweep of defendant Biggs’ motel room where police had received information that Biggs was meeting someone at the motel, Biggs had left the motel door open so that anyone inside could see out, and, on two previous occasions, Biggs had been arrested in the presence of persons armed with firearms).

Defendant Hinton argues, however, that because of the remoteness of the crawl space and the size of the door, the officers nevertheless exceeded their authority to conduct a protective sweep. These arguments are without merit. Under the second prong of Buie, there is no requirement that the area searched be immediately adjacent to the area where the defendant was arrested. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Although discovering the crawl space where the marijuana was found required officers to go through the kitchen, an attached garage, and the laundry room, it was nevertheless a part of the premises in which a potentially dangerous individual could be found. See id. at 335. Nor is the size of the opening of the door important. It is undisputed that the crawl space could hold a person. A small, out-of-the-way space makes a good hiding place for a dangerous individual; it is implausible to think that the persons who are the object of the protective sweep would limit themselves to large, open areas where they could be easily spotted. We therefore conclude that the district court properly denied Defendant Hinton’s motion to suppress.

The officer applied no physical power of arrest over the defendant by approaching him. Defendant’s flight under Wardlaw only added to the reasonable suspicion that the officer already had when he approached him. United States v. Moore, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5892 (E.D. Wis. January 26, 2007).*

Telling a traffic detainee that he was “good to go,” but “can I ask a few questions” did not unreasonably prolong the stop. United States v. Meraz, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5973 (E.D. Wis. January 26, 2007).*

School strip search that was obviously invasive but based on near probable cause was still insufficient to state a claim in the face of a qualified immunity defense and lack of development of the law. Phaneuf v. Cipriano, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5963 (D. Conn. January 25, 2007).*