Named informant actually signed the affidavit for SW which showed basis of knowledge

Named informant actually signed the search warrant, and it was based on personal information so probable cause was shown. Officers went to the defendant’s premises and found him outside and arrested him. They did not have the search warrant in hand but it was coming. They used defendant’s key to enter the house and look for confederates who might destroy the drugs being sought while waiting for the warrant to arrive, and this was lawful under Segura. People v Osorio, 2006 NY Slip Op 8457, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15969 (4th Dept. November 17, 2006).

Officers heard defendant on a wire admit to possessing stolen property and wanting to trade it for meth and having guns. “Johnson and Lebo stated that the Defendant had made threats about killing the cops if they came out. Considering the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable to believe that contraband and/or stolen property was at the Defendant’s residence and that the circumstances required that they go to the mobile home without a warrant.” [Note that the court says “to” not “into.”] The police then went to his house and kicked the door to announce as a knock and talk. The defendant let them in [it seems to me more like they barged in when the door was opened]. The USMJ’s R&R that defendant consented is adopted. United States v. Medley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1175 (E.D. Mo. January 5, 2007).*

Plaintiff consented to entry but claimed that she did not consent to search. Court finds implicit consent from failure to object and finds apparent authority to implicitly consent to the search of her daughter’s room. Owens v. Town of Delhi, 469 F. Supp. 2d 403 (W.D. La. 2007)* (Note: This case proceeds entirely on the judge’s and government’s assumption that a person knows that they can object when an armed police officer is going through their stuff who essentially barged in. It is all implied consent from failure to object.)

Inmate’s § 1983 action for harassing searches was barred under PLRA for lack of exhaustion. The state provided an ALJ process which was not taken advantage of. Hills v. Kershaw Correctional Inst. Officers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94541 (N.D. S.C. November 27, 2006).*

Officer’s reasonable suspicion for a trash search as required under Litchfield was shown in the affidavit for probable cause that was used to get a search warrant for his premises. Eshelman v. State, 859 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. January 10, 2007).

Defendant consented to a patdown, and continued stop was based on reasonable suspicion. “Officer Andrew Tischer testified at the suppression hearing that he stopped Lewer’s car and that after the stop he asked Lewer for identification and that Lewer gave him either a driver’s license or a state identification card, but that he was ‘not a hundred percent sure which one.’ Tischer told the trial court that Lewer ‘wouldn’t look me in the eyes[, his] hands were visibly shaking, and his voice stumbled as I spoke with him.’ Tischer also testified that Lewer’s ‘right hand was making continued movements towards his right pants pocket and his right jacket pocket.’ At this point, Tischer testified that he asked Lewer to get out of the car because he thought that Lewer might have a weapon. Tischer estimated that one to one and one-half minutes had passed from when he walked up to Lewer’s car and when he asked Lewer to get out of the car.” Heroin was validly found during the consensual patdown which defendant knew was for more than just weapons. State v. Lewer, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1223 (December 27, 2006).

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