Snitch’s self-interest required officers to check out potential exigency before just acting on it

Officers lacked exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry based on assertions from a person they just arrested that they had to have understood would be seeking leniency for himself and by becoming a snitch. United States v. Markeif, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93028 (M.D. Pa. December 22, 2006):

The Government asserts that the basis for exigent circumstances formed upon the arrest of Cummings and the information he subsequently proffered to the officers at that point. We accept that Cummings told the officers to “get him out of here” and that he speculated that the individuals observed down the street, some of whom may have been talking on cellular phones, knew his employers in South Williamsport. However, Cummings was admittedly unknown to the officers, as were the individuals down the street, and therefore the officers had no way of knowing whether Cummings was credible or reliable in his assertion that his employers were being “tipped off.” Moreover, the officers did not endeavor to engage the witnessing individuals in a discussion to corroborate Cummings’ assertions to them. In fact, Cummings was acting in accordance with the way many arrested drug dealers do; he was attempting to give the officers some information in the hopes that they would grant him consideration regarding his arrest. These experienced officers were, or should have been, well aware that upon his arrest, Cummings’ priorities were those of self-interest and self-preservation, and with cognizance of Cummings’ motivation, the officers should have proceeded with some caution upon any information proffered by Cummings. We find that there is no credible evidence that tends to show that the occupants of Apartment 1, 1920 Riverside Drive were aware that the police were on their trail. Any assertion in that regard involves rank speculation. Cummings’ suppositions could have been checked out by the officers, but they were not. Therefore, as a corollary, we cannot find, based upon Cummings’ assertions alone, that the officers had a reasonable belief that contraband was being removed or secreted.

Next and importantly, the actions of the officers following the arrest of Cummings do not indicate to the Court that they wholly believed it was urgent to enter Apartment 1, 1920 Riverside Drive to preserve evidence. Lt. Ungard did not immediately travel to the vicinity of 1920 Riverside Drive upon Cummings’ arrest, but rather accompanied him back to Williamsport City Hall. Thereafter, Lt. Ungard proceeded to 1920 Riverside Drive and commenced surveillance. He then observed individuals who fit the description of the suspected residents of Apartment 1 enter and leave the apartment building, however he made no attempt to question or follow these individuals. This is somewhat remarkable, in that Lt. Ungard testified that he was concerned these individuals were leaving with evidence. Further it is clear that Lt. Ungard and other officers were safely able to obtain surveillance positions, and there was no evident danger to the officers if they continued to maintain surveillance while a warrant was being sought.

After a searching review of the facts we are left with the inescapable conclusion that there existed no affirmative evidence that destruction of evidence was imminent, simply because no evidence indicated that the occupants of Apartment 1, 1920 Riverside Drive were aware of Cummings’ arrest or his accusations against them. Instead what we find is apparent post hoc reasoning by the Government that attempts to wedge this warrantless entry into a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Essentially the Government is asking this Court to cure a conundrum of its own making by buying into an artificial construct of both exigent circumstances and probable cause, which we plainly cannot do.

Summary judgment granted arresting officers because plaintiff was stopped while driving a vehicle stolen at gunpoint. Powell v. Hill, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92855 (E.D. Mich. December 26, 2006).*

Pro se § 1983 plaintiff survived summary judgment on illegal search claim despite defendant’s claim it was barred by Heck because it did not yet challenge a conviction. Medley v. McClindon, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93032 (E.D. Mo. December 26, 2006).*

Two anticipatory search warrants were executed on the lawyer defendant for alleged bankruptcy fraud. When confronted by the FBI and an AUSA, he made a proffer. After being charged, he sought to suppress the search via a motion in limine concerning the government’s attempt to void the proffer for lack of candor. The motion was denied. United States v. Peel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92880 (S.D. Ill. December 22, 2006).*

Broad allegations that probable cause was lacking without any specifics was insufficient to get a Franks hearing. Motion denied without prejudice. United States v. Trikha, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92885 (S.D. Ill. December 22, 2006).*