Suppressed search not collateral estoppel in § 1983 case against officer

Criminal defendant who succeeded on Fourth Amendment claim in state court could not invoke collateral estoppel against officer as plaintiff in a civil case. Schumacher v. Halverson, 467 F. Supp. 2d 939 (D. Minn. December 15, 2006):

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question of privity in the context of a § 1983 action between a police officer and a state in Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1984). There, the plaintiff initially prevailed in a criminal proceeding on his motion to suppress evidence based on illegal search and seizure. Id. at 51. Later, in a civil suit against the police officer, the plaintiff sought to bar the officer from relitigating his previously-successful Fourth Amendment claim. Id. The Eighth Circuit interpreted Missouri’s law of collateral estoppel, a body of law substantially similar to Minnesota’s, and declined to estop the officer for want of privity. Id. at 52; see Willems, 333 N.W.2d at 621.

The Duncan court reasoned that the police officer’s interests in a criminal proceeding are not identical to the state’s. Criminal proceedings are designed to vindicate the public interest, and an individual police officer has no personal interest in the outcome. Duncan, 744 F.2d at 52. The Eighth Circuit found a mere interest in the facts is insufficient to establish privity; privity must exist “in relation to an identity of interests in the subject matter of the litigation.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Similarly, this Court finds Officer Halverson was not in privity with the Commissioner of Public Safety in the implied-consent hearing. The Commissioner represented the State of Minnesota and its interest in revoking plaintiff’s driver’s license. The Commissioner had no interest in representing the individual police officer involved in the arrest. The implied consent hearing dealt with plaintiff’s driver’s license; this case concerns the personal and official liability of Officer Halverson and the Lino Lakes Police Department. See State v. Wagner, 637 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Minn. App. 2001)(holding party to implied consent hearing not precluded from challenging validity of traffic stop in later criminal proceeding). Unlike the present defendants, during the implied consent hearing there was never a question of the Commissioner’s having deprived anyone of constitutional rights or the Commissioner’s right to official immunity. There is no privity when such disparate interests are at stake. See id.; Duncan, 744 F.2d at 52.

Excessive force claim allowed to proceed, but without the officers uninvolved in the shooting of plaintiff’s decedent during a drug raid that produced no drugs. Decedent was shot and killed during the raid when he became “combative.” Estate of Brutsche v. City of Federal Way, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90883 (W.D. Wash. December 14, 2006).*

Ybarra did not prevent defendant’s search during execution of a search warrant on business premises because officers had good reason to believe that defendant was involved in drug trafficking. United States v. Lopera, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90929 (S.D. N.Y. October 13, 2006).*

Officers observed a hand to hand transaction and corroborated the informant. The fact that the arrest did not immediately occur did not nullify the probable cause. State v. Sulewski, 98 Conn. App. 762 (December 19, 2006).*

Another case holds that possession of drugs in a car justifies a patdown of a passenger because possession of drugs means guns are likely around. State v. Banda, 639 S.E.2d 36 (S.C. December 11, 2006):

We hold that under the circumstances of this case, [Officer] Lawson had reasonable suspicion to frisk Banda for weapons pursuant to a valid automobile stop. This Court has recognized that because of the “indisputable nexus between drugs and guns,” where an officer has reasonable suspicion that drugs are present in a vehicle lawfully stopped, there is an appropriate level of suspicion of criminal activity and apprehension of danger to justify a frisk of both the driver and the passenger in the absence of other factors alleviating the officer’s safety concerns. Butler, 353 S.C. at 391 (quoting U.S. v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169-170 (4th Cir. 1998)). In this situation, the police clearly had reasonable suspicion to suspect that drugs were present in the vehicle. The police had observed the car leave the residence of a known drug dealer. Furthermore, the car displayed stolen Georgia license tags and the police knew from their confidential informant that the target’s drug shipments came from Georgia. Even though the police shortly realized that Banda was not their target, the fact that the activity observed at the target’s house corroborated the informant’s statements was enough to give the officers a reasonable suspicion that Banda was in some way involved with the target’s drug activity and that drugs might therefore be in the vehicle. See Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, at 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621. Given the frequent association between drugs and guns, Lawson’s safety concerns were justified based on the vehicle’s apparent connection to a known drug dealer.