In a bizarre case of a citizen’s alleged paranoia and impersonating a police officer (which he was acquitted of), he sued various police officers and Assistant State’s Attorneys. There were many claims, but the only one that is of interest here is that mailing him a summons was not a seizure. The officer had no ticket book when he stopped the plaintiff. Tweeton v. Frandrup, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90533 (D. Minn. December 12, 2006):
As an initial matter, “the view that an obligation to appear in court to face criminal charges constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure is not the law.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Jefferson v. City of Omaha Police Dep’t, 335 F.3d 804, 806 (8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether an individual is seized when ordered to appear in court, but noting that “several of our sister circuits have been disinclined to expand fourth-amendment law in” this way). Because court attendance is not a seizure, Tweeton has failed to demonstrate any deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Stop of bus at permanent immigration checkpoint led to questioning of passenger about her citizenship status, and the immigration officer thought it suspicious how protective the defendant was of her bag [apparently he has never traveled with a computer]. In a quick series of questions taking about ten seconds, she consented to a look into her bag, and a brick of marijuana was seen. The District Court suppressed, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the stop was of short duration and that it was not unreasonable. United States v. Jaime, 473 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. December 15, 2006):
The second principle thus relied on in Machuca-Barrera is that the permissible duration of a suspicionless stop at a fixed immigration checkpoint includes the time necessary to “request consent to extend the detention.” Id. at 433. Thus, we held:
“The scope of an immigration checkpoint stop is limited to the justifying, programmatic purpose of the stop: determining the citizenship status of persons passing through the checkpoint. The permissible duration of an immigration checkpoint stop is therefore the time reasonably necessary to determine the citizenship status of the persons stopped. This would include the time necessary to ascertain the number and identity of the occupants of the vehicle, inquire about citizenship status, request identification or other proof of citizenship, and request consent to extend the detention.” Id. (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
On the basis of the foregoing two principles, we held that Machuca-Barrera’s suspicionless detention at the checkpoint was legal because its duration, up to the time he gave his consent to search, was objectively reasonable, and thereafter the duration of his detention could be lawfully extended without any other justification. We stated:
“… the permissible duration of the stop was the amount of time reasonably necessary for Agent Holt to ask a few questions about immigration status. Agent Holt’s few questions took no more than a couple of minutes; this is within the permissible duration of an immigration checkpoint stop. Although Machuca-Barrera notes that Agent Holt asked a question about drugs, we will not second-guess Agent Holt’s judgment in asking that question. The brief stop by Agent Holt, which determined the citizenship status of the travelers and lasted no more than a couple of minutes before Agent Holt requested and received consent to search, was constitutional.” Id. at 435.
It is clear that Machuca-Barrera dictates the result here. There, the time elapsed between the agents’ initial contact with the defendant until he consented to the request to search his vehicle was “no more than a couple of minutes;” here the comparable time was clearly less than half a minute. During that period of time three things occurred in Machuca-Barrera. First, citizenship and travel plan questions were asked and answered, the answers reflecting United States citizenship, and that is likewise the case here. Second, in Machuca-Barrera, the agents asked questions about carrying drugs and guns, which were answered in the negative, and we declined to “second-guess” the asking of that question or to engage in “inquiry into the subjective purpose of the officer asking the questions.” The next thing that occurred in Machuca-Barrera was that consent to search the car was asked for and given, and we expressly and specifically held that the permissible duration of a suspicionless fixed checkpoint immigration stop included the time reasonably necessary to request consent to extend the detention (and, by necessary implication, to receive the reply to the request) by consenting to search of the vehicle. Here, what immediately followed the citizenship and travel plan questions and answers, was Jaime being asked if the bag was hers, and on her promptly responding that it was, whether she would consent to its search and her affirmative reply. Clearly the question whether the bag was hers was a part of, and a necessary predicate to, asking her consent to search it, and hence should be treated in the same way as the request for and receipt of consent to search was in Machuca-Barrera. But, even wholly apart from that, there is no conceivable justification for holding that the bag ownership question and answer impermissibly extended the duration of the stop here, while the carrying drugs or weapons question and answer in Machuca-Barrera did not.
The Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Atkinson, 209 Fed. Appx. 957 (11th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished), that a Franks challenge, one of five issues raised, “lack[ed] merit” after oral argument and was not even discussed.
Defendant’s flight from approaching officers was not a seizure under Hodari D. “Assuming that the detectives’ pursuit of Coley was a show of authority, Coley ran and, therefore, did not submit to it.” United States v. Coley, 464 F. Supp. 2d 487 (D. Md. December 13, 2006).*
