NY: Search warrant for persons associated with a car containing drugs permitted a strip search of the occupants

Another remarkable holding yesterday: New York’s Third Appellate Department held in People v. Ming, 35 A.D.3d 962, 825 N.Y.S.2d 825 (3d Dept. December 14, 2006), that a search warrant directed to all occupants of a car associated with drugs permitted a strip search of all persons found with the car. An overbreadth challenge was rejected:

Next, defendant contends that the cocaine found upon his person in the course of the strip search should have been suppressed because the search exceeded the scope of the search warrant and, therefore, violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, he claims that the warrant was overly broad because it allowed a search of anyone present in the described vehicle without specifically identifying or naming him as one of the suspected drug dealers. We are unpersuaded. Notably, search warrants that direct a search of a particular place or vehicle, “may also direct a search of any person present thereat or therein” (CPL 690.15 [2]; see People v Vanderpool, 217 A.D.2d 716, 718, 629 N.Y.S.2d 307 [1995], lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 847, 658 N.E.2d 235, 634 N.Y.S.2d 457 [1995]), as long as the search warrant application establishes probable cause for the search (see People v Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 330 N.E.2d 26, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50 [1975]).

Here, the application for the search warrant clearly established probable cause inasmuch as it demonstrated that, among other things, the specific 1994 red Lincoln vehicle was being used in the possession or sale of cocaine and, therefore, it was permissible for the issuing judge to “infer that anyone present was involved in the ongoing illegal activity” (People v Neish, 232 A.D.2d 744, 746, 649 N.Y.S.2d 48 [1996], lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 927, 677 N.E.2d 301, 654 N.Y.S.2d 729 [1996]; see People v Williams, 284 A.D.2d 564, 565, 726 N.Y.S.2d 740 [2001], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 909, 756 N.E.2d 95, 730 N.Y.S.2d 807 [2001]). Accordingly, we find no basis to conclude that the suppression motion was improperly denied.