M.D.Ga.: Riverside/Gerstein violation doesn’t justify suppression of evidence seized on arrest

A Riverside/Gerstein violation of not timely presenting probable cause to a magistrate doesn’t justify suppressing the evidence from the arrest. United States v. Jackson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234511 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2024):

Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that a Riverside/Gerstein violation occurred, it does not justify suppression here. “The issue of whether suppression is an appropriate remedy for a Riverside/Gerstein violation is unresolved by the Supreme Court although the Supreme Court has held that exclusion is appropriate for other constitutional violations.” Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Powell, 511 U.S. at 85 n.*). In Lawhorn, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the Exclusionary Rule may justify suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a Riverside/Gerstein violation. Id. at 1291 (declining to apply the Exclusionary Rule to a Riverside/Gerstein violation because the habeas petition at issue was filed many years after the asserted violation). Other Circuits have also approved of a suppression remedy for Riverside/Gerstein violations. Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 174 F.3d 941, 942, 946 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 821 (7th Cir. 1997)).

Under the Exclusionary Rule, a court may suppress “‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure’ and … ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,’ the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.'” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984)). Here, Defendant asserts that a Riverside/Gerstein violation unlawfully prolonged his detention after the 48-hour presumptively reasonable period—from around 5:49 P.M. on September 4, roughly 48 hours after Defendant’s arrest on September 2, to the probable cause determination which occurred on September 6 at 10:30 A.M. Yet the evidence Defendant seeks to suppress occurred at the time of his arrest on September 2—8 hours before the asserted constitutional violation began. Thus, the timeline reveals that the evidence seized at the time of Defendant’s arrest was neither the direct result of, nor derivative from, the asserted Riverside/Gerstein violation.