NJ: Arrest on warrant but illegal entry into third party’s home does not justify suppression of otherwise valid statement

NJ applies New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), and concludes that an arrest on an arrest warrant but not a search warrant for a third party’s location was not grounds to suppress his statement. State v. Bell, 388 N.J. Super. 629, 909 A.2d 1179 (November 17, 2006):

Defendant contends that his arrest was unlawful because it was the product of an unlawful search, and hence his confession should be suppressed as the product of an unlawful arrest. We find no merit in this contention. Defendant’s arrest was not unlawful, as it was authorized by an arrest warrant. Consequently, the cases on which defendant relies, concerning suppression of confessions that result from unlawful arrests, are not on point. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); State v. Chippero, 164 N.J. 342, 753 A.2d 701 (2000); State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990). As the Supreme Court observed in Payton, the fact that defendant’s person was seized during an unlawful search does not preclude the State from prosecuting him. Payton, supra, 445 U.S. at 592, 100 S. Ct. at 1383, 68 L. Ed. at 654, n.34. Nor does it transform his eventual confession into the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” subject to suppression under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963). See also Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 591-92, 95 S. Ct. at 2256, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 420.

In New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1990), the Supreme Court addressed a case in which the police illegally entered defendant’s home in order to effect his arrest for which they had probable cause. Id. at 15, 110 S. Ct. at l642, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 19. Thus, as in this case, the arrest was otherwise legal, although the entry into the house without a search warrant violated Payton. Id. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 1644-45, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 22. In Harris, the Court declined to suppress defendant’s confession:

“[W]e decline to apply the exclusionary rule in this context because the rule in Payton was designed to protect the physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects, like Harris, protection for statements made outside their premises where the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a crime.”

[Id. at 17, 110 S. Ct. at 1643, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 20.]

Administrative inspection for electrical code violations (“Be my guest.”) was valid consent. Furgeson v. City of Tacoma, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83277 (W.D. Wash. November 15, 2006).*

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.