Mistake of name in SW was reasonable, and search not suppressed

The officer preparing a search warrant had a computer problem in trying to create a search warrant for defendant’s premises. He took a previously issued warrant from another case and changed information in it, but he left the previous name in there. The court refused to suppress finding the mistake reasonable, and there was no problem of the wrong place being searched. United States v. Sirmans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82652 (D. Del. November 14, 2006):

The Fourth Amendment mandates that an issued warrant specifically describe the person or things to be searched and seized. United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1983). “Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(1) provides that a warrant ‘shall contain the name of the defendant or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be described with reasonable certainty,’ and this Rule has been read as a gloss on the fourth amendment.” Id. at 747. (citation omitted). The warrant must contain either on its face or by attachment a particular description of what is to be seized. Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 2000). The “requirement of particularity has been described as a question of practical rather than technical accuracy.” United States v. Dollson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22478, 2004 WL 2577551 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2004). To that end, clerical errors will not automatically render a warrant defective. United States v. Carter, 756 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1995). The crucial issue is “whether there has been such a variance as to ‘affect the substantial rights’ of the accused.” Id., citing Cromer v. United States, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 400, 142 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1944)).

The court finds Herron’s uncontradicted testimony credible and his explanation for the mistake reasonable. Considering the affidavit in conjunction with the warrant, it is evident that Herron was referencing defendant and that the inclusion of Henderson’s information was an inadvertent error that does not impinge defendant’s substantive rights.

Alien detained in international waters far from the United States who was in possession of 9200 kgs of cocaine on a ship was not denied any Fourth Amendment rights by there being no prompt determination of probable cause before he was brought to the U.S. for trial. As an alien outside the U.S., the Fourth Amendment did not apply to him under United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). The search on the ship took five days. United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. November 15, 2006) (this case was under submission for two years).

Reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking was clearly present for detaining defendant to bring in a drug dog. Also, officer was not obliged to seek a telephonic warrant for use of the dog and then search of the car. United States v. Mendoza, 468 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. November 15, 2006).

Defendant was a mere visitor whose connection to the premises did not rise to the level of a guest under Olson. United States v. Wineinger, 208 Fed. Appx. 286 (5th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished).