The state carries the burden of proof of exigency for dispensing with announcement. Mere possibility of exigency is not enough. Commonwealth v. Wagstaff, 2006 PA Super 312, 911 A.2d 533 (November 6, 2006):
[*P10] Stated otherwise, while the Commonwealth makes an argument premised upon exigent circumstances, there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing of the existence of any exigencies at the time of the execution of the warrant. Cf. Grubb, 595 A.2d at 135 (“The right, on the scene, under exigent circumstances, to break in unannounced recognizes that the peril to an officer serving a warrant is ever present and he must be able to protect himself. This usually can be done only at the time the warrant is being executed.”).
[*P11] Herein, the lack of evidence supportive of the Commonwealth’s destruction of evidence argument is inimical to its position excusing the manner and method by which the police executed the search warrant. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Carlton, 549 Pa. 174, 701 A.2d 143 (1997), the police announced their presence but did not announce their purpose and forced the door after twenty to thirty seconds. The Supreme Court noted that the police failed to state their purpose prior to entering the dwelling and that there were no exigent circumstances that would have excused the police from announcing their purpose. …
[*P12] Sub judice, the police identified themselves, but they failed to state their purpose.
Store clerk’s call that a man called another man from the store and requested that he bring him a gun gave reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Taylor, 2006 Ohio 5866, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5807 (10th Dist. November 7, 2006).*
Plain feel of a bullet during a patdown justified a greater search. State v. Clay, 2006 Ohio 5864, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5816 (5th Dist. November 7, 2006).*
Small lane crossings are not enough for a field sobriety test, but this was more. State v. Hunter, 2006 Ohio 5810, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 5785 (9th Dist. November 6, 2006):
Generally, de minimis lane violations and small marked lane errors alone are not sufficient to justify the administration of field sobriety tests. State v. Spillers (Mar. 24, 2000), 2nd Dist. No. 1504, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1151, at *6; United States v. Frantz (2001), 177 F.Supp.2d 760. However, in this case, Officer Greiner personally observed Defendant crossing outside the lane three times and he had a tip from the Task Force officer that Defendant was driving erratically and was a vehicle of interest. This properly constitutes a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was drinking, thus properly enabling Officer Greiner to conduct field sobriety tests.
Washington’s sexually violent predator law was narrowly drawn to allow the state access to a convicted SVP’s computer to determine whether he was complying with the law. State v. Williams, 135 Wn. App. 915, 146 P.3d 481 (November 7, 2006):
Contrary to Williams’ assertions, the SCC’s search of his room and computer hard drives was reasonable and in accord with Hydrick. Internal SCC policies authorize the searches and seizures to, in part, enforce the SCC prohibition on the residents’ possession of sexually explicit material. These policies are necessary to both treat and protect the resident and to protect others. They balance the rights of SCC residents with the State’s interest in treatment and protection and do not violate Williams’ privacy rights. See Campbell, 139 Wn.2d at 355-56.
