VA: Arrest for minor misdemeanor statutorily subject only to summons was invalid

Virginia holds that physical arrest for a low level offense that was statutorily subject only to a summons was invalid under the Fourth Amendment under Knowles. Atwater is distinguishable because the statute there gave the officer discretion to arrest or issue a summons. Defendant was subjected to a search incident at his house after he consented while in custody. The search incident produced drugs on him. Moore v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 717, 636 S.E.2d 395 (November 3, 2006), rev’g 47 Va. App. 55, 64, 622 S.E.2d 253, 258 (2005) (en banc). Comment: Atwater was one of the worst decisions of last decade because it permitted a physical arrest of a mother in front of her children for not wearing a seatbelt. The Supreme Court essentially left it to the discretion of the officer how to proceed, no matter how badly that discretion was exercised. Virginia, at least, takes discretion away in some minor offenses.

Consent to taking a blood sample in a hospital ER was not coerced. The defendant was free to leave afterward and did. Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 636 S.E.2d 460 (November 3, 2006):

In the present case, it is undisputed that neither Officer Doyle nor Officer Eberts physically restrained Bristol at the hospital after Officer Doyle told Bristol that he was “under arrest.” Therefore, Bristol was arrested at the hospital only if his consent to the blood test constituted a complete surrender of his personal liberty in submission to Officer Doyle’s assertion of authority. We conclude that Bristol’s consent to the blood test was not such a surrender of his personal liberty.

Bristol merely agreed to submit to a blood test. He did not make any statement nor did he act in a manner demonstrating a complete surrender of his personal liberty to Officer Doyle’s control.

The events that occurred at the hospital confirm the limited nature of Bristol’s acquiescence. After Officer Doyle informed Bristol of the implied consent provisions of Code § 18.2-268.2 and Bristol agreed to have the blood sample drawn, Doyle did not restrict Bristol’s movements in any manner. Officer Doyle merely accompanied Bristol to the emergency room where Bristol’s blood was drawn. Officer Doyle then left the hospital, taking no action to constrain Bristol’s personal liberty. Likewise, Officer Eberts did not act in a manner that could be construed as constraining Bristol’s personal liberty. Bristol left the hospital on his own, and the police did not take any immediate action to restrain him. Thus, Bristol’s consent to the blood test did not constitute a submission to police authority resulting in an arrest.

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