The reasonableness of 2½ months of pole camera observation of defendant’s house was waived by not filing a motion to suppress until after the First Circuit granted en banc review on that issue and then a month later. United States v. Ladd, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87589 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2021)*:
Mr. Ladd has set forth nothing to justify that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this case, and the court does not understand why he waited until now to seek leave to file a motion to suppress. …
. . .
Finally, Defendant makes no argument or assertion that the pole camera captured views or activities that were unavailable to members of the public had they parked in front of the property on public property or walked past the property on a public road or street. In other words, if the images captured by the camera are the same images that are plainly visible to members of the public who passed by or viewed the property in question from a public place, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred by the Government’s use of the pole camera.
Mr. Ladd has set forth nothing to justify that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this case, and the court does not understand why he waited until now to seek leave to file a motion to suppress. Defendant relies heavily on Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), as it is liberally sprinkled throughout his proposed motion to suppress. Carpenter was decided on June 22, 2018, almost three years ago. With respect to the motion for leave and the proposed motion to suppress, all cases cited by Defendant were available and should have been known to him through the exercise of reasonable diligence well before the date his motion for leave was filed. The case of United States v. Moore-Bush was argued en banc on March 23, 2021, yet the motion was not filed until 31 days after the argument. Moreover, the First Circuit announced in December 2020 that en banc oral argument would take place in March 2020. Even if the court accepts Mr. Ladd’s explanation, the motion does not adequately explain why it could not have been filed earlier. Regardless, any opinion issued in that case by the First Circuit is not binding on this court.
When Mr. Ladd and his counsel summarily and cavalierly dismiss the late filing date of the motion by stating that no prejudice will occur because it was filed 52 days before trial, they miss the point. First, 14 of the 52 days have now elapsed since the filing of Defendant’s motion. The statement is made in such a way as if the court has little or nothing to do in those 52 days. The court does not know whether the statement was made out of arrogance or because of an innocent lack of knowledge regarding this court’s busy docket.