ND: Warrantless entry of child protective services to remove a child was unreasonable

State child services officers came to defendant’s door to take her child away. She refused and ran back into the house with officers in pursuit. This warrantless entry and a second entry to collect clothes for the child were unreasonable. Drug evidence found inside is suppressed, and the exclusionary rule should apply here. State v. Bee, 2021 ND 61, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 54 (Mar. 24, 2021):

[*P6] Bee claims the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of her home. On appeal, the State concedes that the officers’ second entry into Bee’s residence, when a BCSS worker pointed out the glass smoking pipe, constituted a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. The State further concedes the plain view exception to the warrant requirement cannot be applied here because the officer violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. When no exception exists, “any evidence seized is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule and must be suppressed.” Graf, 2006 ND 196, ¶ 9, 721 N.W.2d 381 (citing State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 12, 685 N.W.2d 120).

[*P7] The State argues, however, that following the exclusionary rule in this case will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations because officers did not enter the residence intending to search. “A physical entry into a home is a chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment protects.” State v. Hart, 2014 ND 4, ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d 735. “In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). Here, regardless of their intent, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by crossing the threshold of the residence without a warrant. The State’s argument that the officers were merely acting in the regular course of duty to assist social services is unavailing because the social workers are also bound by the Fourth Amendment. See Andrews v. Hickman Cty., 700 F.3d 845, 859 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A] social worker, like other state officers, is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”). The State has not provided persuasive reasoning or authority to avoid application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances.

[*P8] During the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee seeks to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, Bee is entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search.