Informant hearsay once removed was still probable cause. The CI enlisted another to go get drugs from defendant and brought them back to the CI who turned them over to the police. United States v. Bacon, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 8320 (7th Cir. Mar. 22, 2021):
We begin by acknowledging that the controlled buys in this case present novel risks. “The use of an unwitting informant introduces an additional layer of uncertainty to the transaction because it leaves open the possibility that the narcotics were acquired not at the suspect residence but at the location where the confidential and unwitting informants met before and after the transaction.” United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, officers did not search or wire the middlemen, so they could not confirm whether the middlemen obtained the drugs from Bacon or from their own stashes.
At the same time, many of the concerns about voluntary government informants are inapplicable to unwitting informants. Government cooperators merit skepticism because they often have motives to lie such as payment, leniency, or animosity toward a rival. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366, 370-71 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cook, 102 F.3d 249, 251 (7th Cir. 1996). Unwitting informants, by contrast, have “nothing to gain” from participating in controlled buys. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 480-81 (6th Cir. 2009). Officers have not promised them anything and they have no incentive to shift blame because they do not know that law enforcement is involved. To the contrary, unwitting informants have quite a bit to lose. The unwitting informants in this case exposed themselves to criminal liability by participating in illegal drug transactions. The incriminating nature of their statements and actions in the controlled buys bolsters the reliability of those statements and actions. See id. (unwitting informant’s statements were reliable because he did not know officers were recording him and he had nothing to gain from implicating the defendant in a drug deal that also implicated him); cf. Olson, 408 F.3d at 371 (an informant’s statement against penal interest “carries with it a presumption of reliability”).
On balance, we conclude that the controlled buys in this case were reliable indicators that Bacon was selling drugs from his home. See Sidwell, 440 F.3d at 869. As in other cases, the officers here did not actually see the drug sales. See, e.g., id.; United States v. McKinney, 143 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1998). Still, they watched and listened as the confidential informants discussed the transactions with the middlemen; observed the middlemen enter and exit Bacon’s apartment; and obtained the drugs from the confidential informants immediately after the transactions. The main point of uncertainty is whether the middlemen bought the drugs at Bacon’s apartment. Bacon hypothesizes, for example, that the middlemen could have stood in his stairwell for 15 minutes, pretending to buy drugs, only to sell their own drugs to the informants with impunity. We acknowledge this theoretical possibility, but we do not find it troublesome on these facts. We have rejected similarly speculative arguments in the context of standard controlled buys. See, e.g., Sidwell, 440 F.3d at 869. Here, Bacon’s argument is particularly unpersuasive because, by all appearances, the middlemen did not know that they were participating in controlled buys. Bacon does not explain what possible motive they could have had for deceiving the confidential informants about the source of the drugs.
For these reasons, we hold that the unwitting informants did not detract from the probative value of the controlled buys. We note that several other circuits have approved of controlled buys involving unwitting informants. United States v. Washington, 775 F.3d 405, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Artez, 389 F.3d at 1112-13 (collecting cases); see also Gunter, 551 F.3d at 480-81.
We further hold that the controlled buys, along with the other materials in the affidavit, supplied probable cause for the search warrant. Officers received two anonymous tips, close together in time, that Bacon was selling drugs from his home. The officers corroborated the tipsters’ information as to Bacon’s cars, address, and criminal record. They then conducted two controlled buys from Bacon’s residence. See McKinney, 143 F.3d at 329 (“Controlled buys add great weight to an informant’s tip.”). The middlemen who entered Bacon’s apartment not only acquired drugs; they also told the informants that Bacon, a convicted felon, had weapons all over his apartment. On these facts, the state-court judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a “fair probability” that officers would find evidence of illegal drug dealing activities at 1728½ High Street–even if the officers never saw Bacon himself selling drugs. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (Probable cause exists if there is “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”) (emphasis added).
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)