Despite a language barrier and a Spanish-language expert saying the officer’s request was ambiguous, the district court found that defendant consented to a search of his luggage. That finding is not clearly erroneous, even considering all the record. The officer also used a language app on his phone to converse with defendant. Finally, a Spanish-language consent form is desirable, but not a Fourth Amendment requirement. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13722 (8th Cir. Apr. 29, 2020):
Here, Finn asked Garcia if he had one bag—”uno bolsa”—while pointing to Garcia’s checked-baggage ticket.3 The only bag Garcia checked was his suitcase. Finn then used the same word when requesting permission to search Garcia’s bag while the men conversed inside the station. It was therefore reasonable for Finn to believe the two men were discussing the same bag—the only bag Garcia checked. See Leiva, 821 F.3d at 818-19; see also United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that it was reasonable for officers to believe suspect consented to a search when a Spanish-language expert testified that though the relevant Spanish term could be translated in different ways, its meaning was reasonably apparent in the relevant context).
Garcia argues that Finn knew at the time he searched the suitcase that Garcia had a backpack on the bus and that Garcia had only consented to a search of his backpack. Garcia relies on a brief statement Finn made to an unidentified officer after the search, when Finn stated that Garcia mentioned “another [bag]” when they “first started talking.” Garcia did not question Finn about this comment during the suppression hearing, and as a result, it is unclear what Finn meant. Regardless, immediately following that remark, Finn explained that, in fact, he did not believe Garcia actually had a bag on the bus. Having reviewed the video and a transcript of the audio, we are confident that prior to the search of the suitcase, Finn never saw that Garcia had a second bag nor did Garcia ever mention a second bag. As a result, while this discrepancy might give us pause were we considering this as an original matter, the magistrate judge, whose findings were adopted by the district court, found that Finn was credible, and based on the record, we are unable to conclude that the district court clearly erred. See United States v. Coleman, 909 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2018).
We find a case from a sister circuit particularly illustrative. In Leiva, the Seventh Circuit held that it was not clearly erroneous to find that a defendant voluntarily consented to a search even though the officer’s request to search was not properly phrased in Spanish. 821 F.3d at 818-19. There, the officer asked a suspect “¿Puedo buscar su coche?”, which the officer believed meant, “May I search your car?” Id. at 813. According to the defendant’s Spanish-language experts, the phrase meant “May I look for your car?”, “May I get your car?”, or “May I locate your car?” Id. at 814. The defendant argued he had not consented to a search of his car but instead had permitted the officer to “look for” his car. The court was unpersuaded, finding that the context made the officer’s meaning apparent and that the defendant responded in a way that indicated he understood the request. Id. at 818-19. The officer and the defendant were standing near the defendant’s car, which had not moved since the officer initiated the traffic stop, and as a result it would have been clear to a reasonable person that the officer did not need to look for the car. Id.
As in Leiva, so too here. Although Finn’s Spanish translation may have been imperfect, the context of the interaction and Garcia’s response mean it was not clearly erroneous to find that a reasonable officer would believe Garcia understood Finn’s request.
The relative ease with which Garcia and Finn communicated using the translation application further supports the district court’s finding that it was reasonable for Finn to believe Garcia consented based in part on a request using the term bolsa—a translation produced by the application. See Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d at 687 (emphasizing that the officer and suspect “convers[ed] without difficulty for a very substantial portion of their conversation”). ….
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)