CA7: Denial of medical care to arrestee can be a Fourth Amendment issue

Denial of medical care to an arrestee can also be determined under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, based on reasonableness. Legg v. Pappas, 383 Fed. Appx. 547 (7th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

Finally, Legg argues that Agee and Hutt violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably denying him medical care. Whether the officers acted reasonably is determined by four factors: the officers’ notice of the arrestee’s medical needs; the seriousness of the medical needs; the scope of the requested treatment; and police interests. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007). All four factors show that Hutt and Agee behaved reasonably. First, there is nothing in the record that suggests that Hutt or Agee had notice that Legg was in need of medical care. By all accounts, it appeared that Legg was just plain drunk. Furthermore, neither he nor his family members said he needed medical care. Indeed, when Legg went to the hospital, he told Dr. Oakley that “there’s nothing wrong with me, I’m just drunk.” The second factor is of no help to Legg because he was not in serious medical need at the time he was transported from his brother’s house. Furthermore, since no one requested treatment, the third factor also shows that Agee and Hutt behaved reasonably. Finally, the police had an interest in taking Legg into custody because he had outstanding warrants. Since none of the factors favor Legg, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

Williams v. Rodriguez:

The severity of the medical condition under this standard need not, on its own, rise to the level of objective seriousness required under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis operates on a sliding scale, balancing the seriousness of the medical need with the third factor–the scope of the requested treatment. In Sides for example, the court noted that the plaintiff was partially responsible for his lengthy detention outdoors, since he insisted that the officers not charge him at all, rather than requesting that the officers take him to the station house or write him a citation immediately. Id. Finally, police interests also factor into the reasonableness determination. This factor is wide-ranging in scope and can include administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns. Sides reflected the latter of these interests, with the court emphasizing the importance of an on-site investigation and noting that the officers did not prolong the plaintiff’s detention once this investigation was completed. Id. Again, we offer no opinion as to whether defendants’ conduct violated Williams’s Fourth Amendment rights under this multi-factor analysis, but for the reasons discussed above, Williams has failed to meet the higher burden of showing that Officer Rodriguez was deliberately indifferent to an objectively serious medical condition.