MD: Maryland exclusionary rule and GFE applied to search in NJ for evidence of a MD murder

Defendant was a suspect in a Maryland murder case, and the state and USMs certainly had probable cause for him connecting him to the murder. Yet, the affidavit for the search warrant for property in New Jersey merely conclusorily stated that defendant was a suspect in the murder in the four corners of the affidavit. Therefore, probable cause was not shown. Turning to the good faith exception and conflict of laws, the court instead finds the search under the warrant saved by the good faith exception. While the search was in New Jersey and that state does not have a good faith exception, Maryland follows Leon and not a separate state-created good faith exception. Applying conflict of laws principles, Maryland has the greatest governmental interest in the search because the murder was in Maryland. Therefore, Maryland law on good faith exception applies, and the court finds it satisfied because the warrant was not so lacking in probable cause that reliance on it wasn’t reasonable. Carroll v. State, 2019 Md. App. LEXIS 369 (May 2, 2019):

In general terms, states have adopted one of four different approaches: “(1) a mechanical approach determined by the law of the forum State; (2) a significant relationship approach that looks to which State has the greater interest in the process by which the evidence was obtained; (3) a governmental interest approach that weighs the interests of the forum State against those of the State where the evidence was obtained; and (4) an exclusionary rule approach based on the underlying policies of the respective exclusionary rules of the States involved.” Commonwealth v. Banville, 931 N.E.2d 457, 464 n.1 (Mass. 2010) (providing a general overview of the four approaches). The first approach is mechanical; the other three ask the court to weigh the interests and policies of the involved states. The question of what approach we should adopt is one of first impression.

. . .

Whatever analytical merit there may be in trying to fit Maryland into one of the general approaches adopted by our sister states, we are not certain that a one-size fits all approach will satisfy every factual context that may arise. For that reason, we will focus only on the application of the exclusionary rule in the context of this case. And, in doing so, we will borrow analytical considerations from some of the various approaches taken in other states.

The criminal act in this case is the murder and robbery in Maryland of two Maryland citizens by another Maryland citizen. The investigation, arrest, and searches were a joint law enforcement effort involving officers from Maryland and New Jersey in addition to the federal Marshals Service. Nothing in the record suggests that the Maryland police were consciously trying to evade Maryland law; New Jersey was involved only because appellant had left Maryland and went to New Jersey. In our view, whatever interest New Jersey may have in the process by which the evidence was obtained, Maryland has a greater governmental interest in the case.

As to the underlying policies of the two states regarding the exclusionary rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the good faith exception “on independent state grounds” based on the impact that its adoption would have on “the privacy rights of [its] citizens” and the “enforcement of [New Jersey] criminal laws.” See Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 850.21 It views the purpose of the exclusionary rule as “not merely to deter police misconduct.” It is also an “indispensable mechanism” to protect the right to be free from unreasonable searches, and the adoption of the good faith exception would “disrupt the highly effective procedures employed by [New Jersey’s] criminal justice system to accommodate that constitutional guarantee without impairing law enforcement.” Id. at 856-57. Clearly, the application of the good faith exception in this case will, in no way, impact the privacy rights of New Jersey citizens or impair or negatively disrupt the procedures employed in New Jersey’s criminal justice system.

The Court of Appeals “has not recognized an exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,” Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 102 (2010) (Barbera, J., dissenting), and has followed Leon, permitting “evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid [to] be admissible if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant.” McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467 (1997); and see Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 520 (2004) (Greene, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court, regarding a canine sniff, should take an “opportunity” to “interpret Article 26 … so as to afford [Maryland] citizens greater protections than those as interpreted under the Fourth Amendment”).

We hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here; that the warrants are not so obviously deficient that they could not have been reasonably relied upon by the officers in good faith; and that the evidence recovered from both the residence and the garbage bag was admissible at trial. Therefore, we need not address appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the State’s argument that the garage bag in this case was abandoned under both Maryland and New Jersey law.