Missouri’s Linn State Technical College’s student drug testing policy is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. After the prior appeal, Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir. 2013), the district court erred in conducting a program-by-program analysis of where the special needs doctrine would apply. Because the students were hands on in industrial training, and going into industries where they would almost certainly be drug tested at work, testing them as they learn is not unconstitutional because of the safety concerns. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21132 (8th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015) (2-1) [Update: Decided en banc: Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23030 (8th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (en banc) [posted here], panel at Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2015), prior opinion, Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir. 2013).]:
In Barrett, based on the evidence presented in support of Appellees’ motion for a preliminary injunction on their facial challenge, we determined many points that remain relevant and buttress our instant analysis: (1) the public has a valid interest in deterring drug use among students engaged in programs posing significant safety risks to others, 705 F.3d at 322; (2) “some college students that attend Linn State have a diminished expectation of privacy because they are seeking accreditation in heavily regulated industries and industries where drug testing, in practice, is the norm,” id. at 323; (3) Linn State’s testing procedures significantly minimize the intrusiveness of Linn State’s drug-screening program and are relatively noninvasive, thus the invasion of students’ privacy is not significant, id.; and (4) the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that can arise from a student under the influence of drugs while engaging in a safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for Linn State’s testing policy, id.
In analyzing Appellees’ as-applied challenge, the district court interpreted Barrett rigidly and conducted an exhaustive program-by-program analysis, permanently enjoining Linn State from administering its drug-testing program to students in specific, enumerated programs. In doing so, the district court erred on several fronts.
1. Special Need
. . .
In light of the particular programming taking place on Linn State’s campus, Linn State has a justified interest in providing a safe, healthy, and productive environment for its relatively small student body and faculty population, while simultaneously preparing students for the realities of the workplace environments they are entering. This is a special need significant enough to conduct a balancing test of competing constitutional interests.
2. Balancing
a. Nature of Privacy Interest
. . .The district court’s refusal to acknowledge Linn State’s unique role in this educational setting is error. In its exhaustive risk analysis of specific programs offered at Linn State, the court often mitigated the safety risks in programs based upon the supervision of Linn State staff in the classroom. Yet, by doing so, the court emphasized the important role of the instructors in the educational setting where students need supervision, and quite clearly acknowledged the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy of all Linn State students. Many of the Linn State students are performing dangerous work for the first time. If this technical college is to shoulder the obligation to educate its students in these vocational fields, that responsibility requires at least a concomitant obligation from its students to participate drug and alcohol free. Thus, this unique environment requires a heightened level of supervision and somewhat diminished expectation of privacy.
b. Character of the Intrusion
The analysis maintained in Barrett regarding the character of the privacy intrusion remains unchanged in Appellees’ as-applied challenge. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 323. The procedures in place significantly minimize the intrusiveness of Linn State’s drug-testing policy and the invasion of students’ privacy is not significant. Id.; see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (determining that the testing method employed by the state was relatively noninvasive and that the state could not be faulted for excessive intrusion).
c. Nature and Immediacy of Concerns and Efficacy of the Policy
Here, we start with the premise established in Barrett: the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that can arise from a student under the influence of drugs while engaging in a safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for Linn State’s testing policy. 705 F.3d at 322. …
Additionally, as already noted in Barrett, “[w]hile it is true that random testing may be a more effective deterrent,” Linn State’s alleged failure to adopt the most effective drug-testing policy is not reason enough to override Linn State’s substantial interest and pursuit in this matter. 705 F.3d at 323-24. In Von Raab, the Court addressed similar arguments from those challenging the efficacy of the [*30] chosen drug-testing policy, ultimately rejecting them because the Court held that focusing on ways to, say, manipulate a test too easily “overstates the case.” 489 U.S. at 676. At bottom, as in Von Raab, the policy here holds a “close and substantial relation” to Linn State’s goal of advancing safety and educational interests on campus, given the unique vocational focus of this college. Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Linn State’s student population comprised of roughly 1200 students are primarily engaged in safety-sensitive and potentially dangerous curriculum due to the unique nature of this particular vocational and technical college and its limited focus. On balance, testing the entire student population entering Linn State is reasonable and hence constitutional and an effective means of addressing Linn State’s interest in providing “a safe, healthy, and productive environment for everyone who learns and works at LSTC by detecting, preventing, and deterring drug use and abuse among students.”
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the district court’s permanent injunction and remand for dismissal of the case. Because we reverse this matter, we also necessarily reverse the district court’s award of fees in favor of Appellees and, accordingly, remand the consolidated matter for dismissal as well.
