IL: Anticipatory warrant for place where package was “accepted” was valid

Anticipatory warrant that authorized a search of only the place where the package was “accepted” for delivery, even though it was otherwise inspecific, was still valid. There was a specified triggering event, and the officers could not be sure where the package would end up. Anticipatory search warrants strike a proper balance between the need to search but not relying on exigent circumstances for a warrantless search. People v. Duoc Bui, 2008 Ill. App. LEXIS 216 (1st Dist. March 21, 2008), released for publication May 7, 2008 (not posted on court’s website as of this posting):

We believe that our holding strikes the appropriate balance between the purpose of the warrant requirement and the need for the judiciary to encourage the use of warrants and to recognize that anticipatory warrants meet important law enforcement needs. The purpose of the warrant requirement is to act as a check on police officers “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” by interposing a “neutral and detached magistrate” into the process. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948). Our holding in this case is consistent with this purpose because it encourages police to obtain an anticipatory warrant when they intercept a package containing narcotics and have reason to believe that the package will be brought and opened at a location other than listed on the delivery address. Our holding thereby ensures that a magistrate, and not a police officer, will ultimately determine if there is in fact probable cause to believe that the package will be brought to another location. To require the police to obtain a new warrant after defendant brought the package to his home and then opened it would create the possibility that police would lose track of the criminal and the contraband and would fail to take into account the speed and flexibility with which law enforcement is required to act when dealing with those who traffic in narcotics through the mail system. We recognize the concerns raised by defendant regarding the need to limit police discretion and the potential for police abuse created by general warrants. However, given the particular facts of this case, including the use of the electronic monitoring device inside the package and the information sworn to by Officer Bator regarding narcotics traffickers moving the package to another location, we simply do not believe that those concerns are implicated in this case such that we would be required to find the warrant unconstitutional.

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The triggering condition of the warrant was acceptance of the package at the nail salon or “any other location” in the State of Illinois. Therefore, pursuant to Grubbs, there must have been probable cause to believe that the package would be accepted at a location other than the nail salon. We do not read Grubbs to require police to know every possible location where the package could be brought and accepted, including, as defendant suggests, the house on Campbell Street. To adopt such an interpretation would significantly hinder the effectiveness of an anticipatory warrant where narcotics traffickers could simply ship a package containing narcotics to one location and then bring it to another place where it could be safely opened. We decline to do so and instead conclude that, to satisfy the fourth amendment, there must have been probable cause to believe that the package would be accepted at a location other than the delivery address.

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