Prison guard had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk or car on prison grounds

A state prison guard was reasonably suspected of importing contraband into the prison, and he was brought into a conference room and interviewed and patted down. His car was searched in the parking lot revealing a close relationship to some inmates. Then his desk was searched and drugs were found. Summary judgment for defendants granted. Morris v. Valeriano, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45993 (D. Conn. June 25, 2007):

In the case at bar, prior to searching Morris’s person and car, the defendants had many objective facts from which they could have reasonably drawn the inference that Morris may have been planning to carry contraband into the correctional facility. A routine audit of the speed-dial system for all DOC facilities had discovered that 3,576 calls were made from inmate phones at Garner to Morris’s speed-dial number between June 1, 2003, and May 17, 2004, as compared to an average of between 25 to 50 of such calls per month to other speed-dial numbers. See Def.’s Stat. at PP7-9. Moreover, the audit found that the recording feature on Morris’s phone was disabled on February 10, 2004, which requires an affirmative act. Id. at PP12-13. Finally, three DOC Security Division employees personally listened to calls made by inmate Duffy to Morris between May 17 and May 20, 2004, in which they claim to have heard Duffy urge Morris repeatedly to bring him various items, with Morris responding in a way that, to these individuals, indicated he was planning to bring those items to Duffy. Id. at PP20-22. They also claim that they heard code words that they believed were used to disguise the items Duffy and Morris were discussing. Id. at P23.

The court finds these facts sufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. See Carey, 737 F.2d at 205-206. Moreover, the court rejects Morris’s argument that the intrusion in this case was far greater than constitutionally permitted. See Plf.’s Mem. in Opp. at 10-11. In Carey, the Second Circuit permitted strip searches of certain correction officers where there was reasonable suspicion to do so. Id. A search of such an intrusive nature having been permitted under the reasonable suspicion standard, the court can find no reason for not constitutionally permitting the brief pat-down search of Morris’s outer clothing. Moreover, with respect to the search of Morris’s car, the Supreme Court has indicated that a “search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one’s person,” Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), and that individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in their car, U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). Based on this reasoning, as well as the presence, acknowledged by Morris, of the sign at Garner’s entry and the Administrative Directives regarding vehicle searches on prison property, the court finds the search of Morris’s car to be constitutionally permissible. It was based on a reasonable suspicion that Morris was bringing contraband into Garner. See supra at 10-11.

Therefore, summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim against the defendants is granted.

The officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on a 911 call from a crime victim who reported that defendant had threatened her with a shotgun. She did not give her name, but she identified herself as his girlfriend, and that was enough to find her later if need be. Once the officer was inside, the defendant consented to finding the shotgun. United States v. McKnight, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46205 (M.D. Tenn. June 25, 2007):

This case is distinguishable from J.L. in at least two material respects. First, the caller was not exactly anonymous. While the Court does not know based on the record before it if Ronesha Smith gave her name to dispatch, it is clear that the caller identified herself as the girlfriend of Barry McKnight and that she was staying at 151 University Court. As the Supreme Court pointed out in J.L., an anonymous tip is less reliable than “a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated.” Id. at 1375. Here, even if Ronesha Smith did not initially give her name to the police, she was sufficiently identified such that the police could track her down and hold her accountable should it become necessary. See, United States v. Howard, 150 Fed. Appx. 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2005)(tip was not anonymous even though investigating officer did not know informant where the informant left her name and number with the 911 dispatcher and following arrest investigating officer contacted the informant); Elston, 479 F.3d at 318 (a “significant indicator that an anonymous informant is reliable is her disclosure of information that would enable authorities to identify her if they deem it necessary to do so”).