Suspect with 62 IQ could consent to search; Miranda waiver standard applied

Defendant with a 62 IQ could still consent to a search, and the same analysis was applied for waiving Miranda rights. United States v. Jennings, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42344 (M.D. Ala. March 2, 2007):

As the standard that a consent to searches be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, is the same as for the waiver of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right regarding self-incrimination under Miranda, see Barbour, 70 F.3d at 585 and Colorado v Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986); and similar forms, essentially, were used with some modification as to place or item to be searched; the analysis of defendant’s behavior, intellect and understanding of the consequences of his actions as to the searches is the same. The forms used n18 for the consent to search were simplistic and concrete; they were not lengthy; they were read by the detective to defendant; defendant was asked if he understood them, and after indicating his verbal understanding, signed the three forms. Neither Dr. Dana or Dr. Boyer review these particular forms with defendant. Thus, it is our finding that given the testimony presented as to defendant’s capabilities, his understanding of simple concepts and verbal explanations as indicated by the experts, the government met its burden of showing that defendant consented to the search of his personal bag and it contents.

Defendant has no standing to challenge the finding of his cellphone number in another person’s cellphone call history. United States v. Redd, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42330 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2007).*

Franks challenge failed where defendant could only show that he disagreed with the affidavit. United States v. King, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42496 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2007):

Here, Cameron alleges falsities in the affidavit with respect to the reliability of the confidential informants referred to in the affidavit; information obtained (or not obtained) from the informants (i.e., no statement by the informant that he purchased cocaine from Cameron); and the source of money used to purchase the cocaine (i.e., no “Official Miami-Dade County Funds” were used to purchase the cocaine). However, Cameron offers no proof of these alleged misrepresentations in the affidavit other than his own reading of the affidavit and records he apparently obtained from the Miami-Dade Police Department with respect to two earlier sales of narcotics by Cameron to different informants being used by other police officers at the subject residence. Thus, Cameron fails to make a “substantial showing” of falsehood in the search warrant affidavit or reckless disregard for the truth which would warrant a Franks hearing under the circumstances of this case.

Plaintiff’s apparently swallowing a handcuff key while in jail justified x-rays and a forced enema when he refused to voluntarily produce the key. He had an escape attempt history, and that justifiably concerned the jailers. Faircloth v. Lee, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96328 (E.D. N.C. November 20, 2006).*

(And this is all the cases for today.)