No expectation of privacy in a cellphone left at a crime scene

Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in a cellphone left at a crime scene that was in another’s name. Alternatively, it was abandoned at the crime scene. United States v. Hanner, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36296 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2007):

From the unrebutted evidence presented during the suppression hearing, the following has been established by a preponderance of the evidence:

. Cricket cellular telephone 412-628-5290 was found by the police in the alleyway adjacent to the house and crime scene where Frank Helisek, Jr., had been shot on the night of January 19, 2004;

. The telephone subscriber records for Cricket cellular telephone 412-628-5290 reflect Derrick Maurer as the subscriber;

. The telephone subscriber records do not list Defendant Hanner as an authorized user of the subject telephone;

. The listed subscriber, Derrick Maurer, did not purchase this particular cellular telephone;

. The listed subscriber, Derrick Maurer, never gave permission or authorized Defendant Hanner to possess or use Cricket cellular telephone 412-628-5290;

. Periodically, Dena Berardi and/or Paul Cimino would contact Defendant Hanner at cellular telephone 412-628-5290; and

. With the exception of Khaliah Solomon, no one other than Defendant Hanner would answer cellular telephone 412-628-5290.

What remains unknown and without evidentiary support, however, is how Defendant Hanner came to be in possession of Cricket cellular telephone 412-628-5290 and/or whether Defendant Hanner was an authorized user of the phone.

. . .

Without any substantively meaningful evidence to support Defendant Hanner’s argument that he had a subjective expectation of privacy, one which society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable,” the Court finds that Defendant Hanner has not carried his burden to establish that he had a legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy in the Cricket cellular telephone 412-628-5290 and thus, he is foreclosed from challenging the warrantless search of the Cricket cellular telephone.

B. Abandonment

Assuming, arguendo, however, that Defendant Hanner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject Cricket cellular telephone, his motion to suppress would still be denied. The police recovered the subject cellular telephone after Defendant Hanner voluntarily abandoned it; thus, Defendant Hanner relinquished any legitimate expectation of privacy that he may have had.

Excessive force in a jail on a pretrial detainee is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. Jenkins v. City of Clanton, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36016 (M.D. Ala. March 7, 2007).*

Curfew stop resulted in defendant turning away and walking away from the police officer. The officer stopped him and frisked him, and the defendant spontaneously made admissions and drugs were found. The stop and frisk was legal. State v. A.L., 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 7578 (2d Dist. May 18, 2007).*