Taylor Phipps, Probable Cause on a Leash, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 57 (2014).

Abstract:

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Warrantless recording and monitoring of private attorney-client conversations in a police station interview room violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law, so no qualified immunity. [Talk about “clearly established law” …] Gennusa v. Canova, 748 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 2014):
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John B. Lyman, Goldilocks and the Fourth Amendment: Why the Supreme Court of North Carolina Missed an Opportunity to Get Officer Mistakes of Law “Just Right” in State v. Heien, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1012 (2014). [Note also that Heien v. North Carolina was noted on SCOTUSBlog as a petition of the day.]

Abstract:

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Consent to a search blood is different than consent to a medical procedure. Consent to one is not consent to the other. State v. Evans, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 318 (April 4, 2014):

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The search of defendant’s bag at Sea-Tac airport was valid as a search incident. A warrant was obtained to search his computer. United States v. McGrue, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6374 (9th Cir. April 7, 2014).*

The detailed information from CI1 was corroborated by CI2, and there was probable cause for issance of the search warrant. United States v. Robbins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47587 (S.D. Ind. April 7, 2014).

Warrantless GPS monitoring after the Seventh Circuit approved of it but before Jones was valid under Davis good faith. United States v. Kaczmarek, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47580 (S.D. Ind. April 7, 2014);*
United States v. Burton, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47582 (S.D. Ind. April 7, 2014) (codefendant).*

Cato: The Fourth Amendment: Cars, Phones, and Keys? by Jim Harper:

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The Oregonian: Mohamed Mohamud deserves new trial due to ‘unconstitutional’ surveillance, lawyers argue by Helen Jung:

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WaPo: Volojh: Another denied application from Judge Facciola in the e-mail warrant case by Orin Kerr:

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There is no standing to challenge GPS placement on a car in which one is a passenger. [I beg to disagree because the passenger is being tracked, too. What’s the difference between this and Brendlin where the stop of a car was a stop of the passenger? If the passenger is stopped, the passenger is also followed.] United States v. Allen, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47588 (S.D. Ind. April 7, 2014).

“[U]nder the facts presented by this case, a forensic computer search cannot be performed under the border search doctrine in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Because the officials here reasonably suspected that Saboonchi was violating export restrictions, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is denied.” United States v. Saboonchi, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47665 (D. Md. April 7, 2014).

There’s no reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment building’s common basement storage area. Defendant also consented to a patdown. United States v. Ellis, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47666 (D. Minn. April 7, 2014),* R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48286 (D. Minn. March 17, 2014).*

Arrest warrant for the defendant coupled with information that he was home was sufficient for entry. A protective sweep thereafter was permissible. United States v. Jones, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47548 (E.D. Mich. April 7, 2014).*

There was reasonable suspicion for this stop: “In this case, the Government cites the following factors as grounds to justify the stop of Defendant: (i) the reported shooting at the Regency apartment complex; (ii) the broadcast reporting two individuals walking away from the area of the shooting, one of whom was wearing a mask; (iii) the observation of two men walking away from the entrance to the apartment complex; (iv) the fact that no other people were walking in that area; (v) the fact that one of the men appeared to be wearing a bandanna or other mask; (vi) the officer’s awareness that wearing a bandanna or mask may be associated with the commission of a crime; and (vi) the fact that the two men appeared to be together.” United States v. Chambers, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47416 (E.D. Mich. April 7, 2014).*

There was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant in this case. “Sgt. Harris’ affidavit for search warrant in this case is less than perfect. However, there is no evidence to show that he made false statements knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Moreover, the deficiencies in his affidavit were not material to the state judge’s determination that probable cause existed to believe evidence of criminal activity would be found at the defendant’s residence.” The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Green, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47418 (E.D. Mich. April 7, 2014).*

Politico: Judge again rejects feds over email search by Josh Gerstein:

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WSJ: Why Isn’t the Supreme Court in a Hurry to Challenge the NSA? by Meghan Foley:

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Chicago Sun-Times: Police-related suits cost city more than $500 million since ’04 by Andrew Schroedter:

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Vox: Remember when legal marijuana was going to send crime skyrocketing? by German Lopez:

Denver’s crime data shows a slight decrease in the past year: violent crime in January and February fell by 2.4 percent compared to the first two months of 2013.

http://www.vox.com/2014/4/3/5563134/marijuana-legalization-crime-denver-colorado

The Hill: High court won’t take up NSA case by Julian Hattem:

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Defendant was a college student suspected of setting off a small homemade bomb/firework in a vacant lot. He was stopped leaving the scene, and detained. Nothing illegal was found on him or in his car. The officers wanted to search his house, and they obtained consent which the trial court found to be involuntary because “the officers pushed for him to give consent to search his home. … Assuming without deciding that consent to search the vehicle was voluntarily given and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, consent to search the vehicle did not give the officers carte blanche to continue to detain Fasline until they got him to consent to the search.” Exigent circumstances doesn’t support the search of the house either. The excuse the police gave in pushing for consent was that their lunch break was coming up and they wanted to get it over with. That’s not exigency. State v. Fasline, 2014-Ohio-1470, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1405 (7th Dist. March 31, 2014).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search incident to defendant’s arrest because it was reasonable. Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and his DL came back suspended. That justified his custodial arrest, and a search of his person turned up ecstacy. It was valid, so defense counsel can’t be ineffective. State v. Morton, 2014-Ohio-1434, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1351 (8th Dist. April 3, 2014).*

Officers were working an area in “response to numerous drug activity complaints” and saw an unattended white Lexus with the engine running. When they got out, there was a gray Lexus near it. Officers recognized both as having been involved in prior drug arrests. The smell of marijuana was coming from the white Lexus and there was a digital scale on the front seat. Defendant approached with a wad of money sticking out of his pocket. The smell was probable cause to search the vehicle and any containers in it under the automobile exception. State v. Franklin, 2014-Ohio-1422, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1337 (8th Dist. April 3, 2014).

Officers with an arrest warrant go to the home owned by John Humphrey Sr. looking for defendant James Humphrey, a relative. John Sr. tells them James is upstairs, and he consents to an entry, allegedly under the threat of a search warrant if he didn’t let them in. First, there was plenty of probable cause for a search warrant, so that was not an empty threat that vitiates consent. Second, James put nothing at all on to show standing in the house owned by John Sr. United States v. Humphrey, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186770 (W.D. N.Y. July 1, 2013).*

Defendant was badly hurt in a car accident and med-flighted to a hospital. The nurse on the flight testified at the suppression that defendant was coherent and talking en route. At the hospital, an officer talked to defendant about consent to a blood draw, and he changed a consent form from “car or premises” to “blood from self.” The finding of voluntary consent was supported by the record. State v. Hill, 2014-Ohio-1447, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1377 (2d Dist. April 4, 2014).*

The vehicle in this case was stopped for a traffic offense, and Martin was driving and defendant was a passenger, but both, it turned out, gave false names, defendant using his brother’s. After they were released, the officer got more information and realized the false names. He looks for it and pulled the vehicle over again, and defendant was now driving and Martin was the passenger. The court concludes there is no bright line rule for standing in this situation, and it concludes defendant has no standing despite being the driver. United States v. Almeida, 748 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2014):
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WaPo: Volokh: Do travelers have a right to leave airport security screening areas without the TSA’s permission? by Orin Kerr:

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TechDirt: DOJ Flips Out That Evidence Gathered Via FISA Orders Might Be Made Available To Defendants by Mike Masnick:

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