A Kansas City Greyhound bus employee called police to say that a man fell asleep on a bench in the bus station (“a high crime area”) and a gun was hanging out of his pocket. The police response was a part of their community caretaking (“community caretaker” here) function, not investigation of a crime. It turned out defendant was a convicted felon. United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2014):

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New Mexico courts did not violate clearly established federal law (under § 2254) in determining that there was no exclusionary remedy for an alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Gonzales v. Bravo, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6236 (10th Cir. April 4, 2014):

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“Deputy Wendy Jason, the investigating officer, testified that she stopped Cantsee because his cracked windshield violated NRS 484D.435. However, NRS 484D.435 does not prohibit operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield. Although the cracked windshield could violate another statute, the district court concluded that Deputy Jason’s incorrect citation constituted a mistake of law that invalidated the investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment and granted Cantsee’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop. We conclude that a police officer’s citation to an incorrect statute is not a mistake of law that invalidates an investigatory traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment if another statute nonetheless prohibits the suspected conduct. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order.” State v. Cantsee, 2014 Nev. LEXIS 32, 130 Nev. Advance Rep. 24 (April 3, 2014). [Note: That’s the rule of the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 120.1(2) (“An arrest shall not be deemed to have been made on insufficient cause hereunder solely on the ground that the officer is unable to determine the particular crime which may have been committed.”).]

It is well established in this state and elsewhere that the smell of a working methamphetamine lab is exigent circumstances. State v. Clayton, 2014 Ala. LEXIS 49 (April 4, 2014).

Plaintiff was stopped and handcuffed by the defendant officer under mistaken identity. After 16 minutes, he was released without an apology after his ID was called in. The officer gets immunity for his actions, because there was no showing he acted with malice. Brown v. Town of Chapel Hill, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 302 (April 1, 2014).

Defendant was hunting and was approached by a wildlife officer who asked for his hunting license. The officer then asked if defendant was a convicted felon. Asking that question didn’t make the stop unreasonable. “Again, law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment simply by putting questions to a person who is willing to listen. We conclude defendant was not ‘seized’ in the constitutional sense when Officer Starbuck asked him about his criminal history.” State v. Price, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 317 (April 1, 2014).*

wdbj7.com: Parents and students say student allegedly caught with inappropriate picture of minor prompts cell phone sweep at Pulaski County [VA] schools by Orlando Salinas.

The school board denies that there has been a wide sweep of cell phones.

Aljazeera America: Field of drones:

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Politico: Feds: No DNA tests for clearance by Josh Gerstein:

Genetic testing for background checks is ‘not on the table at all,’ a spokesman says.

Mason C. Clutter, Dogs, Drones, and Defendants: The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (forthcoming Spring 2014).

Abstract:

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The state appealed the grant of a motion to suppress installation of a GPS device two years before Jones. It’s a lengthy opinion dealing with all aspects of GPS and affirming suppression: installation with reasonable suspicion, installation under the automobile exception, and good faith. Without any binding authority saying it was valid, the good faith exception doesn’t apply. State v. Sullivan, 2014-Ohio-1443, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1328 (10th Dist. April 3, 2014):

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In a § 1983 case, the fact a later convicted deputy sheriff participated in the search of plaintiff’s house doesn’t state a claim against the municipality for custom. Key v. Shelby County, 551 Fed. Appx. 262 (6th Cir. 2014).*

Defendant’s stop was not impermissibly long, so the motion to suppress would not have been granted. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective. State v. Morton, 2014-Ohio-1434, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1351 (8th Dist. April 3, 2014).*

The officer’s testimony that defendant was driving without headlights at 11:30 pm justified a stop. State v. Gammill, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3541 (Tex. App. – Dallas April 1, 2014).*

The officer approached defendant to find out if he knew anything about another car there, so defendant wasn’t seized. State v. Franklin, 2014-Ohio-1422, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1337 (8th Dist. April 3, 2014).*

A nighttime search requires a separate showing of probable cause for that, and, here, a few sales of drugs at night isn’t sufficient. State v. Zeller, 2014 ND 65, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 63 (April 3, 2014):

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Defendant consented to the blood draw in this felony DUI case, and it was voluntary on the totality. He was not a newcomer to the law. Higgins v. State, 2014 Del. LEXIS 152 (April 1, 2014).

2255 petitioner’s guilty plea waived the suppression issue. Even attempting to get to it via an IAC claim, petitioner offers nothing to show that it would have been granted if it had been pursued. United States v. Wendfeldt, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46211 (D. Nev. April 3, 2014).*

Defendant wasn’t “seized” by an officer allegedly telling him to remain at the scene of an accident. The information had been exchanged, and he was otherwise free to leave and the officer could not legally have kept him [so? That could still be a seizure]. State v. Roth, 2014-Ohio-984, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1368 (3d Dist. March 17, 2014).*

A juvenile was denied a probable cause determination without a hearing in 48 hours, and he’s ordered immediately released. State ex rel. K.W., 2014 La. App. LEXIS 852 (La. App. 4 Cir. March 28, 2014):

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Cato@Liberty: Theory: The Supreme Court Could Apply the Terms of the Fourth Amendment in Fourth Amendment Cases by Jim Harper:

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NYT: Sweeping Away a Search History by Molly Wood:

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A nighttime knock-and-talk at a shop building behind defendant’s house was not shown to be on the curtilage. State v. Cady, 425 S.W.3d 234 (Mo. 2014):

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Rejecting the R&R, the court finds that the officers exceeded the consent given when they searched the car. United States v. Camargo-Chavez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45241 (E.D. Okla. April 2, 2014),* R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46266 (E.D. Okla. March 13, 2014).*

Police pried their way into defendant’s house and he ran for the back door. He tripped and fell and was pounced on. The search of his person revealing keys to the house and car outside was valid. United States v. Hampton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186696 (S.D. Ga. November 5, 2013).*

The officer observed a hand to hand drug deal then stopped defendant for a traffic offense and then ordered him out of the vehicle. Two rocks of crack were in plain view. The whole suppression hearing was over whether the stop was valid, and it was found that it was. Defense counsel’s argument after the proof closed there was no ground to order defendant out of the car was overruled as a non-issue since it wasn’t timely pursued [and should have been denied anyway under Mimms]. State v. Manso, 2014-Ohio-1388, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1317 (9th Dist. March 31, 2014).*

When a person is ordered out of a car, he certainly doesn’t abandon that which is left in the car. Here, the officers didn’t even ask about the defendant’s coat, and one officer testified he believed it was defendant’s because it was in his lap. The coat is a “closed container.” A search of the jacket turned up a gun. United States v. Davis, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45269 (D. Ore. April 2, 2014):

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Officer’s reaching into a seat pocket in a Long protective weapons frisk was reasonable. These searches are not constrained like a Gant search incident to a search for evidence of the offense for which defendant was stopped. They are instead based on reasonable suspicion a weapon is present. United States v. Charleston, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44620 (E.D. Wis. April 1, 2014).

The searches of defendant’s clothing and for a buccal swab for DNA was with consent. Defendant testified that he thought the consent form was for clothing alone, and he was told that he had to give the DNA swab or they’d get a search warrant. It was all by consent. [And there was probable cause, so a DNA warrant would have issued.] State v. Vansickle, 2014-Ohio-1324, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1241 (12th Dist. March 31, 2014).*

Plaintiff’s case implied the invalidity of his conviction, so it is barred under Heck v. Humphrey. He filed the suit before conviction (so see Wallace v. Kato), but was finally convicted, and the case was dismissed on Heck grounds, and he appealed and lost. Jackson v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6004 (4th Cir. April 1, 2014).*

A man on a bus saw defendant on the bus with a gun, and he called 911 and described him. That was reasonable suspicion for his stop and frisk. United States v. Woods, 747 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2014)*:
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