Under O’Connor v. Ortega [and Mancusi v. DeForte, not cited], defendant had standing in an office shared with others in a public employment context. United States v. Torres-Ramos, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89183 (C.D. Cal. October 17, 2008):

As the facts illustrate, Solano possessed keys to both the manager’s office and the security office, and used both offices to the exclusion of all but a small number of other employees. As prior holdings make clear, the fact that these offices may have been shared with a small number of employees and been accessible to superiors does not defeat Solano’s claim of standing under the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the Court concludes that Solano had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records kept in both the manager’s office and the security office.

Warrant for casino information of defendant’s gambling activities was based on probable cause and was subject to the good faith exception. United States v. Hernandez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88984 (D. Minn. October 28, 2008)* (Comment: Unless there has become an expectation of privacy in casino records, why wasn’t this case just decided on that ground?)

Minor property damage arising from a potential seizure that did not happen did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable interference with property. Robertson v. City of Grand Rapids, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89272 (W.D. Mich. November 4, 2008):

Assuming that an unauthorized towing of plaintiff’s vehicles would have constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, it is clear that no such seizure occurred in this case. By plaintiff’s own telling of the events, officers were only preparing to tow the vehicle when plaintiff intervened. Defendants never accomplished a significant interference with plaintiff’s possessory interests. The only consequence of the event was some minor property damage. In these circumstances, no viable Fourth Amendment claim exists.

Supplemental claims for a Fourth Amendment violation were properly cognizable in state court under Younger v. Harris rather than federal court. The § 1983 action was dismissed for not stating a claim. Galvani v. Pennsylvania, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89150 (M.D. Pa. November 4, 2008).*

Officer’s testimony was that he believed he had probable cause, so the good faith exception applies, absent evidence he didn’t have probable cause. [Won’t they always testify they did?] United States v. Gravitt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88687 (N.D. Okla. October 31, 2008):

In this case, Wilson relied on a warrant and the Court must presume that he was acting in good faith unless there are facts that indicate his reliance on the warrant was unreasonable. At the suppression hearing, Wilson testified that he relied upon Judge Klein’s finding of probable cause and believed he was serving a valid warrant. Defendant has not shown that Wilson’s affidavit was devoid of factual support or that his reliance on the warrant was wholly unwarranted. Wilson produced evidence of short-term traffic at West’s residence that was consistent with drug trafficking. He conducted his own surveillance to confirm this fact and used an RCI to determine if drug sales were taking place at the subject residence. He also confirmed the identity of West with the RCI and checked West’s criminal history. Therefore, Wilson’s affidavit states sufficient facts to show that his reliance on the warrant was reasonable and the good faith exception applies to this case.

Comment: Descartes said “I think, therefore I am.” This sums up the good faith exception. I believe I acted in good faith, and, as long as there is at least a sliver of evidence that I was not acting in bad faith, I will be found to be acting in good faith. However, good faith should not equate with lack of proof of bad faith, but, regretfully in this world, it does.

Close only applies in horseshoes and the good faith exception.

Defendant granted consent to search his gas tank after officers found fresh tool marks on it and a fiber optic scope revealed something floating in it. United States v. Cardenas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88276 (W.D. La. October 17, 2008).*

Defendant’s driving in a high crime area indicated to officers that he was engaging in a drug deal, and that justified the stop. State v. Taylor, 2008 Ohio 5638, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4747 (3d Dist. October 31, 2008):

[*P11] We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the police officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring when they approached Taylor to question him. The Grand Prix’s unusual driving patterns, the exaggerated concern of its occupants with checking their surroundings, the decision of both drivers to park far from the store entrance, the fact that the occupants conducted some type of quick interaction, and their presence in a parking lot that was known to the police for a lot of drug activity justified further investigation.

Officers who testified that the defendant ran a stop sign were not believed by the USMJ after people in the neighborhood testified that there never was a stop sign at the intersection where defendant allegedly ran the stop sign. The stop was without probable cause. United States v. Davis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87888 (N.D. Ohio May 13, 2008)* (“The undersigned finds it unreasonable for these three seasoned police officers to fail to notice that it was impossible for Defendant to run a stop sign that clearly does not exist. Therefore, even if the undersigned were to credit the testimony of Officers Patton, McLaughlin, and Pantall, that testimony still fails to establish an articulable basis in probable cause due to the unreasonable nature of the mistake.”).

Nervousness plus is required for reasonable suspicion [my words, not the court’s]. United States v. Cardell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87924 (E.D. Mich. October 30, 2008):

Campbell was extremely nervous when Deputy Lilly approached the car. While nervousness is an unreliable indicator of illegal activity and is given very limited or no weight in the reasonable suspicion calculation, United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 2008), it is reasonable to conclude that an extreme display of nervousness would elevate the level of suspicion that more than a traffic infraction engenders. [¶] Campbell’s nervousness must be added to the information Deputy Lilly obtained during the briefing: Deputy Lilly observed White move her leg in a kicking motion like she was hiding something, and Campbell stated he did not think he had drugs in the car. Based on this collective information, it was reasonable for Deputy Lilly to detain Campbell even after Campbell provided a valid license, registration, and insurance.

While there was an exigentless entry into defendant’s apartment finding child pornography, the government showed that it had an independent source and would have obtained a search warrant. Alternatively, the government showed inevitable discovery. United States v. Bonczek, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87436 (S.D. N.Y. October 16, 2008)*:

The Government has met its burden to show that the NYPD would have obtained a warrant even without the information confirmed by the illegal entry. Sergeant Minca knew he had a viable complaint from Mr. Vega when he asked Detective Ryan to come into Manhattan from his home in Orange County, 55 miles away, in order to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, that was Sergeant Minca’s sole purpose in calling Detective Ryan into work. He did not need Detective Ryan to look at the computer screen. Both Sergeant Minca and Detective Ryan recognized the need to obtain a warrant and took a step toward obtaining one by calling the Manhattan District Attorney’s office before entering Mr. Bonczek’s apartment. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Government has satisfied both elements of the independent source doctrine and that the evidence seized from Mr. Bonczek’s apartment is not subject to the exclusionary rule.

Defendant was surrounded by police, but it was not so coercive that it was involuntary. United States v. Haeuser, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87246 (E.D. Wis. October 17, 2008).*

In a suit brought by the officers’ union, a TRO is denied against NYPD’s policy of drug and alcohol testing officer’s involved in a shooting. Likelihood of success on the merits not shown under Skinner. Palladino v. City of New York, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86757 (S.D. N.Y. September 30, 2008):

At this stage in the proceedings, plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown, in contravention to defendants’ assertions, that IO 52 and its enforcement likely does not constitute a special need. As in Skinner, the City of New York has a substantial interest in the safety of its citizens, visitors, and the police department. Defendants contend that a sober police force serves to further that interest and that IO 52 encourages sobriety. Morever, plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that IO 52 is a regulation primarily concerned with law enforcement. To date, there has been no evidence proffered that alcohol monitoring of police officers pursuant to the regulation has been used primarily for any other purpose than deterring alcohol consumption and increasing public confidence in police force action following a shooting. Moreover, plaintiffs have not argued, nor cited any evidence to conclude, that IO 52 has been applied in any particular manner that uniquely raises specific constitutional violations beyond their general challenge to the need for such a regulation.

Aspects of law enforcement, such as the use of police personnel to collect Breathalyzer samples, are undoubtedly involved in the administration of IO 52. However, at this juncture, plaintiffs have not shown that a primary purpose of the regulation is to generate evidence for prosecution. In fact, none of the four police officers cited, who have been subjected to Breathalyzer tests as a result of IO 52, were subject to prosecution or even found to be intoxicated.

Plaintiffs have not argued that the text of IO 52 and the safety and reputation rationales proffered by defendants were crafted as pretext to enable the gathering of evidence against police officers for criminal prosecution. Absent a persuasive showing that the NYPD’s Breathalyzer testing is pretextual, it is to be initially assessed in light of its stated administrative purpose. No officer has been subject to criminal prosecution following an IO 52 search. At most, plaintiffs have alleged that criminal prosecution of offending officers may be an incidental purpose and future intended consequence of IO 52. The present record before this Court cannot support a conclusion that significant privacy concerns rise to an unconstitutionally prohibited level. On the record, as it presently exists, plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction.

Defendant abandoned a safe in his girlfriend’s apartment. He was kicked out and was moving his stuff and did not meet the deadline she gave him. He abandoned it by leaving and not safeguarding it. United States v. Davis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86756 (S.D. N.Y. October 10, 2008).

Although Davis did not discard the safe, Scriven conveyed the same basic message to him that the INS agents conveyed to the defendant in Abel. She asked him to pack his belongings and remove them from her apartment by June 2006. Following that request, Davis’s conduct sufficiently evinces an intent to abandon the safe.

Defendant, a convicted felon, was not credible in his effort to show standing to contest a search. His connection to the property was pretty tenuous at best, and it was a stretch. United States v. Bryant, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86861 (C.D. Ill. October 24, 2008).*

It is likely that a drug dealer will keep drugs in his house, so that gives nexus. United States v. Burton, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86680 (E.D. Pa. October 27, 2008)*:

In drug-related cases, numerous courts of appeals have held evidence of drug crimes is likely to be found in drug dealers’ residences. See Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298 (citing cases in accord from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits). The Third Circuit reasoned “evidence associated with drug dealing needs to be stored somewhere, and … a dealer will have the opportunity to conceal it in his home.” Id. at 297. In Whitner, the defendant was evasive about where he lived, leading to a “reasonable inference [he] was attempting to conceal the existence of the apartment and his association with the apartment. This attempt at concealment when combined with the other information … set forth in [the] affidavit logically suggests [the defendant] was storing some evidence of illegal activity at the apartment.” Id. at 299.

Jacket was a place where drugs could have been kept, so it could be searched under a search warrant. United States v. Deas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86725 (D. Conn. October 27, 2008).*

Fact defendant had been previously arrested by the officer was a factor in whether he was free to leave when he was being talked to by the officer. He was singled out of a group of five to be talked to. United States v. Williams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86910 (S.D. Ohio October 27, 2008).*

Protective sweep under Buie cannot be justified where there was already an entry in violation of Payton. United States v. Montgomery, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84975 (M.D. Pa. October 22, 2008):

Nor can the subsequent search of Montgomery’s apartment be justified as a protective sweep. In Maryland v. Buie, the Supreme Court held that police may conduct a protective sweep–“a quick and limited search of premises” that is “narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding”–incident to a lawful arrest. 494 U.S. 325, 328, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990). Such a search is only permitted, however, “if the searching officer possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others.” Id. at 334; Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822-23. Here, Buie is inapplicable because the seizure was clearly unlawful–as noted above, the agents violated Payton when they seized Montgomery at his home without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances.

A case Lexis didn’t send to me, but reported by a colleague:

Defendant’s being an alleged child molester in an interstate traveler case did not give probable cause to believe that child pornography would be found in his house. Even Leon did not save it. United States v. Hodson, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 20240, 2008 FED App. 0348P (6th Cir. September 19, 2008):

We opined in United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006), that “[s]tanding alone, a high incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography.” We adhere to that view and conclude that it was unreasonable for the magistrate judge in this case, when confronted with the request for the warrant, to infer such a nexus without further evidence to support that inference. It is similarly unreasonable for the officer executing the warrant either to infer that nexus herself or to rely on her own subjective knowledge to claim reasonable reliance on the warrant. 5 HN4An officer seeking a warrant must produce adequate supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause exists to support the particular search requested. United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir 1996) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971), and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159 (1933)).

ICE agents conducted an inventory of defendant’s vehicle under standardized procedures under Florida v. Wells. Here, a gun was found with an illegal alien, as well as photographs of him holding the gun. United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84632 (S.D. Fla. August 12, 2008):

The government need not present evidence of an agency’s written procedures for an inventory search to be valid; an officer’s testimony regarding his reliance on standardized procedures is sufficient as is his “unrebutted testimony that he acted in accordance with standard inventory procedures.” United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lowe, 9 F.3d 43, 45-46 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the government was required to submit a written version of the procedures governing inventory searches); Laing, 708 F.2d at 1570 (uncontroverted testimony of DEA agent as to his inspection of the contents of the defendant’s car “sufficiently established the routine nature of the procedure, thereby eliminating the possibility that the inventory check was conducted as a subterfuge for an investigatory search.”).

We find in this case that the government has met its burden of showing that ICE has a routine, standardized procedure governing inventory searches. The agents credibly testified that ICE mandates an inventory of every vehicle and vessel that comes into its custody. The agents articulated the rationale behind that policy: to safeguard the owner’s property and to protect ICE from liability claims. They discussed the necessity of completing ICE’s standardized inventory form and of documenting, in writing and through photographs, everything found inside the vehicle at the time an inventory occurred. They also mentioned processing items of evidentiary value through use of evidence bags that were turned over to a case agent at the conclusion of the inventory.

Civil case for unlawful search and seizure after the claims had been denied in plaintiff’s criminal case and affirmed on appeal cannot form the basis of a civil case. Also, the statute of limitations ran. Groves v. Battani, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84813 (N.D. Ind. October 20, 2008).*

TRO denied on use of Indiana voter photo ID law. Terry has no application here. Stewart v. Marion County, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84817 (S.D. Ind. October 21, 2008):

Plaintiff next argues that the Voter ID Law violates his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that he cannot be asked for identification in the absence of probable cause that would support a warrant. However, Plaintiff cites only Terry stop case law to support his assertion. Plaintiff does not cite a single case that holds poll workers must have probable cause before they can require the voter to produce valid photographic identification. The Court concludes that the case law Plaintiff cites is not relevant to whether the State of Indiana may require voters to present valid photographic identification. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.

Entry into plaintiffs’ home looking for another who also lived there and named in a bench warrant resulted in summary judgment for the defendants. They received a call from a CI that he was there, and they saw his car there when they arrived. Merring v. City of Carbondale, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84989 (M.D. Pa. October 22, 2008).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a third party consent search that would have failed. Cowans v. Bagley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83040 (S.D. Ohio September 30, 2008)* (one issue in a 324 page habeas denial in a death case).

Entry into third party’s property for a parole search for a person who did not live there stated a claim for relief in a civil case. Perez v. City of Placerville, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83172 (E.D. Cal. September 9, 2008):

Ultimately, nothing in the law justifies the entry into and search of a third person’s house to search for a parolee. Cuevas v. De Roco, 531 F.3d 726, 2008 WL 2552572, *4 (9th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches of a person’s home is not diminished by the mere presence of a guest in the home. Id. Therefore, officers must be “reasonably sure that they are at the right house” before relying on a parolee’s search condition to search a person’s home. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis in original). A parole condition indicates “only the parolee’s acquiescence to a warrantless search of his own residence.” Id. (emphasis added).

Defendant’s searching cross examination at a Franks hearing was alleged to have a chilling effect on his testimony at trial. He did not show, however, that the cross exceeded the scope of direct. United States v. Vaughn, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82950 (E.D. Cal. September 2, 2008):

The defendant has failed to identify any particular subjects or questions inquired into by government counsel during the suppression hearing that were allegedly beyond the scope of the testimony he willingly gave or were not otherwise relevant to Defendant’s credibility at the Franks hearing. Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2004) “There is no question that a witness’s credibility is properly subject to exploration once he takes the stand.”). As the Ninth Circuit explained in United States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988):

Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) commits the scope of cross-examination to the trial judge’s discretion. See United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 594 (9th Cir. 1981). In exercising this discretion, the trial court may permit cross-examination “as to all matters reasonably related to the issues [the defendant] put in dispute by his testimony on direct.” Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d at 1353; Green, 648 F.2d at 594 (same).

In Vasquez, the defendant argued that because his direct testimony addressed only the events surrounding his delivery of five kilograms of cocaine to the undercover officer, it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to permit cross-examination concerning the 25 kilograms of cocaine, paraphernalia and $85,000 in cash found in his apartment. Vasquez, 858 F.2d at 1392. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding instead that because the defendant’s testimony addressed the events leading up to his arrest, including the time he left his apartment and whether he was accompanied at the time, the items found in his apartment were “reasonably related” to Vasquez’s direct testimony. Vasquez, 858 F.2d at 1392.

The defendant had no objective reasonable expectation of privacy in premises where he would not have been allowed to stay if he had asked. United States v. Dent, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83385 (D. Me. September 26, 2008)*:

In this case, the defendant never asked the homeowners’ permission to store belongings in their house; would not have been granted such permission had he asked; and, in my view, was well aware that such permission would not be forthcoming. To the extent that Jaime had become aware that the defendant had made use of her residence for purposes other than casual daytime visitation, for example, staying overnight or using 81 Marble as his mailing address, she had expressly forbidden him to do so. He could not have harbored any reasonable belief that it was permissible for him to store his belongings there. Further, as Jaime testified, 81 Marble was a home in which every resident had equal access to all rooms within. In leaving his bag unattended in Meagan’s first-floor bedroom, without the knowledge or permission of the homeowners, whom he knew would have denied such permission, the defendant took the risk that the homeowners would invade the privacy of his closed but unlocked bag. He thereby forfeited whatever expectation of privacy he otherwise might have harbored in its contents.

Defendant showed sufficient error in the search warrant affidavit to get a Franks hearing. United States v. Billian, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83401 (N.D. Ind. October 17, 2008):

In this case, the defendants have raised issues the significance of which ultimately can only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing. Whether some or all of the alleged misrepresentations the defendants claim were present in Detective Smith’s affidavit were deliberate, or included with reckless disregard as to their truth, or whether, as the government claims, any such errors were simply harmless mistakes and immaterial to a finding of probable cause, can only be determined following an evidentiary hearing that will enable the court to hear and assess the testimony of relevant witnesses, including but perhaps not limited to Detective Smith, who drafted and submitted the affidavit to the state court magistrate. Therefore, the court concludes that any ruling on the defendants’ motion to suppress will be deferred pending further proceedings and that their motion for an evidentiary hearing should be granted.

The seizure of a bag of cocaine from defendant’s buttocks was valid as a search incident and not as a Terry frisk. State v. Muse, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 831 (October 17, 2008):

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the challenged search and seizure of the Appellant by police occurred incidentally to his arrest for sale of cocaine. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the Appellant’s reliance on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), is misplaced. Under the Terry stop exception to the search warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may temporarily seize a citizen if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been, is being, or is about to be committed. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998). In the present case, a warrantless arrest occurred lawfully pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103, and was clearly based upon probable cause. The police lawfully seized the bag containing cocaine from the Appellant’s buttocks area as it became visible, contemporaneously with his arrest. This search was permitted under a different exception to the warrant requirement, a search incident to arrest. See Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 300.

Police were called because defendant allegedly took pictures of children while he was in a library with his computer. They asked him to come with them, and he packed up his computer and stuff and went with them. When defendant denied taking pictures, the officers called in for further instructions. The court rejects “police speak” in the report that defendant was detained at that point. United States v. Cameron, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82375 (N.D. W. Va. April 18, 2008).*

Internet police: Internet service providers. See MSNBC.com: ISPs are pressed to become child porn cops / New law, new monitoring technology raise concerns about privacy. It encourages it, but does not require it.

Railroad employees’ union stated a claim for relief for a DUI test of locomotive engineers without probable cause to believe they are under the influence. Skinner does not apply to governmental actors. United Transp. Union v. Perdue, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80991 (S.D. W.Va. September 30, 2008):

Furthermore, the facts presented in the instant complaint describe a situation that falls outside the purview of Skinner. In Skinner, the railroad was searching its own employee to determine the cause of an accident; here, local law enforcement performed the search. While Skinner stands for the proposition that administrative searches in the wake of railroad accidents may be performed without probable cause, there is little to suggest that Skinner extended to local law enforcement. The Court in Skinner stated, “The FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather to prevent accidents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615. Therefore, this Court finds that Skinner does not apply to local law enforcement.

Nothing in the instant complaint suggests that the police had anything approaching probable cause. In the absence of probable cause, and assuming that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, the application of the breathalyzer to Chapman is a sufficient factual allegation to support a § 1983 claim.

Officer had authority to make a community caretaking entry into the defendant’s home because of child inside who was left alone after his parents were arrested outside [how convenient]. United States v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80945 (E.D. Cal. August 20, 2008)*:

Here, Officer Gonzales was confronted with a hazardous and uninhabitable dwelling occupied by a 14 year old, both of whose parents had been placed under arrest and were being transported to jail. Due to deplorable living conditions and the risk to the health of the child, the Officer had to call Child Protective Services. The Officers’ normal practice is to review the residence to determine whether it is habitable, and whether or not, if an appropriate guardian is available, the child can be maintained in the residence or has to be placed in foster care.

Further, Mrs. Johnson had consented to the protective sweep by authorizing the Officers to look for her daughter to assure that her daughter was not left with Junior.

Plain clothes and armed ICE officers came to defendant’s house to do a knock-and-talk about his subscribing to child porn websites. The officers were able to coax the defendant into letting them look at his computer, and the court finds this was voluntary consent. United States v. Bach, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80711 (D. Me. August 25, 2008)* (Comment: This is similar to innumerable cases I’ve read and a few I’ve handled. With patience, the police can often get consent to look at a computer. I won’t say “usually” because we never know how many times the police do not get consent. Once the police do the knock and talk, they would admit that everything would likely disappear if they got a warrant to come back. But, I’m not so sure that that would happen even the majority of the time.).