Protective sweep was justified at the time of arrest beause of others potentially being present. United States v. Best, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84984 (M.D. Pa. October 22, 2008).*

Without an intervening change in the law, defendant cannot relitigate on post-conviction his search and seizure claim already denied by the court and affirmed on appeal. Dumas v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84772 (W.D. N.C. August 8, 2008).*

Forfeiture claimant sought to show he had an exclusionary rule claim as a defense to a forfeiture to show his excusable neglect. Here, the search was consented to, so he loses on that claim. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 15010 S.W. 168th Street, Miami, FL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84542 (S.D. Fla. March 6, 2008).*

Use of handcuffs must be reasonable in a detention or it converts into an arrest. Here, the officers outnumbered the defendant and safety concerns were minimal. State v. Williams, 2008 Ohio 5511, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4639 (2d Dist. October 24, 2008):

[*P19] The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Carter. Here, there were at least four officers present at the point Williams was stopped. There is no indication in the record that any other individuals were near the officers at the time. In fact, the record indicates that even the “known crack addict” had left the area. Further, the record indicates that Williams did not make any threatening gestures and did not appear to be armed or attempting to arm himself. Also, there is no indication that Williams had failed to comply with the officers’ requests.

[*P20] We conclude, based upon these facts, that the officers’ use of restraints was not reasonably necessary as part of a brief, investigative stop, and that officers therefore converted the Terry stop into an arrest by handcuffing Williams.

Defendant cannot argue on appeal a ground not presented to the trial court that the prosecution can respond to. State v. McKee, 2008 Ohio 5464, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4582 (2d Dist. October 17, 2008.*

In a suit brought by the officers’ union, a TRO is denied against NYPD’s policy of drug and alcohol testing officers involved in a shooting. Likelihood of success on the merits not shown under Skinner. Palladino v. City of New York, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86757 (S.D. N.Y. September 30, 2008):

At this stage in the proceedings, plaintiffs have not sufficiently shown, in contravention to defendants’ assertions, that IO 52 and its enforcement likely does not constitute a special need. As in Skinner, the City of New York has a substantial interest in the safety of its citizens, visitors, and the police department. Defendants contend that a sober police force serves to further that interest and that IO 52 encourages sobriety. Morever, plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that IO 52 is a regulation primarily concerned with law enforcement. To date, there has been no evidence proffered that alcohol monitoring of police officers pursuant to the regulation has been used primarily for any other purpose than deterring alcohol consumption and increasing public confidence in police force action following a shooting. Moreover, plaintiffs have not argued, nor cited any evidence to conclude, that IO 52 has been applied in any particular manner that uniquely raises specific constitutional violations beyond their general challenge to the need for such a regulation.

Aspects of law enforcement, such as the use of police personnel to collect Breathalyzer samples, are undoubtedly involved in the administration of IO 52. However, at this juncture, plaintiffs have not shown that a primary purpose of the regulation is to generate evidence for prosecution. In fact, none of the four police officers cited, who have been subjected to Breathalyzer tests as a result of IO 52, were subject to prosecution or even found to be intoxicated.

Plaintiffs have not argued that the text of IO 52 and the safety and reputation rationales proffered by defendants were crafted as pretext to enable the gathering of evidence against police officers for criminal prosecution. Absent a persuasive showing that the NYPD’s Breathalyzer testing is pretextual, it is to be initially assessed in light of its stated administrative purpose. No officer has been subject to criminal prosecution following an IO 52 search. At most, plaintiffs have alleged that criminal prosecution of offending officers may be an incidental purpose and future intended consequence of IO 52. The present record before this Court cannot support a conclusion that significant privacy concerns rise to an unconstitutionally prohibited level. On the record, as it presently exists, plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction.

Officer lacked reasonable suspicion for stop of defendant’s vehicle at 4 a.m. in Atlantic City, where driving at that hour is not abnormal. The vehicle did accurately match the description. United States v. Brown, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87119 (D. N.J. October 27, 2008):

Ultimately, the Court is essentially left with a loosely fitting match of the vehicles, a head turn by the driver that lasted a “couple of seconds”, and a hand-off of some indescript object by the driver to the passenger in the rear seat. Despite giving the officers’ experience and specialized knowledge the deference it deserves, the factors present in this case do not amount to the level required for reasonable suspicion.

Defendant’s mother who was given his computer bag to use the computer could consent to its search by a law enforcement officer who was looking for a gun possessed by the defendant. United States v. Jackson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87648 (W.D. Wis. October 28, 2008).*

Defendant’s girlfriend wanted the police to retrieve his gun in the house when the police took him away. He objected to the search, but the court finds that Randolph did not prohibit the search. United States v. Thies, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89982 (D. Iowa October 23, 2008):

Deputy Derrig was told by Nicole Plain that Thies was intoxicated and violent, and she wanted the deputy to enter the house and remove a gun because she feared for her safety. A reasonable officer, after hearing Plain’s concerns and confirming that Thies was, in fact, intoxicated, and he had a gun in the house, would have concluded that Plain needed protection from domestic violence. The court finds that Randolph does not extend to the facts of the present case. See United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 2008) (Randolph is case-specific and extends no further than its particular facts); United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (strictly limiting the application of Randolph). The deputy’s entry into the house to retrieve the gun was authorized by the consent of the co-occupant, and was not unlawful. See Matlock, supra.

Defendant was not in custody when he consented and made inculpatory statements. He was told that if he didn’t consent he would be held until a warrant was obtained. The officers were in plain clothes and the situation was not otherwise coercive. The officers actually said that they would not search at that time, and the defendant followed the officers away to talk to them some more. United States v. Bernier, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90150 (D. Me. November 3, 2008).*

All the exigency requirement of the automobile exception requires is that the vehicle be capable of moving, and the government showed that here. United States v. Odom, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89985 (S.D. Fla. September 11, 2008)*:

Here, the evidence shows that Defendant’s van appeared capable of functioning at the time of the search. Law enforcement observed Defendant drive the van into the parking lot, just moments before the search. Moreover, based on the CS’ statements and recorded conversations, law enforcement had strong reason to believe the van had just been driven several hours from several miles away with no problem. Based on this evidence, there existed no reason for law enforcement to believe the van was not operational at the time of the search. To the contrary, the evidence points to the conclusion that the van was fully capable of functioning. The clear law of this circuit, cited above, forecloses any argument by Defendant that the search of his van was unlawful because all the suspects were in police custody and that the police had possession of his car keys.

Officers testified that they could see drugs on the kitchen table from outside the front door. That was a valid plain view, and that justified the entry. United States v. Boutte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90100 (W.D. La. October 3, 2008).*

Defendant’s 2255 petition amounted to nothing more than an effort to relitigate the search issue he lost before trial, so it is barred on post-conviction. Dumas v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90125 (W.D. N.C. September 24, 2008).*

Consent form stated that “the scope of consent included ‘other material or records pertaining to narcotics.'” That included a digital camera and a computer. United States v. Lucas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90857 (W.D. Ky. November 6, 2008):

Based on the totality of the circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer would have considered Lucas’s consent to search “other material and records pertaining to narcotics” to include the laptop computer and the digital camera. The officers had sufficient reason to believe that information regarding marijuana cultivation would be found on both the digital camera and the computer. Even though the consent form did not specifically mention computers or digital cameras, many federal courts have found that the search of a computer is appropriate in similar circumstances. For example, in United States v. Rossby, 81 Fed. Appx. 109, 110 (9th Cir. 2003), a consent to search “letters, papers, materials, or other property” was interpreted to include the defendant’s computer. Because of the similarity between the phrases “other material or records” and “letters, papers, materials, or other property,” the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is persuasive.

(Comment: This is just too far-fetched to be remotely believable.)

There is no “trivial” standard for probable cause. Either it is or it isn’t. United States v. Nelson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90952 (E.D. Mich. November 6, 2008).*

Defendant swerved twice, and that caused the stop, and the nature of the stop was within the purposes of the stop until defendant was arrested. United States v. Gelb, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90866 (D. Neb. November 7, 2008).*

Consent obtained in violation of Miranda can still be valid. A consent is not an incriminating statement. Voluntariness must still be considered, and here it was. United States v. Golinveaux, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075 (N.D. Iowa November 6, 2008):

The Court finds that when Defendant consented to a search of her car, she was in custody and had invoked her right to counsel (despite not having been given a Miranda warning). Nonetheless, clear precedent in the Eighth Circuit provides that “a consent to search is not an incriminating statement.” Cody, 755 F.2d at 1330. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda.

. . .

After considering all of the facts and circumstances, the Court concludes that the Government has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant’s consent to search her vehicle was given voluntarily. While Defendant was asked more than once to consent to a search of her vehicle, there is no evidence that the officers were threatening or that the dialogue was unduly coercive. The Court believes that Captain Berte had a legitimate concern that if the vehicle contained other chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, then it could constitute a danger to persons using the parking lot at Wal-Mart. Having found that Defendant’s consent to search was given voluntarily, the Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Parents required to submit to drug testing as a condition of their child’s juvenile probation order violated the Fourth Amendment. The parents had a reduced privacy interest when they lived with a probationer, but not that reduced. The special needs exception also did not permit such a search. State v. Jane Doe II (In the Interest of Jane Doe I), 2008 Ida. App. LEXIS 139 (November 13, 2008):

We thus conclude that both a strong State interest and a laudable purpose are served by the magistrate’s order here compelling the parents to submit to drug testing. Nevertheless, we also conclude that the special needs exception to the warrant requirement does not legitimize the order. We come to this determination based largely upon the most analogous United States Supreme Court decision applying the special needs doctrine, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001). The Court there considered a program developed by hospital and law enforcement authorities to induce pregnant drug abusers to enter into substance abuse treatment for the protection of their fetuses. Concerns about the rising number of cocaine-using pregnant women being seen at a Charleston hospital led hospital officials, law enforcement, and other government authorities to adopt a protocol to “identify/assist pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse.” It provided that the hospital would test a patient for cocaine through a urine drug screen if she met one or more of nine criteria indicative of drug abuse. The policy provided for education and referral to substance abuse treatment for patients who tested positive. A threat of law enforcement intervention provided an inducement for the patients to accept such treatment. Patients who refused treatment or missed an appointment with a substance abuse counselor would be arrested.

In a police corruption trial in Chicago, one cop testified that they bribed a judge for a bogus search warrant. The judge wasn’t named. They also admitted planting drugs so their searches would not come up empty handed. At the bottom of the story:

It was easy to steal money when drug dealers had no idea how much cash they were carrying—and couldn’t complain to anyone, he said.

Officers carried “insurance drugs” for the times when a suspect might swallow a bag or a search warrant came up empty, Doroniuk testified. Then what? Egan asked.

“Plant it,” he answered in reference to the cocaine.

As for his allegation about a crooked judge, Doroniuk said the exchange came when he used a lying informant to obtain a search warrant. He offered no detail except to say that a judge got cash on the side.

As he began his cross-examination of Doroniuk, Pinelli asked how many people might have endured a wrongful drug conviction because of his misdeeds.

“I don’t know,” Doroniuk replied. “I never followed the cases.”

Interesting NYTimes article today: You’re Leaving a Digital Trail. What About Privacy?. Think of the possibilities in criminal investigation and prosecution, and criminal defense.

A protective sweep may occur without a search incident where the officers are inside by consent. United States v. Davis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96780 (S.D. W.Va. November 25, 2008) (recognizing a split in the circuits):

The facts of this case are distinguishable from Buie in that the officers in this case were in Defendant’s hotel suite with his consent and that he was not under arrest at the time of the protective sweep. Defendant argues that Buie‘s holding should be limited to protective sweeps conducted as part of searches incident to arrest. Several courts have addressed factual situations similar to the case at bar in light of Buie, but the Fourth Circuit is not among them. Unsurprisingly, these authorities are split as to whether law enforcement actions similar to those in this case are reasonable. This may be due, in large part, to the inherently fact-based nature of the balancing test. The reasoning in these cases is instructive nonetheless.

The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a protective sweep may be performed only as part of a search incident to arrest. …

Other courts have extended Buie protective sweeps to other non-arrest situations. …

As a threshold matter, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that a protective sweep can be conducted only as part of a search incident to arrest. Based on the cases cited above, it appears that Defendant’s argument has been adopted by three courts of appeals, but it has been rejected by at least five. In the absence of guidance from the Fourth Circuit, this Court is inclined to side with the weight of authority. Moreover, the courts that have rejected arguments similar to Defendant’s are more in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buie, Terry, and Long. The competing interests balanced by the Buie Court–a suspect’s right to be free from unwarranted intrusions and law enforcement officers’ safety–are no less present because a suspect is not under arrest. Obviously, a suspect’s privacy interest is equally present whether he is being arrested or merely questioned by the police. Likewise, law enforcement officers may be at risk from unknown threats whether they are in a home to execute a search warrant or to speak with a suspect. As some courts have noted, see, e.g., Gould, 364 F.3d at 584, law enforcement officers may, in certain circumstances, be at greater risk from hidden dangers where a suspect is not in custody; in such situations the officers may be preoccupied with the unrestrained and potentially dangerous suspect while undisclosed persons are planning an ambush elsewhere in the residence. Precluding officers from conducting protective sweeps of residences unless an arrest has occurred disregards the important officer safety interest recognized in Terry and its progeny without good reason, and such a rule could endanger law enforcement officers in some situations. Thus, the Court finds that a protective sweep that is not part of a search incident to arrest is not per se unreasonable. For the same reasons, a protective sweep is not unreasonable simply because the officers were invited into the residence.

An officer stepping out of a police car that had not made a “stop” is not a seizure. Abandonment and flight before seizure makes the stuff dropped admissible. United States v. Golson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96553 (E.D. Pa. November 21, 2008).*

Record does not support defendant’s claim he would be held until a search warrant arrived. United States v. Bernier, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96642 (D. Me. November 3, 2008).*

Exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry to arrest here was a disputed fact, so summary judgment was denied on this claim. Rivera v. Leto, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96680 (S.D. N.Y. November 25, 2008).*

Rule 41 violations are subject to an intentional disregard rule, and defendant failed to show it here as to one of several warrants served concurrently with one after 10 p.m., the others before 10 p.m. The state officer testified that he was unware of the 10 p.m. execution rule. United States v. Deas, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96088 (D. Conn. November 24, 2008)*:

Courts have repeatedly held that suppression is rarely the proper remedy for a Rule 41 violation; only a “fundamental” violation of Rule 41, i.e. one that “renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards,” requires automatic suppression. United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.6 (1974); United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Martinez-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 901 (2005)); United States v. Smith, 340 F.Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972). The Second Circuit has articulated two additional circumstances under which a violation of Rule 41 requires suppression of the evidence: (1) the defendant was prejudiced, in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed; or (2) there is evidence of “intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.” United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 385-87 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule does not require suppression of evidence found in a search).

Sexual advances from a school teacher did not rise to a Fourth Amendment violation; something else, yes. Maier v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96368 (W.D. Pa. November 26, 2008).*

Defendant had no expectation of privacy in his VFW club that police entered to question him about possession of narcotics when they responded to a CI’s tip. United States v. Perry, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24095 (9th Cir. November 24, 2008).*

“Animosity between the informants and the defendant–even if known by the agent–does not establish that the informants were lying to the agent about defendant’s possession of child pornography. The informants, who gave separate and consistent statements to the agent, faced serious repercussions (including prosecution) for knowingly furnishing false information to a criminal investigator.” United States v. Brown, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95827 (S.D. Ga. November 25, 2008).*

Defendant was only subjected to an investigative stop when the officer was asking for his identification, but he dropped his bag and fled. That justified a seizure. United States v. Williams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95964 (E.D. Va. November 25, 2008).*

Motion to suppress is granted because the testimony at the suppression hearing was that the defendant was stopped for failing to signal because the left taillight was smashed out and could not work. When the vehicle was towed, however, it was apparent from disinterested witnesses that the taillight was not smashed at all by the inventory. Therefore, the taillight being the only basis for the stop and the officer not being believed, the motion must be granted. United States v. Arias, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95350 (D. R.I. November 21, 2008).* (Comment: A good friend of mine won in state court the same way: The police said they stopped the defendant for loud music from the car. The inventory of the car showed the radio/stereo didn’t work. Motion to suppress granted.)

The car of a defendant known to be a drug dealer and use a particular car who showed up for a drug sale and was arrested with drugs and the keys on his person could be searched because there was probable cause there were more drugs in the car. United States v. Hall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95459 (M.D. Pa. November 24, 2008).*

Defense counsel could reasonably have determined that a motion to suppress would have failed, so he was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress. Mediina v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95351 (D. R.I. November 21, 2008).*

Probation officers in Florida have to choose between a probation violation and whether they can make a new case when they conduct a probation search. Here, they could use the evidence found to revoke, but not to make a new case. Gordon v. State, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 17596 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. November 21, 2008).*

Defendant was stopped because of overtinted windows, and, when the windows were rolled down, marijuana smoke drifted out. That justified an arrest and search incident, so the defendant’s argument that reasonable suspicion was lacking was misplaced. State v. Williams, 2008 Ohio 6030, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5053 (2d Dist. November 21, 2008).*

Facts relayed from other officers gave the officer who stopped defendant reasonable suspicion. United States v. McCauley, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24078, 2008 FED App. 0421P (6th Cir. November 25, 2008) (unpublished).*

Defendant was held for 45 minutes before the officer decides to pat him down for “officer safety.” The patdown was unjustified and without probable cause, either. United States v. Moore, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94408 (E.D. Tenn. November 19, 2008):

In this case, whatever reasonable concern for his safety Officer Lewis could articulate at the beginning of the stop dissipated during the nearly forty-three minutes he allowed the defendant to sit in Ms. Moore’s vehicle and stand along the roadside during the search of that vehicle. The court finds that Officer Lewis’s attempt to search the defendant’s person was not related to any concern for “officer safety” and the search cannot be justified as a patdown for weapons.

The consenter had apparent authority as to the officers because she repeatedly claimed to be the owner of the property, and acted like she was. United States v. Salgado, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94257 (N.D. Ill. November 18, 2008).*

Defendant was stopped because he drifted over the fog line and might be impaired. The defendant’s unusual travel plans and inability to say who he was going to visit and exactly where was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Perales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94356 (D. Kan. November 19, 2008).*

Warrantless search condition imposed on defendant after guilty plea pending sentencing was valid. United States v. Thompson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93432 (W.D. Va. October 2, 2008):

The defendant has failed to meet her burden of proving that the warrantless search condition is not needed to assure the safety of the community. The defendant points to United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the Ninth Circuit invalidated a search of a pretrial defendant’s residence where the search was based on conditions of bond that subjected him to a drug screen and a warrantless search. But the Ninth Circuit did not hold that pretrial release subject to a condition permitting warrantless searches was per se unreasonable. Instead, the court concluded that the pretrial defendant’s consent to search would be valid only if the search was reasonable, id. at 868, and the search of that particular defendant’s home was not justified by either special circumstances or the totality of the circumstances, id. at 872, 874.

The case of United States v. Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 1993), is more on point. The court in Kills Enemy found that a warrantless search pursuant to a condition of release was permissible for an offender who had pled guilty and was awaiting sentencing. Id. at 1203 (noting that “[a] convicted person awaiting sentence is no longer entitled to a presumption of innocence or presumptively entitled to his freedom”).

Moreover, beyond the legal argument presented, the defendant does not submit any facts or circumstances indicating that the warrantless search requirement is not needed in this case. The government aptly argues that the warrantless search condition protects the community against further identity theft while Thompson awaits sentencing. “Safety of the community” may include security against future criminal activity, and is not solely relegated to protection against physical violence. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 13 (1983) (“[T]he language referring to the safety of the community refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community. The committee intends that the concern about safety be given a broader construction than merely danger of harm involving physical violence.”).

The defendant has not presented any evidence or argument regarding the other conditions imposed while she awaits sentencing. Therefore, the defendant has failed to meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she would not be a danger to the community or a flight risk without the conditions currently imposed.

Plain feel during a patdown revealed crack cocaine, but the officer had to pull down the defendant’s pants and underwear to see it, hidden beside defendant’s genitals. This was an unreasonable and inappropriate search. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 347 (November 7, 2008):

We are persuaded that the police officers exceeded the bounds of propriety and reasonableness in pulling down Marshall’s pants and underwear, leaving him exposed. Though some states have statutes that specifically govern how strip searches should be conducted, Kentucky does not. Therefore, we must apply Fourth Amendment principles of reasonableness, which the U.S. Supreme Court has defined as:

a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1253 (6th Cir. 1989). We conclude that the search of Marshall fails this test.

We shall first examine the scope and manner of the search. In a venerable old case, the U.S. Supreme Court stressed the sanctity of one’s personal privacy when it said:

The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one . . . to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass[.] Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891) (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit reiterated this concept more recently when it stated that: “a strip search, regardless how professionally and courteously conducted, is an embarrassing and humiliating experience.” Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982).

The trial court made a finding that the search did not cause Marshall embarrassment – contrary to Marshall’s direct assertion that he was “acutely embarrassed.” Officer Schwartz testified that he pulled Marshall’s pants almost to his knees; he pulled Marshall’s underwear down past his buttocks, leaving him fully exposed. Marshall was in handcuffs at the time. Although Officer Schwartz testified that he did not believe anyone could see into the room where the search was conducted, he admitted that the door was open and that several people were in the apartment. He also had told two women to stay inside the apartment. We are not aware that he took any precautions to prevent them from viewing the scene of the search. …

Random license check on a moving vehicle that owner had a suspended DL was cause for stop. Armfield v. State, 2008 Ind. App. LEXIS 2525 (August 11, 2008)*:

We agree with Ritter and Kenworthy that knowledge that the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license is enough to constitute reasonable suspicion for an officer to take the minimal action of initiating a traffic stop. Here, Officer Schmidt made the traffic stop based on the random license plate check revealing that the owner of the vehicle, Armfield, was without privileges to drive. Based on our analysis above, the officers did have the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the Terry stop. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the evidence resulting from the stop.