Defendant’s abandoning a bag when he saw the police was a voluntary abandonment not caused by the police. The stop had not yet occurred, so it couldn’t cause it. United States v. Tuua, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48054 (D. Haw. June 19, 2008):

It is undisputed that Tuua tossed his black bag into the stream and maintained no control over the bag. The court concludes that Tuua abandoned the bag and therefore lacks standing to challenge its search. In United States v. Mendia, 731 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the defendant had “abandoned his reasonable expectations of privacy in the heroin by turning it over to [another individual] and making no effort to follow [that individual] after [he] drove away with the heroin in his trunk.” Id. at 1414. The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant had relinquished control of the heroin and thus “abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. See also United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that “placing garbage for collection constitutes abandonment of the property”).

Trial court’s aborting a suppression hearing based on an erroneous interpretation of a statute on impeding traffic required that the suppression hearing be conducted again. State v. Hannah, 259 S.W.3d 716 (Tenn. 2008).*

The nature of seizure of all computer files in a document search involving a Pennsylvania State Senator usually requires that they be searched off site to determine whether they are pertinent, and that does not make execution of the warrant unreasonable. United States v. Fumo, 565 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Pa. 2008):

I have already concluded that “because of the nature of computer files, the government may legally open and briefly examine each file when searching a computer pursuant to a valid warrant,” in order to determine which files are described by the warrant. See United States v. Fumo, No 06-319, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80543, 2007 WL 3232112, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2007). For “few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked ‘[crime] records.'” United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990). Given the large volume of information on computer equipment and security concerns, for reasons of practicality the government may conduct this review of computer files offsite. For example, in United States v. Stewart, another district court judge upheld a search and seizure pursuant to a warrant authorizing seizure of “[a]ll computer hardware and software containing any of the items mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Attachment.” No. 96-583, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5181, 1997 WL 189381, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997). The “computers were taken [by the agents] with the intent to copy the files, return the computers, then later sort through the files for relevant information.” 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5181, [WL] at *4. The court found the procedure to be “proper” and not violative of the Fourth Amendment because “[i]t was simply not practical for the agents to search at the scene all the files on the computer hard drives of all three computers as well as their accompanying diskettes, especially since their computer expert was not at the search location.” Id. The court further noted that “[s]uch a procedure, that is, taking voluminous documents or computer files for copying and sorting away from the search location, has been upheld.” Id. (citing United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 616 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) …; United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2000) …; United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) …; United States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465-66 (11th Cir. 1991) …

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his wife’s car, that he shot at the police from, to have standing to contest a search. Thomas v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 287 (Tex. App. — San Antonio January 16, 2008), released for publication May 23, 2008, pdr refused In re Thomas, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 497 (Tex. Crim. App., Apr. 9, 2008).* (Comment: This case is dead wrong on standing. It seems obvious that the vehicle was subject to a search incident, and the court should have just decided that instead of some completely off the wall finding that a defendant has no standing in his spouse’s vehicle. And, because there is an alternative ground that is correct, SCOTUS would never take it, and it was up to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to correct it. Good luck there.)

Plaintiff’s claim of being an accidentally shot bystander did not state a Fourth Amendment claim because he was not the person to whom the officers were attempting to apply force. Instead, the “shocks the conscience” standard (Rochin) applies, and plaintiff cannot meet it. Warfield v. City of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 2d 948 (N.D. Ill. 2008):

A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only when there is a “governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (emphasis in original). The means of detention must be intentionally applied “to the object of the detention.” Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998). Therefore, where a police officer fires his gun at a fleeing suspect and the bullet inadvertently strikes an innocent bystander, there has been no Fourth Amendment seizure. Berg, 219 F.3d at 269; see also Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Where the hostage is hit by a bullet intended for the hostage-taker, the mishap is the unintended consequence of government action, and the governing principle is that such consequences cannot form the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation); Brandon v. Village of Maywood, 157 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924-25 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (no Fourth Amendment cause of action for accidental shooting of innocent bystander).

Plaintiffs here are like the innocent bystander or passerby described in the cases above. Whether or not the officers knew Plaintiffs were in the vestibule when they fired at Smith, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs were not the intended targets of the officers’ bullets. In Bublitz v. Cottey, for example, a family was killed after their vehicle collided with the car of a fleeing felon when police officers used a tire-deflation device to stop the felon’s car. 327 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2003). In that case, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that just because the officer intended to stop the felon’s car, it does not follow that he therefore intended to stop any other car that could potentially become involved in a subsequent collision. Id. The Court held that the family’s suffering was an “accidental and wholly unintended consequence;” because the family “was simply not the intended object” of the defendant officers’ attempts to seize the fleeing criminal. Id. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated and could not provide the basis for a Section 1983 claim. Id. Similarly, in the instant case, Plaintiffs were not the intended object of the officers’ attempts to seize Smith, and so the Fourth Amendment is not implicated here.

Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process guarantee provide recourse for Plaintiffs here. “The guarantee of due process serves to protect the individual against arbitrary action of government.” Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1998). “[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense….” Bublitz, 327 F.3d at 490. When officers are faced with a “dangerous, fluid situation, in which they were forced to make decisions in haste, under pressure,” their conduct does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment unless it “shocks the conscience.” Schaefer, 153 F.3d at 797-98 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47). In these cases, “even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates the concerns of substantive due process.” Id. “The sine qua non of liability” in these cases is “a purpose to cause harm.” Id. In Schaefer, the defendant officers fired their weapons at a husband who was holding his wife hostage, and accidentally fatally shot the wife. Id. at 798-99. The Seventh Circuit held that the officers’ conduct did not “shock the conscience” because the officers did not intend to shoot the wife. Id.

Officer was called to assist a woman in getting her car license back from the defendant. The officer’s admission into the defendant’s residence was impliedly authorized by another woman there who said defendant was inside and turned and headed in with the officer following. United States v. Goncalves, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39671 (N.D. N.Y. May 15, 2008):

In this case, the Court finds, based on the totality of all the circumstances, that when Stacey Goncalves, in response to Officer Coyle’s inquiry as to where defendant was, stated that defendant was inside, turned around and entered the house without further explanation or instruction, and left the doors open behind her, she impliedly consented to the officers’ entry into the house for the purpose of locating defendant.

Younger abstention correctly applied to a § 1983 action filed before plaintiff was charged in state court and the search issue was subject to resolution in the state court action. Michel v. City of Akron, 278 Fed. Appx. 477, 2008 FED App. 0259N (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

CI has been corroborated by the officers in a months-long investigation, and the officer had probable cause for the stop and search. United States v. Pender, 554 F. Supp. 2d 289 (N.D. N.Y. 2008).*

Stop of the wrong guy, but objectively likely the right one, was with reasonable suspicion. The fact he was not the person named in the 911 call about a burglar in the neighborhood did not negate reasonable suspicion. The patdown was reasonable in scope. United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2008):

In sum, reasonable suspicion existed to believe that Vickers was engaged in a recently completed burglary, which gave the officers the right to stop him. Furthermore, the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the stop when the officers sought to pat down Vickers. True, the police were incorrect in their initial suspicion that Vickers was involved in the burglary that prompted the police response. That hindsight does not change the Fourth Amendment analysis of whether the stop and frisk of Vickers was reasonable. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Vickers’s motion to suppress.

Comment: The police are entitled to make reasonable mistakes in enforcing the law, and, the way the court sets out these facts, every thing the officer who encountered the defendant did was clearly reasonable under the circumstances. They stopped him really close to the scene of the burglary, the report was detailed from the victim to 911, the defendant easily matched the description of the burglar, etc. We can’t tell, but it would seem that the entire investigation keyed on the wrong guy quickly, so the real burglar likely escaped and was never caught.

Defendant was removed because he was arrested, not to prevent him from being asked for consent under Randolph, although his protestations may suggest that he would have refused consent. Instead, the officers asked his girlfriend, and she resisted. Then they said that they would get a search warrant but it would take a while because it was Christmas Eve. The District Court erred in not analyzing whether there was probable cause to get a search warrant. If there was probable cause, then it was not a lie. United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2008):

The district court did not err in its fact finding per se, but rather took an incorrect view of the law. The district court interpreted our case law to mean that if Brown’s statement reflected a legitimate belief, then the stated intention to get a warrant did not create a problem with the consent. We do not question the district court’s determination that Brown personally believed what he said. But we find that it was error to evaluate whether the stated intention to get a warrant was genuine or pretextual without considering whether the police actually had the underlying probable cause for the search.

Consider: If the police did not have a reasonable basis to believe there was probable cause then it follows that any statement, or “threat,” that a search warrant could be obtained would necessarily be “baseless” and could only be “merely a pretext to induce submission.” In that case, the consent may be involuntary. See White, 979 F.2d at 542. Without determining whether there was probable cause (or a reasonable factual basis to believe there was probable cause), the court cannot know whether the statement was baseless or not. For instance, if instead of sending Detective Brown, Detective Armon himself had gone to the flat and made the same remark, whether or not his statement that he could get a warrant was “genuine” would have to turn on whether he had a reasonable basis for believing there was probable cause. He could not just refer to some other officer’s representations to him to establish “genuineness.”

In this case, the testimony established that Armon specifically instructed Brown to go to the 944B flat and get consent to search. Brown also said that Armon told him there was enough to get a warrant, but Brown admitted he had no knowledge of any of the facts that would establish probable cause. If Brown’s mere “belief” in this case were enough to establish a genuine statement of intent to obtain a warrant (a “nonbaseless” threat, if you will), there is nothing to stop one officer from telling another officer that there is enough to get a warrant when there really isn’t, just to get consent. In other words, since an officer on the scene cannot lie to the occupant that he’s going to go get a warrant when he knows there isn’t probable cause, then that same lie cannot be permitted simply because the police compart-mentalize who knows what. The way to thwart this potential cat’s-paw-like circumvention of the rule is to determine whether there was a reasonable factual basis on which to conclude there was probable cause. This is consistent with our previous case law. See White, 979 F.2d at 542 & n.1 (finding no evidence that police intended to coerce with an empty threat and noting that the police obtained a search warrant for another search of the residence the following day); Duran, 957 F.2d at 502 (finding the threat to obtain a warrant did not vitiate consent because it was “firmly grounded” and the police had probable cause); United States v. Talkington, 843 F.2d 1041, 1049 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding consent invalid where police lied in claiming that they were in the process of applying for a search warrant).

We are not suggesting one way or the other as to what the officers were truly doing in this case; we are just saying it was error for the district court not to examine whether there was a factual basis for the police to believe they had probable cause to get the search warrant. If there was, then there was a genuine intention to get a warrant and the statement did not vitiate consent. On the other hand, if, on remand, the district court determines the police had no reasonable factual basis to believe they had probable cause then there was necessarily a baseless/pretextual threat that may render Smith’s consent involuntary. As it stands, the district court failed to make a determination (and the prosecution did not present the relevant evidence) on this issue, thus we must remand.

Defendant was asked for consent for his house that he shared with his girlfriend where both were on the lease, and he was asked elsewhere. This did not fit within Randolph because defendant was not removed so the police could ask the girlfriend in his absence. United States v. Reed, 539 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008):

As the district court properly concluded, Reed’s case does not fall within the ambit of Randolph. First, Reed was absent from the residence at the time Foster consented and the search was conducted. Reed’s absence was a result of a valid arrest, and the police did not execute the arrest for the purpose of removing Reed from the area when the police obtained Foster’s consent. See United States v. Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the case did not fall within the narrow line of Randolph where the defendant was not physically present when consent was obtained and he was not removed “from the area to avoid hearing him invoke an objection to the search”). See also United States v. DiModica, 468 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation where consent to search was obtained from a wife after her husband was removed from the home during the course of a valid arrest); United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the co-tenant’s consent to search a house was independent of defendant’s arrest). Further, it is clear from the record that Foster voluntarily consented to the search of 4009 Bonfield, as evinced by her consultation with her sister and an attorney.

Moreover, had Reed been standing in the doorway and refused to consent to a search because it was not his place, only to be overridden by Foster’s subsequent consent, we might have a closer question under Randolph. But we need not answer that question because unlike the defendant in Randolph, Reed was not present at the searched residence.

Comment: This could have been a sufficient alternative ground if the court wanted to go there.

Interrogations in the home are not per se custodial, but they more likely may be. Here, it was. United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008):

The home occupies a special place in the pantheon of constitutional rights. Under the First Amendment, the “State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). The Second Amendment prohibits a federal “ban on handgun possession in the home.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. , (2008), slip op. 64. The Third Amendment forbids quartering soldiers “in any house” in time of peace “without the consent of the Owner.” U.S. CONST. amend. III. The Fourth Amendment protects us against unreasonable searches or seizures in our “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id. amend. IV. The question presented in this case is one of first impression in our court: under what circumstances under the Fifth Amendment does an interrogation by law enforcement officers in the suspect’s own home turn the home into such a police-dominated atmosphere that the interrogation becomes custodial in nature and requires Miranda warnings?

. . .

Applying this standard to an interrogation conducted within the home presents some analytical challenges, however, and presents an issue on which our court thus far has said little. The usual inquiry into whether the suspect reasonably believed he could “leave” the interrogation does not quite capture the uniqueness of an interrogation conducted within the suspect’s home. “Home,” said Robert Frost, “is the place where, when you go there, they have to take you in.” Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 38 (Edward C. Latham ed., 1967). If a reasonable person is interrogated inside his own home and is told he is “free to leave,” where will he go? The library? The police station? He is already in the most constitutionally protected place on earth. To be “free” to leave is a hollow right if the one place the suspect cannot go is his own home. Cf. Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1060 (holding that an interrogation at an FBI office was not custodial because, inter alia, the defendant was told he was free to leave and “was, in fact, returned home at the end of the interview”). Similarly, a reasonable person interrogated inside his own home may have a different understanding of whether he is truly free “to terminate the interrogation” if his home is crawling with law enforcement agents conducting a warrant-approved search. He may not feel that he can successfully terminate the interrogation if he knows that he cannot empty his home of his interrogators until they have completed their search. We must, therefore, consider how to apply the traditional Miranda inquiry to an in-home interrogation.

An interrogation conducted within the suspect’s home is not per se custodial. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 342-43, 347 (1976). On the contrary, courts have generally been much less likely to find that an interrogation in the suspect’s home was custodial in nature. United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1994); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(e) (3d ed. 2007). The element of compulsion that concerned the Court in Miranda is less likely to be present where the suspect is in familiar surroundings. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969). Nevertheless, an interrogation in the suspect’s home may be found to be custodial under certain circumstances. See id. at 325-26 (holding that an interrogation was custodial where four police officers arrived at the suspect’s home, entered the bedroom, and behaved as though the suspect was not free to leave while he was questioned).

San Francisco jail’s pre-January 21, 2004, strip search policy where strip searches occurred without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 539 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We turn first to the question of whether a policy of strip searching arrestees solely because they are classified for housing in the general population, in the absence of any reasonable suspicion, violates the arrestees’ constitutional rights. Following a long history of precedent, we conclude that it clearly does.”).

District court erred in not making a determination of whether a prior illegal entry tainted the defendant’s consent. United States v. Myers, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18061 (11th Cir. August 22, 2008) (unpublished).*

Officers responding to gunshots had at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to enter to look for victims. Brigham City does not require probable cause, just reason to believe. United States v. Gambino-Zavala, 539 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. August 25, 2008).

Search incident of cellphone failed because officers did not have probable cause (although they did have reasonable suspicion) for defendant’s arrest. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2008).*

Defendant’s cellphone call as he was being stopped with probable cause created exigent circumstances. The officers had no cause to go into the premises until they discovered he made a call to a confederate and that something was going on inside. United States v. Moses, 540 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2008):

It is true that the officers initially had no evidence suggesting that another person was present in 407-A North Cedar Street. When, however, Moses made a telephone call during the course of the traffic stop to his cousin at 407-B North Cedar Street — the residence adjacent to unit 407-A from which Moses was seen to have emerged — Sergeant Kroh became concerned that Moses had warned someone back at Cedar Street about the police so that evidence at 407-A could be removed or destroyed. Moreover, when the officers reacted to this suspicion and returned to 407-B North Cedar Street to interrogate the cousin, her behavior in causing a loud and unprovoked commotion added to the officers’ suspicions that someone else was present inside unit A and that her outburst was calculated as a warning to that person. See United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 531-32 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding an exigent-circumstances search of a fourth-floor apartment where suspects deceived officers into investigating a second-floor apartment whose occupants created a loud commotion that officers reasonably believed might have warned persons on the fourth floor to the police’s presence). The officers also observed that the windows of unit A were blocked and that a gold vehicle was parked outside the house, suggesting the possibility that someone else might be present. Moses’ argument simply ignores these highly relevant facts.

Philadephia “live stop policy” for inventories was constitutional, and officer’s modification was reasonable. The stop did not have to be terminated when the tow truck did not arrive in 30 minutes. United States v. Felder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39000 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2008).*

Sole lessee had authority to consent to a search. United States v. Young, 278 Fed. Appx. 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Defendant refused to remove his hand from his pocket in a high crime area, and the officer had reasonable suspicion to order him to remove his hand, based on the totality. United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2008).*

Consent to enter a hotel room was not consent to search it. Smith v. State, 889 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. App. 2008):

Even assuming that Hardy’s act of opening the door and letting the officers in constituted consent to enter, no reasonable person could have interpreted this to mean that the officers also had consent to search the premises. Cf. Buckley v. State, 797 N.E.2d 845, 849-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding officer’s removal of the lid to a small tin exceeded the scope of consent where the officer asked the defendant if he could search the house to see if anyone else was present and the defendant replied that the officers could “go ahead and check … anything [they] want[ed]”). Thus, it follows that Corporal Hoover did not have consent from Hardy or Smith to search the toilet.

Defendant at least impliedly consented to a condition of probation searches. He objected at the time he was put on probation that he was ordered and did not consent, but there was no appeal of this condition. Brooks v. State, 292 Ga. App. 445, 664 S.E.2d 82 (2008),* cert granted Nov. 3, 2008).

The plaintiff could not show that a Washington county had any duty to her individually to remove old warrants from the system such that she could sue them for negligence. Vergeson v. Kitsap County, 145 Wn. App. 526, 186 P.3d 1140 (2008).*

Single room occupancy buildings are not a closely regulated industry to which the city can continually enter under an administrative search exception. San Joaquin Motel & Hotel Propery Owners Ass’n v. City of Stockton, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91766 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2008).*

A motion to suppress establishes a defendant’s claim that he is an aggrieved party of the search at issue, and the state does not have to prove that. People v. Jorlantin, 2008 Colo. LEXIS 1002 (November 10, 2008).*

Brooks v. State, 292 Ga. App. 445, 664 S.E.2d 827 (2008), posted here, had state cert granted, Brooks v. State, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 95 (November 3, 2008):

This Court is particularly concerned with the following issue or issues:

Whether the State must demonstrate “reasonable grounds” to justify a search or seizure despite the existence of a validly imposed condition of probation or parole that prospectively waived the probationer or parolee’s Fourth Amendment rights.

If so, whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that under the facts of this case, the police had “reasonable grounds” to conduct the search.

Defendant was arrested without probable cause and should have been Mirandized before he made a statement. A citizen’s report of the smell of a decomposing body had been separately received, and that produced the body. People v. Castillo, 49 V.I. 195 (2008):

From the circumstances presented, the Court finds beyond cavil that law enforcement would have inevitably discovered and did in fact independently discover Laquina Hennis’ body. Although the officers had searched the 8th Street structure(s) several times, a citizen’s report on April 11, 2007, complaining of a stench emanating from the shed adjacent to the dwelling occupied by the Defendant, led to the officers’ return and subsequent recovery of the body. It was therefore only a matter of time before the victim’s body would have been inevitably, but independently found, particularly given that the investigation of the missing child involved multiple agencies from territorial and federal levels.

Vehicle frisk was valid under Long, and raising Thornton was a “red herring.” United States v. Diaz, 519 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008):

We refuse to pursue the red herring of Thornton dangled by Diaz. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Thornton, regarding the lawfulness of vehicular searches incident to arrest, does nothing to abrogate the limited vehicular “frisk” permitted during a Terry stop by Long and its progeny. Indeed, the majority’s reasoning in Thornton only strengthens the rationale for the type of search conducted in this case. If officer safety concerns justify the search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment where the vehicle’s occupant had exited the vehicle before being confronted by police and was arrested, handcuffed, and secured in the backseat of a police car, surely safety concerns justify the same search where the vehicle’s occupant was only temporarily detained under Terry and may imminently regain control of the vehicle and its contents. Thus, the district court properly denied Diaz’s motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition found in the vehicle.

Defendant raised a search issue in his state case, lost on standing, and then pled guilty one day into trial, and that was a waiver of the Fourth Amendment claim. He filed a state post-conviction petition challenging the search as an IAC claim. He had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his search claim under Stone. Chippolla v. Valdez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17501 (D. Idaho March 6, 2008).*

Abruptly walking away from a police officer in a high crime area is not reasonable suspicion. Defendant’s stop was invalid. People v. Archibald, 2008 V.I. LEXIS 13 (Super. Ct. September 11, 2008).*

Armed uniformed officers were at the door for a knock-and-talk, and they talked to the defendant in Spanish in a nonthreatening manner. He read and signed a consent form that said he had a right to refuse consent, so the consent is valid on the totality. United States v. Valencia-Reuvelta, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91288 (W.D. Wash. October 23, 2008).*

Defendant had standing to challenge the stop of the vehicle he was in because it was a stop of him as well. However, he had no standing to contest the search of the vehicle in which he was a mere passenger and had no interest in the vehicle or the trailer. United States v. Ubaldo-Viezca, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91218 (M.D. Ala. March 19, 2008).*

Consent to enter to talk to the defendant was voluntary, but an officer walking to the bathroom to look around exceeded the scope of consent. State v. Hetrick, 2008 Ohio 1455, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1283 (9th Dist. March 31, 2008).

Being in a high-crime area is not reasonable suspicion. Neither is the fact a weapon was found on someone else reasonable suspicion as to the defendant. People v. Smith, 49 V.I. 229 (2008).*

Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy on land outside his farm where officers found the remains of a horse. Reams v. Irvin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25350 (N.D. Ga. March 31, 2008).*

Reasonable suspicion here included defendant’s admission that he was traveling to a known drug house that was already under investigation. United States v. Ammerman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25460 (W.D. Mo. March 31, 2008).*

Where the use of a drug dog did not extend the defendant’s stop, he has no Fourth Amendment claim. United States v. Scott, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25184 (E.D. Ky. March 28, 2008).*

Police reasonably believed that defendant’s former live-in girlfriend had authority to consent to a search of the property. Although she had moved out six weeks earlier, she was on the lease, she had a key, and she obviously could come and go. State v. Shaffer, 2008 Ohio 3116, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 2633 (5th Dist. June 19, 2008).* Comment: Obvious moral to the story: Change the locks, fool!

Defendant’s stop was for a traffic offense and his questioning was based on the officer smelling marijuana. Macias v. State, 292 Ga. App. 225, 664 S.E.2d 265 (2008).*

Officer’s knowledge that the owner of a vehicle being driven has a suspended license is reasonable suspicion to stop, absent information that the owner is not the driver. The court adopts the majority rule. State v. Hess, 185 N.C. App. 530, 648 S.E.2d 913 (2007):

In sum, our research reveals that when an officer knows that a vehicle being operated is registered to an owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, the majority of jurisdictions have held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, absent evidence that the driver is not the owner. See, e.g., State v. Tozier, 2006 ME 105, 905 A.2d 836, 839 (Me. 2006) (holding that “[a]lthough it is possible that a driver under suspension could register a vehicle and that others … could drive it, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the owner is driving the vehicle, absent other circumstances that demonstrate the owner is not driving”); accord State v. Mills, 458 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that “[i]t was reasonable to infer the vehicle was being driven by its owner given the absence of evidence to the contrary”); accord State v. Panko, 101 Ore. App. 6, 788 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that if an officer knows that the owner’s driver’s license is suspended, “he may make a stop … unless other circumstances put him ‘on notice that the driver is not the vehicle’s owner'”). We are persuaded by the rationale of the majority of jurisdictions and thus adopt the holding of the majority of jurisdictions that when a police officer becomes aware that a vehicle being operated is registered to an owner with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, and there is no evidence appearing to the officer that the owner is not the individual driving the automobile, reasonable suspicion exists to warrant an investigatory stop.

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to stolen property he stashed on his father’s property. Even if he had standing, his father had the authority to consent, which he did. State v. Sullivan, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 910 (August 22, 2007).*

Officer approached the defendant at the counter in a Waffle House after watching the defendant have a hard time parking the car at 3 a.m. The encounter was on reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, and the DUI is affirmed. State v. Green, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667 (August 22, 2007).*

State child protection statute that requires that investigations be done promptly does not ipso facto become exigent circumstances for an entry into a home. Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008):

We can first easily dispose of any contention that the Texas Family Code’s requirement that TDPRS undertake a “prompt” investigation somehow exempts the defendants’ actions from constitutional scrutiny. A statutory command to investigate allegations within twenty-four hours is not a license to ignore the Fourth Amendment, and it is unreasonable for the defendants to think otherwise. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968) (holding that, although a state may develop its own search and seizure law, the state may not authorize police conduct that infringes Fourth Amendment rights). Regardless of what Texas law may authorize, entry into a house by the individual defendants must satisfy Fourth Amendment standards.

Dog sniff of a car left in the Indianapolis airport parking garage was reasonable suspicion for more. Officers keyed on the car because of other information. United States v. Grogg, 534 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2008).*