A window tint stop led to reasonable suspicion of crime. State v. Jolly, 2008 Ohio 6547, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5463 (2d Dist. December 12, 2008)*:

[*P18] Here, having approached Jolly’s vehicle, Abney and Coleman, experienced officers, observed conduct that they were able to articulate that raised concerns for their safety. Jolly refused to look at Abney, Jolly was in obvious distress, Abney could not understand Jolly’s responses to his routine questions, and most importantly, Jolly ignored Abney’s order to stop reaching for the bag. For their safety, the officers were entitled to remove Jolly from the car and pat him down. Placing Jolly in the cruiser did not render his detention custody nor exceed the scope of Abney’s legitimate investigation of the window tint violation.

A radio call about a theft and ID’ing the suspect justified defendant’s stop when he was the only person in the vicinity at the time. He was cooperative and consented to the show up. He was not handcuffed or directed to go anywhere. State v. Walker, 2008 Ohio 6551, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5450 (2d Dist. December 12, 2008).*

Search of a passenger’s purse incident to the driver’s arrest on a parole violation was unlawful. United States v. Mataafa, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100419 (E.D. Cal. December 1, 2008)* (citing United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993) (consent does not reach to passenger’s purse), United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983) (search incident of passenger’s briefcase unlawful).

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in jail telephone calls to persons other than his lawyer. United States v. Morris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100296 (W.D. Pa. December 8, 2008).*

Officer had reasonable suspicion: “(1) she had received information that gunshots had been fired in the 200 block area of Dinwiddie St., a high crime area; (2) moments later she observed Defendant proceeding from that same area to 5th Ave. in close proximity both in time and location to the sound of the shots; and (3) the late hour on Christmas Eve or Christmas morning.” Plus, the defendant was evasive when he saw the officer. United States v. Sewell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100289 (W.D. Pa. December 11, 2008).*

Search incident of a car after an armed robbery produced a six page print out: “How To Commit Armed Robbery In Six Easy Steps.” The printout was done eleven hours before the robbery. What is apparent from reading the “Six Easy Steps” is that it apparently is a joke.

Reasonable suspicion for continued detention in a traffic stop was not present, but it became consensual. What is important here is what was not reasonable suspicion that was quickly dispatched by the court. United States v. Morales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99043 (D. Utah December 8, 2008):

The government points to the following facts to support Sergeant Nixon’s claim of reasonable suspicion: (1) Mr. Morales’ extreme nervousness from the inception of the stop to the end; (2) Defendants had only stayed one night in California before traveling back to Michigan, yet they had “quite a bit of luggage;” (3) the person to whom the vehicle was registered was not present; (4) the vehicle was already registered and licensed in the state of Michigan (carrying a Michigan license plate), although it had been purchased in California just two days before; and (5) the Defendants were traveling on a known drug pipeline.

The facts and circumstances of this case, however, when taken in their totality, “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1980). Mr. Morales’ nervousness describes most persons when stopped by the police. And although told that “probably” only a warning will be issued, the nervousness will often not subside until the warning is actually in hand. With regard to the luggage, Defendants were traveling across the country, which is at best a three to four day trip, in addition to the one to two days already spent in California. Furthermore, it was Christmas time, and much of the baggage in the Defendants’ vehicle appeared to be shopping bags (perhaps Christmas gifts).FN4

4 It is not lost on the court that time and time again officers cite as a factor supporting their reasonable suspicion of criminal activity the fact that very little luggage was present in the car when the defendant was allegedly traveling a long distance. Apparently the luggage factor cuts both ways.

The government also finds support for Sergeant Nixon’s claim of reasonable suspicion in the fact that the vehicle was properly registered on the date of purchase. But extended detentions must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, not lawful behavior. Citizens should be encouraged to properly register their vehicles, not penalized for it. One can only imagine the suspicions that would have arisen and been articulated by Sergeant Nixon had Elaine Bailey not transferred ownership of the vehicle to her name prior to having her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend drive it back to Michigan.

With regard to traveling on a drug pipeline, Sergeant Nixon testified that virtually every highway in Utah is considered a drug pipeline. Therefore, this is a non-factor.

The facts relied on by Sergeant Nixon to find reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in this case, encompass far too much innocent behavior. Accordingly, the court finds the evidence insufficient to justify Defendants’ continued detention based on reasonable suspicion. Therefore, in order for Mr. Morales’ continued detention to be lawful, it must have become a “consensual encounter.”

There is no heightened Fourth Amendment standard for a consensual recording by a wired CI sent into defendant’s house to record him. Having let the CI in, the expectation of privacy “vanished,” and the Third Circuit has already decided that. United States v. Caple, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98966 (M.D. Pa. December 8, 2008):

Defendant attempts to distinguish these cases by pointing out that the conversation here occurred in plaintiff’s home, where he had a heightened expectation of privacy. The defendant in Lee raised a similar argument. In that case, the confidential informant’s recording took place in the defendant’s hotel suite. Defendant argued that the recording should be suppressed, because it “occurred in [his] hotel room, a place where a person has a heightened expectation of privacy.” Lee, 359 F.3d at 200. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that “[w]hat is significant is not the type of room in which surveillance occurred but [defendant’s] action in admitting [the confidential informant] to the room.” Id. at 201. The expectation of privacy that defendant had while alone in his room “vanished” when he invited the informant into the room. Id. The court concludes that the same reasoning applies here: defendant invited the informant into his home and spoke freely with him. He did not have an expectation of privacy for the conversation in that setting and his recorded conversation with the informant is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. The informant could testify to the contents of this conversation in court, and the court will not prevent the government from supplying the jury an accurate recording of that conversation.

On RawStory.com, by ‘KopBusters’ investigators bait Odessa police to illegally raid house: Video, by Stephen C. Webster. There is YouTube video with it.

For former drug interdiction officer Barry Cooper, the media storm is just beginning.

His upcoming reality show, ‘KopBusters,’ a ‘To Catch A Predator’ style crusade against dirty officers, sparked an immediate response after RAW STORY covered a news brief of their first sting.

Cooper has now released footage from the initial episode of ‘KopBusters,’ in which the Odessa, TX police department raids a suspected marijuana grow house, only to discover they played right into the filmmaker’s hands. As surveillance cameras roll, the police slowly figure out they’ve been had, seemingly caught red-handed of illegally overreaching in a first-of-its-kind operation.

On his Web site, KopBusters.com, Cooper describes how the sting took place.

Community caretaking function cannot be used to enter a house (noting that Cady involved a car). The emergency exception would apply instead. State v. Gill, 2008 ND 152, 755 N.W.2d 454 (2008):

[*P20] We have said that the emergency exception may be applied when the following requirements are met:

(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.

(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.

(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.

Nelson, 2005 ND 11, 691 N.W.2d 218, P 12. An objective standard is used to determine whether an officer reasonably believed an emergency existed. Id. Whether an objective officer would believe an emergency existed is a question of fact. See id. at P 15.

Defendant’s stop for DUI was with reasonable suspicion but not probable cause. Defendant was arrested and removed from the scene without probable cause, so his test is suppressed. City of Devils Lake v. Grove, 2008 ND 155, 755 N.W.2d 485 (2008).*

Police bypassed the defendant’s attempt to assert control over property so he could refuse consent, but the police bypassed him to ask a person with apparent authority to consent. The bypass of the defendant made the consent invalid. State v. White, 168 P.3d 459 (Wash. App. 2007).

While waiting for information to come back on the computer check during a traffic stop, the officer asked for and obtained consent. The officer did not unreasonably extend the stop. State v. Raney, 168 P.3d 803 (Ore. App. 2007).*

The defendant, known to the police to be a drug dealer, was seen entering the house to be searched with a search warrant just before the warrant arrived. He was searched during the search. He argued he was a mere “transient visitor,” but the trial court found he was more than a transient visitor and there was reason to search him. State v. Steel, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 779 (October 2, 2007).*

Defendant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a driver’s license checkpoint he was stopped at, and the trial court erred in concluding that he did not. State v. Haislip, 186 N.C. App. 275, 651 S.E.2d 243 (2007).*

Defendant’s employer could consent to a search of company computer with defendant’s personal files on it. Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer files. Defendant was suspected of theft from the company, and he was locked out of the office and computer. State v. M.A., 402 N.J. Super. 353, 954 A.2d 503 (2008):

We emphasize that the record is devoid of evidence that defendant claimed ownership or sought return of the computers before the search. To be sure, defendant instituted no legal action for the return of what he claimed was his lawful property. Simply put, he did not do so because he did not own the computers. Braun owned them. Because Braun owned the computers, he had the authority to consent to their search; and because Braun voluntarily consented to the search, the search was valid. …

Our inquiry does not end here. Defendant contends that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal information he stored in the computers because he had a private office and placed confidential passwords on the computers to block third party access to that information. …

The evidence establishes that defendant abandoned the computers before the search. Thus, he had no expectation of privacy in them. Nevertheless, we extend our inquiry to consider the merits of his contention. …

A dog sniff at the front door of a house is not unconstitutitonal. The question of a dog sniff is the place where the sniff was made, and the front door is open to the public. People v. Jones, 279 Mich. App. 86, 755 N.W.2d 224 (2008):

Thus, the Court did not state or suggest that police activity at a home is categorically distinguishable from police activity involving the trunk of a car for purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of a canine sniff. Rather, the categorical distinction of which the Court spoke related to the difference between police activity that reveals lawful as well as unlawful conduct, thereby invading a zone of privacy and implicating Fourth Amendment protections, and a dog sniff that reveals only the presence of contraband (unlawful conduct) and does not intrude on legitimate privacy interests. Indeed, the Court distinguished Kyllo not because a home was involved there, but because lawful as well as unlawful activity could be detected in Kyllo. If the dissent were correct in its analysis, the Court in Caballes could have simply disregarded or distinguished Kyllo on the basis that the Kyllo search was of a home.

Comment: The court thus creates a conflict with Florida’s 4DCA Rabb case. State v Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. App. 4DCA 2006) (a canine sniff from outside a home to detect narcotics inside the home uses extra sensory procedure such that violates firm line at door of home protected from intrusion by Fourth Amendment), review denied, State v. Rabb, 933 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2006), cert. den. 127 S. Ct. 665, 166 L. Ed. 2d 513 (U.S. 2006), posted here, distinguished, on remand from Florida v. Rabb, 125 S. Ct. 2246, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1051 (U.S. May 16, 2005), in light of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005).

Continuation of questioning after defendant being told he was free to leave was an unreasonable continuance of the stop because no person would think he would be free to leave. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 2008 PA Super 173, 954 A.2d 659 (2008):

[*P17] The Court made a critical observation: when an individual has been subjected to a valid detention and the police continue to engage that person in conversation, the citizen, having been in official detention, is less likely to understand that he has the right to refuse to answer questions or a search. Furthermore, while acknowledging the importance of the ninth factor, the Court stressed that “conferral of the ‘free-to-go’ advice is, itself not a reason to forego a totality assessment” and therefore does not constitute a controlling factor in assessing whether a person would actually credit a police indication that he was free to leave. Id. at 75 n.24, 757 A.2d at 899 n.24.

. . .

[*P22] In the present case, many factors establish the existence of a coercive environment supporting: 1) the reasonableness of Appellee’s belief that he actually was not free to re-enter his car and drive away, and 2) his conclusion that he could not decline the officer’s requests for more information and to search his car and person. We first examine the nature of the prior seizure. Unlike the defendant in Strickler, Appellee herein had been subjected to a traffic stop. Despite this fact, Appellee was asked his origination as well as his destination; after his answer was not sufficiently detailed, police requested more precise information. Police directed Appellee to exit his car and then walk to its rear, even though the existence of a hole in his taillight could readily have been addressed while Appellee remained in his vehicle. In this regard, we must stress that Appellee was not ordered from his vehicle based on Officer Mays’s concern for his own safety. Thus, police herein directly controlled Appellee’s freedom of action after initiating the stop and conducting questioning as if he had engaged in suspicious activity. These facts support the existence of an intimidating atmosphere because police demands that Appellee justify his whereabouts and exit his car were excessive under the circumstances leading to the stop. (emphasis in original)

Tire barely crossing centerline once when there is no other traffic is not cuase for a stop. Fowler v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 6253 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth August 14, 2008).*

Consent to enter a car to look for a gun permit that led to smell of marijuana justified officer looking in a CD case where the smell was coming from. State v. Black, 987 So. 2d 1177 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006), released for publication July
28, 2008.*

Defendant’s stop was with probable cause, not just reasonable suspicion, so the plain view was valid. State v. Warren, 191 P.3d 722 (Ore. App. 2008).*

Telling a person that the officer needs to pat him down is a seizure because no person would believe he was free to leave. Here, however, the request was with reasonable suspicion. Bandy v. Commonwealth, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 382 (August 12, 2008).*

Officer assisting a motorist stopped on the side of the road may ask for DL and then run it. Coffia v. State, 2008 OK CR 24, 191 P.3d 594 (2008).

Furtive movement in car and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of the car. Commonwealth v. Copeland, 2008 PA Super 180, 2008 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2046 (August 7, 2008).*

Placing something in a trash can inside a place where the defendant had guest standing before he left was evidence of his abandonment. State v. Shelton, 2008 MT 282, 345 Mont. 330, 191 P.3d 420 (2008):

[*P16] Generally, one has little or no expectation of privacy in garbage, especially if it is deemed to have been abandoned. See e.g. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment vol. 1, § 2.6(c), 689-702. Had Shelton left the marijuana seed and residue in his own garbage can inside his own apartment, he might have a stronger case. See e.g. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, P 12 (suggesting that garbage inside one’s home would enjoy greater privacy protection than that left outside on the curb, exposed to the public). Shelton, however, discarded the bag in a garbage can in his friend’s apartment. Absent any evidence that he intended to return for the bag of trash, we may presume that Shelton abandoned the trash. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, P 15 (noting that in the absence of “express intent,” abandonment of property may be inferred from a person’s actions alone). Wood, Johnson, or any other number of persons could have rifled through that garbage. See e.g. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, P 16. Shelton relinquished control over the garbage when he left Wood’s apartment. When “a person intentionally abandons his property, that person’s expectation of privacy with regard to that property is abandoned as well.” 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, P 14. Shelton has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag of trash that he abandoned.

Montana holds that an informant’s consent to record defendant in private place violated the state Constitution. [This case was under submission for two years; it was 3-1-3.] State v. Goetz, 2008 MT 296, 345 Mont. 421, 191 P.3d 489 (2008):

[*P54] For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the electronic monitoring and recording of the Defendants’ conversations with the confidential informants, notwithstanding the consent of the confidential informants, constituted searches subject to the warrant requirement of Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. The electronic monitoring and recording of those conversations without a warrant or the existence of an established exception to the warrant requirement violated the Defendants’ rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11. As a result, we hold the District Court erred in denying the Defendants’ motions to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of the three conversations at issue on the basis that the activities at issue did not constitute searches.

Chronologically:

[*P24] Similarly here, we conclude Brown provides little, if any, guidance in resolving the issue before us in light of the reliance on federal jurisprudence–and limited analysis and application of the provisions of the Montana Constitution–in that case. Therefore, we overrule Brown and again recognize that Solis is not controlling precedent. As a result, we examine the issue before us anew, applying more current and consistent interpretations of Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution.

II. Analysis Under Current Montana Constitutional Search and Seizure and Right To Privacy Jurisprudence

[*P25] The issue in the present case is whether the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of a face-to-face conversation with the consent of one participant in the conversation violates the other participant’s rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article II, Sections 10 and 11. The initial inquiry in addressing this issue is determining whether such conduct constitutes a search. See State v. Scheetz, 286 Mont. 41, 46, 950 P.2d 722, 724 (1997). A search is “the use of some means of gathering evidence which infringes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” Hardaway, P 16. “A search occurs when the government infringes upon an individual’s expectation of privacy that society considers objectively reasonable.” Where no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists, a “search” does not occur within the contemplation of Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. State v. Hamilton, 2003 MT 71, P 17, 314 Mont. 507, P 17, 67 P.3d 871, P 17 (citing Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 46, 950 P.2d at 725).

[*P30] Here, the face-to-face conversations between the Defendants and one other individual were within the Defendants’ private homes and, in Hamper’s case, in the confines of a vehicle. The Defendants did not conduct their conversations where other individuals were present or physically within range to overhear the conversations. In other words, the Defendants kept their activities and conversations away from prying eyes (and ears), and did not expose their conversations to the public’s “independent powers of perception.” We conclude the Defendants exhibited actual subjective expectations of privacy in the face-to-face conversations they held in private settings.

[*P37] Based on the foregoing, we conclude each Defendant’s expectation of privacy in the conversations at issue here is one society is willing to accept as reasonable. As stated above, “[a] search occurs when the government infringes upon an individual’s expectation of privacy that society considers objectively reasonable.” Hamilton, P 17. Thus, we further conclude that the electronic monitoring and recording of the Defendants’ in-person conversations constituted searches within the contemplation of the Article II, Sections 10 and 11 rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches.

As for a compelling state interest, the court found recording violated the consent to enter requirement.

[*P46] Similarly, here, the State cannot justify a search under the consent exception as a result of the simple expedient of failing to inform the potential–and physically present–objecting party that the search is being conducted. We conclude that the warrantless searches of the conversations at issue here cannot be justified by the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

[*P53] . . . Consequently, we decline to adopt a particularized suspicion standard to justify the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of a one-on-one conversation occurring in a vehicle.

Massachusetts holds that the comtemporaniety requirement of the search incident doctrine requires that the search occur reasonably close to the time of the arrest. Where the search of a bag on the defendant was more than 30 minutes after the arrest, it was not contemporaneous. “The case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment demonstrates, however, that the contemporaneity requirement continues to have meaning. Accordingly, this case, where the search did not occur at the time or at the place of arrest, has surely crossed that line.” Commonwealth v. Pierre, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 580 (2008):

The bounds of the temporal requirement of contemporaneity of the search with the arrest were tested in United States v. Chadwick, supra. There, at a Federal detention facility an hour and one half after the defendants’ arrests, Federal agents searched a footlocker that had been found in the trunk of an automobile near the defendants when they were arrested. Id. at 4-5. Although the government argued that the search was “reasonable because the footlocker was seized contemporaneously with respondents’ arrests and was searched as soon thereafter as was practicable,” the Supreme Court invalidated the search because of the time delay. Id. at 14, 15.

This principle in Chadwick has survived related rulings in New York v. Belton, supra, and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). In Belton, the Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id. at 460. This standard notably still requires contemporaneity of the search; it simply loosens the spatial restrictions announced in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969) (area within arrestee’s “immediate control”), to include as a per se rule the passenger compartment of an automobile in which a person is arrested. See Belton, supra. The Court in Belton explicitly distinguished Chadwick, noting that Chadwick involved a time delay between the arrest and the search, a factual circumstance not present in Belton. Id. at 461-462. Thus, although Belton relaxed the spatial requirement in circumstances where an arrest takes place in an automobile, it did not relax the temporal requirement of a lawful search incident to arrest.

Acevedo, although overruling Chadwick in part, affected only the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the legality of searches of closed containers therein. See Acevedo, supra at 571. It did not, therefore, alter the central tenet of Chadwick regarding search incident to arrest. See United States v. $639,558 U.S. Currency, 293 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 955 F.2d 712, 717-718 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Nor has the contemporaneity requirement been diminished by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623-624, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2004), where the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile was upheld even though the arrestee was a “recent occupant” of the vehicle rather than actually occupying the vehicle when arrested. This extension of Belton once again dealt only with the spatial aspect of a search incident to a lawful arrest; that is, only the distance between the arrestee and the search was at issue. See Thornton, supra at 620-621. That the search took place contemporaneously with the arrest was not in dispute. See id. at 618.

Indeed, Massachusetts courts, interpreting Federal law, still afford considerable significance to the requirement of contemporaneity. In Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. at 546-547, the defendant was arrested in his car, taken to the station for booking, and the car was towed to the same station where it was searched. Relying on New York v. Belton, supra, and its preservation of the contemporaneity requirement, the Supreme Judicial Court found the two-hour delay to be fatal to the Commonwealth’s claim that the search was incident to arrest. Id. at 554.

“Well trained” drug dog element for a valid dog sniff was supported by the affidavit for the search warrant which discussed the dog’s credentials. United States v. Wu, 217 Fed. Appx. 240 (4th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Traffic stop was factually justified although there was an ulterior motive of checking for stolen car stereos where there had been a rash of them in that area. In plain view in the backseat were car stereos with the wires hanging loose. The plain view was valid. People v. Flores, 308 Ill. Dec. 686, 862 N.E.2d 619 (2d Dist. 2007).*

Failure to signal a turn was not a traffic violation on which a stop could be based when the defendant came up to an intersection where the through street was blocked, and she then had to turn left or right. There was no warning of the blocked intersection. State v. Greever, 150 P.3d 918 (Kan. App. February 2, 2007),* revd State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 183 P.3d 788 (2008), posted here.

Officer had reasonable suspicion defendant was trespassing when he was stopped. The person watching a rural house found a vehicle parked under the back deck that did not belong there, and he called the sheriff. State v. Bastian, 37 Kan. App. 2d 156, 150 P.3d 912 (2007).*

Officer was in driver’s house by consent. When the defendant was being arrested, the officer followed him into the bedroom when the defendant was getting dressed, and that was valid for officer safety under Chrisman. Hoover v. Director, Dept. of Transportation, 2008 ND 87, 748 N.W.2d 730 (2008).*

Turn signal violation is strict liability, and the fact that the officer may have mixed motives for the stop is irrelevant. State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 183
P.3d 788 (2008), revg State v. Greever, 150 P.3d 918 (Kan. App. February 2, 2007) posted here.*

Fact that a forfeiture seizure was allegedly illegal was not established to show that a default judgment should be set aside. State v. $33,000.00 United States Currency, 2008 ND 96, 748 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 2008).*

Defendant was riding with a probationer who had been stopped. He was directed out of the car, and he was handcuffed “for officer safety.” While handcuffed he admitted having used marijuana which was an offense. The arrest was valid and supported by the evidence. State v. Gay, 2008 ND 84, 48 N.W.2d 408 (N.D. 2008).*

Police surrounded a house in Delaware looking for a suspect in a NYC shooting. After two officers left to get a search warrant, sounds of a possible shot from inside and a baby’s “blood curdling” scream justified an emergency entry. Blake v. State, 954 A.2d 315 (Del. 2008):

While the officers were on their way to apply for a search warrant, one of the NYPD detectives saw an individual in the apartment, later identified as Blake, raise the window screen in one of the windows. Blake pointed a handgun at him and challenged the officers to shoot him. The detective relayed by cell phone to the officers at the front door of the apartment that the person inside had a gun. The detectives who had left to get a search warrant were called back to the scene. The NYPD detective outside saw Blake crash through the window and attempt to escape. He ran about two blocks before police apprehended him.

Meanwhile, the officers at the door heard the muffled crying of a baby in the apartment during the incident. The NYPD detective at the front door testified that after he heard a crash like a window breaking, he heard a sound like a “boom” and then the baby’s crying turn into “blood curdling” screaming. The detective also heard a foot pursuit over the Wilmington officer’s radio. The detective testified that the officers at the front door were concerned for the infant’s safety, forced open the door, and entered the apartment. They found the infant on the floor. The officers also performed a safety sweep of the apartment and saw what appeared to be a small amount of crack cocaine and other drug paraphernalia on the floor near the infant.

Clandestine meth lab is per se exigent circumstances. State v. Sandor, 2007 Ohio 1482, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1384 (9th Dist. March 30, 2007):

This Court agrees with the Eleventh District that the danger to occupants, officers and community associated with the suspected production of methamphetamine constitutes per se exigent circumstances. Therefore, if officers have probable cause to believe a premises is being used to manufacture methamphetamine, the officers may conduct a warrantless search in the interest of safety. Recently, the legislature has recognized the public safety threat created by methamphetamine labs by enacting R.C. 2933.33(A) which provides:

“If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that particular premises are used for the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, for the purpose of conducting a search of the premises without a warrant, the risk of explosion or fire from the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine causing injury to the public constitutes exigent circumstances and reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need to protect the lives, or property, of the officer and other individuals in the vicinity of the illegal manufacture.”

This Court finds that R.C. 2933.33(A), while not applicable in the present case, is exceptionally persuasive authority. It is clear that the legislature has deemed the very real threat of explosion and fire due to the volatility of the materials used to produce methamphetamines a sufficient enough threat to justify warrantless searches. In short, R.C. 2933.33(A) validates the principle espoused in Pape, and this Court sees no reason why it should not be adopted in the present case. Accordingly, this Court concludes that if police officers in the present case had probable cause to believe a methamphetamine lab was operating on the premises, then exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search of the residence.

The police went to the jail to take a DNA sample from the defendant, and he argued that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, forgoing the Fourth Amendment claim. Taking DNA was not a critical stage. State v. Monroe, 2007 Ohio 1492, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1357 (4th Dist. March 22, 2007).

A police officer on his way to work in uniform was involved in a hit and run and followed the other car that hit him. The other driver ran red lights and finally stopped. The officer came out of the car with his gun drawn in the “low ready” position and directed the driver to turn off the car and get out. The officer then heard breaking glass and was hit with three shots. The car fled. Investigating officers went to the address associated with the car, and they saw it after entering the yard. Based on obsevations, including a broken car window, they got a search warrant, and the warrant was valid. The entry into the yard was valid. Porteous v. State, 259 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App. — Houston (1st Dist.) 2007).

Defendant was detained on reasonable suspicion, and, because of unusual movements in the car, he was handcuffed to be separated from the others and placed in the back seat of the patrol car while they sorted it out. A patdown revealed a tin foil ball. As he was getting into the patrol car, he bumped his head, his hat fell off, and under it were drugs and drug paraphernalia. The seizure was valid. Fentress v. State, 863 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. App. 2007).*