The inventory of defendant’s vehicle was dependent upon the initial impoundment. Under Krull, the officers relied in good faith on the ordinance for impoundment, so the inventory under specific policy thereafter was valid. United States v. Arias, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60724 (W.D. N.Y. June 17, 2010).*

Defendant admitted in his motion to suppress that he did not reside in the place searched, and he had no standing. It belonged to his father, and there was no evidence that he was an overnight guest. There were some clothes there that he could wear, but there was no evidence that they were his. United States v. Jack, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60690 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2010).*

A report from store loss prevention employees was reliable enough on the totality to stop defendant after two transactions that appeared to be fraudulent, despite the fact the credit card was accepted for the transaction. United States v. Abney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60616 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2010).*

CNN.com: Overwhelming odor of marijuana during a traffic stop of a tractor trailer led to discovery of 38,000 pounds of marijuana, 2,700 pounds of cocaine, and 67 pounds of methamphetamine in San Bernardino County, CA.

How does one hide the odor of 19 tons of marijuana?

There are about 10 posts, and they just disappeared yesterday.

The move started on June 22, and that became an arbitrary cut off. I could see it on my software, but it would not post. They have to go back to the last server and recover it. I can’t do it. I don’t want to have to redo them.

That’s why websites “migrate” to another computer–it isn’t instant.

Remember all those days when access was limited? This is supposed to stop that.

On CBSNews.com today from the AP: N.Y. May Mandate Taking DNA from All Criminals | Law Would Be First in Nation to So Broadly Collect and Use DNA to Solve Crimes and Exonerate People Wrongly Convicted:

Gov. David Paterson has proposed roughly doubling New York’s DNA database to include samples from even low-level offenders, making it the first in the nation to so broadly collect and use this evidence to solve crimes and exonerate people wrongly convicted.

New York’s law would require adding about 48,000 samples a year to a laboratory system that state officials say is capable of handling the extra work, with no current backlogs.

The traffic stop took 20 minutes including the computer check. After that, the officer engaged in conversation unrelated to the purpose of the stop, and this was not unreasonable. Defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, but revoked consent when the officer talked about removing the gas tank. Then a drug dog was called, and the extra time was de minimus. United States v. Torres, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41623 (D. Neb. March 10, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41727 (D. Neb. April 28, 2010).

Strip search in “public” for cocaine hidden in defendant’s butt crack was reasonable where defendant was not yet under arrest and he consented. The officers opened patrol car doors and other officers stood around to make cover so bystanders could not see. Jackson v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 359, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 368 (April 28, 2010).*

A federal law enforcement officer had the authority to make an arrest on property near (allegedly “adjacent”) to federal property under state law. [It sure would not violate the Fourth Amendment.] Alternatively, this argument was not preserved for appeal. People v. Redd, 48 Cal. 4th 691, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 229 P.3d 101 (2010).*

DNA testing of juvenile offenders was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner F. v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80 (Ky. 2010).

Officers responding to a trouble call at a hotel room heard an argument in another hotel room and somebody yelling trying to get out. They could investigate the situation under exigent circumstances. Daniel v. State, 303 Ga. App. 1 (2010).*

Officer’s mistake as to who likely committed the crime in the residence did not nullify the probable cause for the premises. State v. Rodriguez-Santiago, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 192 (February 24, 2010).*

Flight from a car stopped by the police or disabled is an abandonment. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. 2010).

A SWAT team entered a house in Wilmington DE with a warrant looking for suspected murderer “Dwayne A. Walker,” but entered the house of younger “Dewayne Walker Jr.” instead. The entry before 6 a.m. lasted about 20 minutes when the police realized they were sent to the wrong house and then excused themselves. The court finds triable issues of a Franks and a nighttime search violation. Walker v. City of Wilmington, 360 Fed. Appx. 305 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

It is in this context that a jury could find that Lawson made his representation to the magistrate: “a past proven reliable informant … stated [that] Walker is currently hiding at his mother’s house in New Castle and is making plans to flee Delaware.” App. at A115. We conclude that this representation regarding the whereabouts of Dwayne A. Walker was not only inaccurate but could be found by a jury to be knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of the truth.

In this case, the police, in addition to seeking evidence of a crime, were attempting to arrest a murder suspect. Murder is, of course, a very serious crime that makes it objectively reasonable for the police to deem the suspect potentially dangerous. Thus, it appears that the District Court’s conclusion that having a large, armed SWAT team and a K-9 Unit present was not unreasonable is correct. Additionally, the SWAT team gathered and confined Plaintiffs in the living room, and as soon as the police realized that they were in the wrong place, they explained the situation and left the premises. Under the circumstances at the time, this conduct was not objectively unreasonable and provides no independent basis for holding the search and seizure to be constitutionally unreasonable.

The nighttime search issue is significant. The warrant authorized a daytime entry, but there was a fact dispute whether the entry was before 6 a.m., and, thus, a nighttime search:

We were confronted with a similar situation in United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968). We ruled as follows:

The time of a police search of an occupied family home may be a significant factor in determining whether, in a Fourth Amendment sense, the search is “unreasonable.” At common law, prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, there was a strong aversion to nighttime searches. Even the odious “writs of assistance” which outraged colonial America permitted search of dwellings only in the daytime. The significance of this aversion of the common law to nighttime searches is underscored by the Supreme Court’s reminder that the search and seizure clause is properly “construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted.” Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S. Ct. 280, 284, 69 L. Ed. 543, T.D. 3686.

During the early years of the republic this common-law tradition was embodied in two statutes passed by our first Congress that authorized only daytime searches. Thereafter, the reluctance to authorize nighttime searches except under exceptional circumstances continued as an integral part of our jurisprudence.

* * *

Here it is claimed that the search, though made late at night, was reasonable because authorized by a warrant issued by a magistrate … However, the issue whether the search was in fact authorized by the warrant is determinable by a reading of the warrant’s simple and unambiguous language. To find that a warrant which is explictly limited to daytime searches legalizes search at any hour of the day or night would be to disregard the magistrate’s actual determination and thus to nullify the requirement of a prior impartial determination that a particular search will be reasonable. “When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman, or Government enforcement agent.” Johnson v. United States, 1948, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436.

Use of Taser by police during a domestic disturbance call was reasonable because of a risk of danger. Mattos v. Agarano, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 694 (9th Cir. January 12, 2010):

Finally, in weighing the gravity of the Fourth Amendment intrusion against the government’s interest, we conclude that the force used against Jayzel was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Even though we find that use of a Taser represents a serious intrusion on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, we recognize that in responding to a domestic violence call, the officers confronted a dangerous and volatile situation. When an intoxicated Troy began yelling profanities at the officers and demanding that they leave, the officers felt the need to arrest him to finish their investigation and diffuse the situation. Because Jayzel interfered with Troy’s arrest and, in doing so, made contact with Aikala, Aikala was justified in removing her from Troy’s side. Although an alternative method of force may have been advisable, the Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to use the minimum amount of force necessary to move Jayzel and arrest Troy. See, e.g., Bryan v. McPherson, __ F.3d ___, No. 08-55622, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28413, *31 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 2009). In this heated situation, Aikala’s deployment of a Taser did not violate Jayzel’s constitutional rights.

Plaintiff claimed that he was falsely arrested by being framed for a burglary by the police. His complaint was dismissed, and affirmed, for failing to properly show that he was the subject of a Fourth Amendment seizure. Rhodes v. Prince, 360 Fed. Appx. 555 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

While the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to revocation proceedings, a bad faith probation search can apply the exclusionary rule. Sherman v. State, 2009 Ark. 275, 308 S.W.3d 614 (2009):

Today, we take the opportunity to hold, as we suggested by way of dicta in Dabney, that the exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation hearings unless the defendant demonstrates that the officers conducting the search acted in bad faith. We refer to the exception as a bad-faith exception so that it is not confused with the Leon good-faith exception, which has no application in revocation proceedings. Further, we make no distinction between the different types of revocation proceedings and hold that the bad-faith exception applies to all revocation proceedings.

In Dabney, the court perceived no bad faith on the part of the police where “it [did] not appear that the officers were primarily seeking revocation.” 278 Ark. at 377, 646 S.W.2d at 4. Other examples of bad faith include cases involving harassment by the police, United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975), and official misconduct that shocks the conscience of the court. People v. Williams, 186 Colo. 72, 525 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1974).

We now consider whether the bad-faith exception applies in the instant case. The circuit court found that there was no evidence before the court that the officers conducting the search were aware that Sherman was subject to a term of suspended imposition of sentence. Sherman does not challenge that finding. Further, there is no evidence that the officers conducted the search for the purpose of harassment. Nor is there evidence of official misconduct that shocks the conscience of the court. We hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable at the revocation hearing. Sherman failed to demonstrate that the officers acted in bad faith. The circuit court did not err in denying Sherman’s motion to suppress.

RS supported defendant’s detention on the highway because the rental contract restricted driving to CA and NV and he was in KS, and his travel plans were “implausible.” United States v. Duenas, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10857 (10th Cir. May 21, 2009) (unpublished).*

Defendant was free to go after his warning ticket was written, but he agreed to stay and talk to the officer, and that was by consent. United States v. Gallardo-Gonzalez, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10899 (4th Cir. May 22, 2009) (unpublished).*

Parole officers initiated defendant’s detention, and it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to have LEOs participate. United States v. Scott, 566 F.3d 242 (1st Cir. 2009).*

A burglar was hiding in the house of others he had no connection to, and the police could not get them to respond to their calls. The police could consider the occupants at risk of harm. When the police came in, they found drugs and drug paraphernalia and arrested the owner. State v. Fausel, 295 Conn. 785, 993 A.2d 455 (2010):

It therefore is of no moment that the police officers in the present case did not encounter an emergency when they entered the residence. They were objectively reasonable in believing that an emergency situation existed within the residence. The Appellate Court thus improperly concluded that “[a] mere concern that someone might be inside and might be in need of immediate assistance does not warrant police intrusion into a private dwelling under the emergency doctrine.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Fausel, supra, 109 Conn. App. 830. That conclusion does not comport with the objectively reasonable standard as applied in this state.

The trial court’s findings that the person who made the down payment and mortgage payments on a house that was burned by arson had apparent authority to consent were supported by the evidence. Defendant never objected to her entering after the fire and looking around. Orr v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3244 (Tex. App. — Ft. Worth February 18, 2010).*

SCOTUS GVR’d this case after Gant. On remand, the court finds the search was justified under the automobile exception instead of search incident because there was probable cause. United States v. Grooms, 602 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2010).*

Gant and the exclusionary rule applied to a pre-Gant search. Belton was no longer “settled law,” and it was narrowing. Essentially, Gant was not a surprise. United States v. Debruhl, 993 A.2d 571 (D.C. App. 2010):

This case presents the question whether the federal “exclusionary rule” should be applied retroactively to a pending case after the Supreme Court has issued a decision expanding Fourth Amendment protection that would benefit the defendant if the rule applies.

At the time of appellee Debruhl’s arrest for a traffic violation, New York v. Belton, as commonly interpreted, allowed the police to search the passenger compartment of an automobile without a warrant, and virtually without restriction, when incident to a lawful arrest. Before Debruhl’s trial, however, in Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court narrowed Belton by precluding warrantless searches of an automobile after the occupants had been removed and secured with handcuffs, and thus no longer remained a threat to police safety or to preservation of evidence. The parties agree that Gant’s revised interpretation of the Fourth Amendment applies retroactively to all cases “not yet final.” Therefore, because Debruhl, like Gant, had been removed from his car and handcuffed before the arresting officers conducted their search, it is undisputed that the search of Debruhl’s car was unconstitutional. As a consequence, argues Debruhl, the evidence seized from his car – cocaine and related drug paraphernalia – must be suppressed under the traditional exclusionary rule.

To the contrary, says the government, the evidence is admissible under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule because of the officers’ reasonable, objective reliance on “settled law” – on the Belton line of cases – while conducting their search before Gant was decided. We cannot agree. As interpreted in this jurisdiction and in several federal circuits, Belton did not reflect “settled law” on which police officers could reasonably rely in conducting the warrantless search on the facts of this case. We therefore agree with the trial court’s decision to reject the good-faith exception and suppress the evidence seized from Debruhl’s car. Accordingly, we affirm.

In a civil case, a private company’s employee who used the company computer to exchange e-mails with her attorney had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mail. The e-mails were gathered as a part of defending a civil case when the company e-mail was reviewed. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 990 A.2d 650 (2010):

Applying the above considerations to the facts before us, we find that Stengart had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails she exchanged with her attorney on Loving Care’s laptop.

Stengart plainly took steps to protect the privacy of those e-mails and shield them from her employer. She used a personal, password-protected e-mail account instead of her company e-mail address and did not save the account’s password on her computer. In other words, she had a subjective expectation of privacy in messages to and from her lawyer discussing the subject of a future lawsuit.

In light of the language of the Policy and the attorney-client nature of the communications, her expectation of privacy was also objectively reasonable. As noted earlier, the Policy does not address the use of personal, web-based e-mail accounts accessed through company equipment. It does not address personal accounts at all. Nor does it warn employees that the contents of e-mails sent via personal accounts can be forensically retrieved and read by the company. Indeed, in acknowledging that occasional personal use of e-mail is permitted, the Policy created doubt about whether those e-mails are company or private property.

Moreover, the e-mails are not illegal or inappropriate material stored on Loving Care’s equipment, which might harm the company in some way. See Muick v. Glenacre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2002); Smyth, supra, 914 F. Supp. at 98, 101; XYC Corp., supra, 382 N.J. Super. at 136-40. They are conversations between a lawyer and client about confidential legal matters, which are historically cloaked in privacy. Our system strives to keep private the very type of conversations that took place here in order to foster probing and honest exchanges.

In addition, the e-mails bear a standard hallmark of attorney-client messages. They warn the reader directly that the e-mails are personal, confidential, and may be attorney-client communications. While a pro forma warning at the end of an e-mail might not, on its own, protect a communication, see Scott, supra, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 444, other facts present here raise additional privacy concerns.

Under all of the circumstances, we find that Stengart could reasonably expect that e-mails she exchanged with her attorney on her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account, accessed on a company laptop, would remain private.

How this will play in criminal cases remains to be seen.

A law-enforcement officer who personally observes a traffic violation while outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction has probable cause to make a traffic stop; the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment under Virginia v. Moore. State v. Jones, 2009 Ohio 316, 121 Ohio St. 3d 103, 902 N.E.2d 464 (2009).

Officer’s false claim that he stopped people leaving defendant’s house with drugs was not true, but he got defendant to consent claiming he’d get a warrant if he did not consent. The consent obtain by this deception was not invalid. State v. Kuegel, 195 N.C. App. 310, 672 S.E.2d 97 (2009).*

Knock-and-talk led to consent. State v. Boyd, 2009 Ohio 421, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 346 (2d Dist. January 30, 2009).*

Defendant’s driving gave reasonable suspicion for his stop for DUI. State v. Semenchuck, 2009 Ohio 465, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 389 (8th Dist. February 5, 2009).*

A 17 day delay between obtaining the search warrant and execution of the search warrant did not make the warrant stale because of evidence of ongoing sales from the premises. The warrant could have become stale, but it did not because probable cause was ongoing. “To protect the CI, the police delayed serving the search warrant.” Ingle v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 409 (May 12, 2010):

We hold, therefore, that the totality of the circumstances establishes that the warrant here was not stale when it was executed. It was executed seventeen days after it was issued, and eighteen days after a controlled buy occurred at the premises. Further, even though it was not included in the affidavit, the CI told the affiant that the residence “was one of his regular stops” and that he had bought drugs there many times[.]” Therefore, it was not error for the circuit court to determine that the warrant was timely executed two-and-one-half weeks after its issuance, given evidence of the controlled buy and of other drug purchases occurring over a period of time.

Recorded telephone calls with the CI in this case were properly admitted into evidence, and they were not obtained by a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 925 N.E.2d 845 (2010).*

On CNET is this really interesting article: ACLU: FBI used ‘dragnet’-style warrantless cell tracking by Declan McCullagh with links to pleadings.

To nab a pair of men accused of robbing banks in Connecticut, court documents show the FBI turned to a novel investigative technique last year: warrantless monitoring of the locations of about 180 different cell phones, court documents show.

The FBI obtained a secret order–it has not been made public–commanding nine different telephone companies to provide federal police “with all cell site tracking data and cell site locator information for all incoming and outgoing calls to and from the target numbers.”

But because the U.S. Justice Department did not obtain a warrant by proving to a judge that there was probable cause to suspect criminal activity, there’s now a risk that the evidence from the location surveillance may be tossed out of court as illegally obtained. (Here’s a list (PDF) of the phone numbers tracked.)

An attorney for Luis Soto, one of two brothers accused of stealing about $90,000 from Webster Bank and New Alliance Bank, asked a Connecticut judge on May 18 to suppress the location information, saying “the government obtained information that could be used to track the movements and locate the whereabouts at specific times of up to 180 people.” That violates their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, Soto said.

On Friday, the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation submitted a friend-of-the-court brief (PDF) agreeing with the defense. It says: “Because cell site location information implicates an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to collecting this information.”

Defendant had no standing in production of pharmacy records. Burger did not apply unless there was an objection to production, and there was none here. Pitcock v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 130 (Ky. App. 2009), ordered published October 21, 2009.*

Officer had qualified immunity for arresting plaintiff for violating a restraining order. Shroff v. Spellman, 599 F.3d 1119, 604 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant was arrested in Rhode Island in a van after a warrant for her showed up from federal court in Minnesota for marriage fraud. She was asked whether she wanted to take any of her bags with her to the police station, and she identified two. After they got to the police station, the bags were inventoried and checked for weapons without reasonable suspicion. The searches were valid as an inventory. United States v. Huang, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27199 (D. Minn. February 23, 2010).*

District Court’s denial of defendant’s § 2255 was reversed. Defense counsel’s choice to waive the motion to suppress because defendant was a borrower of the car he was driving was unreasonable because defendant showed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. Johnson v. United States, 604 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2010):

It is well-established that a driver of a borrowed vehicle may establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle even though that driver is not the owner of the vehicle. See United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418-19 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548-49 (11th Cir. 1987). In determining whether such a non-owner may claim a privacy interest in a car that he is driving, courts consider two factors: whether the driver manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched; and whether that expectation of privacy is one that society would find objectively reasonable. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007). Courts have repeatedly recognized the right of a driver to assert a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of a vehicle where the driver is operating that vehicle with the permission of the owner. Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1418-19; Soto, 988 F.2d at 1553; Miller, 821 F.2d at 548-49; see also Thomas, 447 F.3d at 1197-98 (holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver). In lawfully possessing and controlling the car, the driver has the right to exclude others which corresponds with an expectation of privacy. Similar to an owner driving the car, the authorized driver may have an expectation of privacy in that circumstance. The inquiry is a fact specific one, however, because as we recognized in Amaral-Estrada, some facts may eviscerate any implication of a subjective expectation of privacy. In that case, Amaral-Estrada was operating the car for the purpose of transporting contraband such as U.S. currency, and his expectation was that others would enter the car, taking and leaving items therein. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d at 826-27. In those circumstances, there was no subjective expectation of privacy and therefore he could not challenge the search of the vehicle. Id.

As the driver of the vehicle borrowed from his relative, Johnson could have sought to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The facts relating to this issue are of course scarce in the record, because it was never explored at trial. Nevertheless, those facts that are present do nothing to cast doubt on the existence of that reasonable expectation of privacy and in fact support a finding that Johnson exercised possession and control of the vehicle in a manner establishing an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. The evidence indicates that Johnson borrowed the vehicle from a relative and that he was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle during the relevant time period. There is no indication that he opened the vehicle to general access by other individuals such as would defeat that expectation of privacy.

The 2008 Sixth Circuit opinion was GVR’d in light of Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v. Redding. On remand, the court finds Sixth Circuit law was settled at the time of the student strip search, and there was no qualified immunity. Knisley v. Pike County Joint Vocational School, 604 F.3d 977, 2010 FED App. 0137P (6th Cir. 2010):

However, this Circuit’s law on student strip searches was clearly established as early as 2005, when we published our opinion in Beard. We read Redding to affirm our constitutional holding in Beard. Thus, because Beard remains good constitutional law and because that law was clearly established at the time of the strip search in this case, Redding does not require a result contrary to that reached in Knisley I. Cf. Foster v. Raspberry, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1352 (M.D. Ga. 2009). Our Circuit’s clearly established case law on this issue put the school and its employees on notice that this search was unconstitutional, so defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity protection.

So, a SCOTUS case in point is not required–what is the case law in the circuit on the issue?

Law of the case applied to defendant’s search claim on retrial of his murder case. The facts did not change much at all to justify reopening. State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527 (Mo. 2010), corrected by State v. Deck, 2010 Mo. LEXIS 36 (Mo., Mar. 2, 2010), rehearing overruled by State v. Deck, 2010 Mo. LEXIS 46 (Mo., Mar. 2, 2010).*

The probation search of defendant’s premises was reasonable. State v. Angel, 31 So. 3d 547 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010).*

Search of defendant’s car was valid with probable cause and not as a search incident under Gant. The officer smelled marijuana coming out of the open window and a dog alerted during the stop. State v. Freeman, 33 So. 3d 222 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010).*

Defendant’s stop was based on a combination of traffic offense and information about drug trafficking, and it was still valid. Defendant’s pat down was justified, and plain feel supported the seizure. State v. Davis, 31 So. 3d 513 (5th Cir. 2010).*

NY Constitution requires reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff of a car on the street. There at least is some reasonable expectation of privacy in a car. Not as much as a house, but more than luggage in the hands of a third person. People v. Devone, 2010 NY Slip Op 04828 (N.Y. June 8, 2010):

Based on our State jurisprudence, therefore, whether a canine sniff constitutes a search is necessarily dependent upon whether it constitutes an intrusion into a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. One clearly has a greater expectation of privacy in one’s home than in an automobile (see New York v Class, 475 US 106, 112-113 [1986]), but that does not render the latter interest undeserving of constitutional protection (see Arizona v Gant, __ US __, 129 SCt 1710, 1720 [2009] [addressing warrantless searches of automobiles]). There is a legitimate, albeit reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile. But that expectation is greater than the significantly reduced expectation of privacy one has in luggage turned over to a common carrier. We therefore hold that a canine sniff of the exterior of an automobile constitutes a search under article I, § 12.