AR: While exclusionary rule does not generally apply to revo proceedings, it can apply to bad faith searches to revoke

While the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to revocation proceedings, a bad faith probation search can apply the exclusionary rule. Sherman v. State, 2009 Ark. 275, 308 S.W.3d 614 (2009):

Today, we take the opportunity to hold, as we suggested by way of dicta in Dabney, that the exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation hearings unless the defendant demonstrates that the officers conducting the search acted in bad faith. We refer to the exception as a bad-faith exception so that it is not confused with the Leon good-faith exception, which has no application in revocation proceedings. Further, we make no distinction between the different types of revocation proceedings and hold that the bad-faith exception applies to all revocation proceedings.

In Dabney, the court perceived no bad faith on the part of the police where “it [did] not appear that the officers were primarily seeking revocation.” 278 Ark. at 377, 646 S.W.2d at 4. Other examples of bad faith include cases involving harassment by the police, United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975), and official misconduct that shocks the conscience of the court. People v. Williams, 186 Colo. 72, 525 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1974).

We now consider whether the bad-faith exception applies in the instant case. The circuit court found that there was no evidence before the court that the officers conducting the search were aware that Sherman was subject to a term of suspended imposition of sentence. Sherman does not challenge that finding. Further, there is no evidence that the officers conducted the search for the purpose of harassment. Nor is there evidence of official misconduct that shocks the conscience of the court. We hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable at the revocation hearing. Sherman failed to demonstrate that the officers acted in bad faith. The circuit court did not err in denying Sherman’s motion to suppress.

RS supported defendant’s detention on the highway because the rental contract restricted driving to CA and NV and he was in KS, and his travel plans were “implausible.” United States v. Duenas, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10857 (10th Cir. May 21, 2009) (unpublished).*

Defendant was free to go after his warning ticket was written, but he agreed to stay and talk to the officer, and that was by consent. United States v. Gallardo-Gonzalez, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10899 (4th Cir. May 22, 2009) (unpublished).*

Parole officers initiated defendant’s detention, and it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to have LEOs participate. United States v. Scott, 566 F.3d 242 (1st Cir. 2009).*

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