DC: No GFE for pre-Gant search; Belton was on shaky ground

Gant and the exclusionary rule applied to a pre-Gant search. Belton was no longer “settled law,” and it was narrowing. Essentially, Gant was not a surprise. United States v. Debruhl, 993 A.2d 571 (D.C. App. 2010):

This case presents the question whether the federal “exclusionary rule” should be applied retroactively to a pending case after the Supreme Court has issued a decision expanding Fourth Amendment protection that would benefit the defendant if the rule applies.

At the time of appellee Debruhl’s arrest for a traffic violation, New York v. Belton, as commonly interpreted, allowed the police to search the passenger compartment of an automobile without a warrant, and virtually without restriction, when incident to a lawful arrest. Before Debruhl’s trial, however, in Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court narrowed Belton by precluding warrantless searches of an automobile after the occupants had been removed and secured with handcuffs, and thus no longer remained a threat to police safety or to preservation of evidence. The parties agree that Gant’s revised interpretation of the Fourth Amendment applies retroactively to all cases “not yet final.” Therefore, because Debruhl, like Gant, had been removed from his car and handcuffed before the arresting officers conducted their search, it is undisputed that the search of Debruhl’s car was unconstitutional. As a consequence, argues Debruhl, the evidence seized from his car – cocaine and related drug paraphernalia – must be suppressed under the traditional exclusionary rule.

To the contrary, says the government, the evidence is admissible under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule because of the officers’ reasonable, objective reliance on “settled law” – on the Belton line of cases – while conducting their search before Gant was decided. We cannot agree. As interpreted in this jurisdiction and in several federal circuits, Belton did not reflect “settled law” on which police officers could reasonably rely in conducting the warrantless search on the facts of this case. We therefore agree with the trial court’s decision to reject the good-faith exception and suppress the evidence seized from Debruhl’s car. Accordingly, we affirm.